

The Arts Undergraduate Research Journal
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Faculty of Arts Students' Association
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Statement of Purpose

The Faculty of Arts Students' Association is proud to be sharing the first volume of the Arts Undergraduate Research Journal in hopes that it will provide students in the faculty with the chance to share their work with their peers. Research-based learning is an important component of undergraduate education and the work being undertaken by undergraduate students deserves to be not only recognized but celebrated.

The Faculty of Arts Students' Association created this journal in conjunction with the Arts Undergraduate Research Symposium to highlight both supervised and unsupervised research being completed at the undergraduate level. The intent of this journal is to provide students with the opportunity to present their work and for all students in the faculty to engage with examples of research being completed that have been awarded exemplary grades. This provides a learning opportunity for students reading the journal to see examples of research formulation, allowing for a better understanding of how research is undertaken at the undergraduate level.

Being able to explore research work also provides students with experience that may influence further graduate research endeavours. Having a paper published in a journal can also be an important aspect of graduate school applications and we hope that this publication allows students to progress with their plans for further learning after the completion of their undergraduate degree. The journal is student-run and allows for further experience with editing work that will help students learn more about writing-related fields. Because departments have different citation, editing, and marking schemes, it is important to remember that while we may not all be totally familiar with a specific field of study, this journal presents the opportunity to see how research is formulated in different classes.

The Faculty of Arts Students' Association works towards creating a sense of community throughout the Arts and hopes that this journal will continue the community building process amongst students in the Arts. This journal presents all departments to engage with each other through research and for students to learn about the work being done in different academic fields. Research completed in the Faculty of Arts provides important insight into the world we live in and this journal gives just a glimpse of the amazing work being completed by our students.

Letter from the Editor

I am so excited to be able to present the first publication of the Arts Undergraduate Research Journal. This project is meant to celebrate the work being completed throughout all departments in the Faculty of Arts here at the University of Calgary and to provide undergraduate students the chance to engage with exemplary work being completed at the course level within the Faculty. Every year, we are able to showcase supervised work at our Arts Undergraduate Research Symposium and we hope that this journal gives students the opportunity to showcase research work that was not supervised but provides important insight into Arts related fields.

This year we received close to thirty submissions which demonstrated to the Faculty of Arts Students' Association that there was the need for more opportunities for undergraduate students to showcase their work. As a club, we have worked hard this year to advocate for more opportunities for research creation at the undergraduate level and are proud of the progress we have made in making these opportunities more accessible for students. The work being done by students in the Faculty of Arts creates new ways of seeing and understanding the world we live in, the ideas presented by our students have the potential to change the world. Research is for everyone and we hope that this journal continues to grow in order to showcase even more work being completed by Arts students.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Arts Undergraduate Research Symposium supervisor Dr. Gavin Cameron for his continued support of the Faculty of Arts Students' Association and for supporting this project. I would also like to thank the Arts Undergraduate Research Symposium Committee for their hard work this year in putting together events and for their support in publishing this journal. But most importantly, I would like to thank all the students who submitted their work for review. When we opened up submissions this year, we were not sure if there would be any response due to the changing nature of online learning but were so happy to see the interest shown by students in the Faculty of Arts. We know that different professors have different criteria for research papers and projects, so we hope that students continue to submit their work next year for the second volume of the journal.

The world will not be the same place that it was before COVID-19 changed the way we live and students in the Faculty of Arts have an imperative role to play in shaping the post-pandemic world. Your contributions are capable of shifting the ways in which our world views or approaches certain topics. Whether you are interested in music, art, psychology or politics, the questions you are trying to answer help to move us forward.

I hope that you enjoy reading all of the amazing work shown in the journal this year and that you will be back again next year to see the work being completed by this incredible Faculty.

Emma Stirling
she/her
Vice President Academic
Faculty of Arts Students' Association

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Alberta as the Texas of the North: An Analysis of Violence
Hayley Cleveland
SOCI 425

‘Alberta is the Texas of the North’ is a phrase suggesting that Alberta and Texas are synonymous within their differing national contexts: both Texas and Alberta have held conservative political values and both economies have been driven by agriculture and oil and gas (Pew Research Center, 2020; Watkins & Fong, 1980; Wiseman, 2011); however, to what extent does Alberta reflect Texas when it comes to violence? In the following essay, I will examine colonization to establish an origin of violence, homicide rates to understand total crime, and capital punishment to analyse public opinion on legitimate state-sanctioned violence.

The Doctrine of Discovery, a set of legal documents supporting European colonization, played an important role in much of the initial violence that took place in both Texas and Alberta. These documents enabled Europeans to believe in their racial, political, and religious superiority, and therefore justified the violence used against other Europeans and Indigenous peoples for the sake of expansion (Upstander Project, 2020). Beginning with Texas, during the colonizing process there were large amounts of violence between the Spanish and French and later between Mexicans and Americans (Chipman & Joseph, 2010; Torget, 2015). This violence also applied to Indigenous groups such as the Karankawa, who were eradicated due to European conflict, and the Comanche, where consistent hostility between the Spaniards and later Anglo-Americans led to their tribe’s dwindling numbers (Barr, 2009; Bullock Texas State History Museum, n.d.). The white supremacy thus established by the Doctrine of Discovery, alongside increasing economic opportunities, also contributed to the prevalence of slavery across the state; an already violent practice, Texas’s need for slavery to support the cotton industry divided communities, and as it became a deeply rooted political issue, more violence often became

commonplace (Torget, 2015). One example is the Nueces massacre in 1862: after refusing to fight for the Confederacy, several German immigrants were attempting an escape to Mexico when several Confederates ambushed them and killed approximately 19 people, later executing another wounded 11 (McGowen, 2000). The practice of lynching, killing someone illegally based on racial or political beliefs, also became common (Ross, 2020). The largest lynching within the state was at Gainesville, when forty Unionists were hanged by the Confederates, as it was thought they were treasonous and supporting abolitionist movements. Although this was never proved to be true, it demonstrates the extent several Texans were willing to go to protect their values and economic interests (McCaslin, 2020). Overall, out of the 460 lynching-victims between 1885 and 1942, 72% were black and therefore represents the embedded racism within the practice (Ross, 2020).

Since Alberta's early settlement in the 1700s, violence has been ongoing between Indigenous people and Canadian settlers. The Cypress Hills massacre is an example of this unrest, where several Americans and French Canadians attacked a group of Assiniboine who were known to be peaceful: defenceless at the time, 16 were murdered along with several women being captured and raped (The Alberta Teachers' Association, 2018; Allen, 1983). While the attack was claimed to be over a dispute regarding missing horses, the brutal violence represents the many common beliefs that killing Indigenous people was justified and meant to demonstrate the settlers' belief in their superiority. Consistent discrimination against Indigenous people also fuelled violence against white settlers, as was demonstrated in the Frog Lake massacre of 1885. During the political tension of the 1885 North-West Rebellion, several Plains Cree took to violence to protest their mistreatment and killed nine settlers in the modern-day Alberta community of Frog Lake, including an Indian agent known to be harsh and arrogant (Canadian

Plains Research Center, 2006). This led to the government's execution of the perpetrators – the largest mass execution in Canadian history – with the intention of demonstrating the power the Canadian government held over Indigenous people (McCoy, 2003). Violence towards Indigenous people is still perpetrated today: while they only made up 5% of the Canadian population in 2018, 22% of all homicide victims were Indigenous, with Alberta having the third highest provincial Indigenous homicide rate at 10.3 per 100,000 people; this rate indicates that indigenous people are five more times likely to be murdered than non-Indigenous people (Statistics Canada, 2019).

In a further analysis of homicide statistics, it appears that Alberta is less violent in comparison to Texas: between 1962 and 1977, Alberta had an average homicide rate of 3.9 per 100,000 while Texas' rate was 10.8 (Disaster Center, n.d.; The University of Alberta, 1980). Between 1990 and 2004, Alberta again was lower with an average rate of 2.4 per 100,000 compared to Texas' 8.8 (Department of Justice Canada, 2006; Disaster Center, n.d.). The most recent data from 2018 indicates that both Alberta and Texas are continuing to have homicide decreases over time with rates of 1.88 and 5.4, respectively; however, while Texas was almost equal to the American national rate of 5.3, and therefore ranking 25th nationwide, Alberta exceeded Canada's national rate of 1.76, ranking the third most violent in the country (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020; Statista, 2020a; Statistics Canada, 2019). Using the logic that homicide rates are reflective of total crime due to their reported accuracy (Statista, 2020a), a claim can be made Texas is more violent overall; however, Alberta appears worse in comparison to its provincial counterparts than Texas does to its fellow states.

Another aspect to consider is capital punishment: since 1976, Texas has had the most executions nationwide at 569; this is over 450 executions higher than Virginia in second place

(Statista, 2020b). Public opinion towards capital punishment is strong, as a 2018 survey showed 65% of those interviewed supported the practice, although this was a 10% decrease from 2013 (Death Penalty Information Center, 2020; The University of Texas at Austin, n.d.). While the death penalty in Canada hasn't been in legislation since 1976, a recent study about reinstating capital punishment revealed that Albertan's demonstrated the highest support for the practice compared to other provinces, with 55% of those surveyed supporting it in some way (Gendreau & Renke, 2020; Research Co., 2020). While this survey does not reflect the entirety of Alberta's views, it does demonstrate that there is an existing population that views state-sanctioned violence as an appropriate response to violent crime.

Based on this analysis, I do not believe that Alberta is the Texas of the North when it comes to violent behaviour. Alberta is objectively not as violent as Texas, as was demonstrated through the widely differing homicide statistics and Texas' longer colonial history enabled more violence to take place, as it has experienced colonization dating as far back as the 1500s compared to the 1700s within Alberta (The Alberta Teachers' Association, 2018; Chipman & Joseph, 2010). Texas' violence is also not as significant nationwide: as previously mentioned Texas homicide rates only rank average within the country, whereas Alberta has significantly higher rates within a Canadian context. While Texas and Alberta may compare economically and politically, the discrepancy in levels of violence demonstrates how they differ socially.

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Seeds of Terror: The Evolution of Stalinist Inner-Party Purges
Abby Goldstein
HTST 333

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union had a long tradition of purging dissident and perceived dissident factions. This reached its peak in the years 1937 and 1938, a period known as the Great Terror which was marked by the arrest, interrogation, and exile or execution of numerous high-ranking party members, in addition to a wide swathe of the general population. What set the Great Terror apart from the previous purges was its sheer magnitude: while the Holodomor and dekulakization campaign both had high death tolls among the general populace, the highest echelons of the Soviet leadership, and to, a certain extent, minor party officials, had escaped such mass persecution. Party purges instead targeted specific conspiracies, both real and imagined. By contrast, the Great Terror was characterized by frequent and often unfounded denunciations within the top leadership, with party members turning over former friends and allies to be tortured and likely killed. This paper will argue that the Great Terror arose as an entity separate from the purges of the 1920s and early 1930s due to the confluence of three factors: first, the strict requirement of a unity of views within the party as established under Vladimir Lenin and the tradition of inner-party purges that resulted; second, General Secretary and party head Joseph Stalin's increasing paranoia, which in the mid-to-late-1930s led to the concentration of power in the hands of Nikolai Yezhov and Lavrentiy Beria, both of whom were willing to ruthlessly root out real and perceived enemies; and third, an atmosphere of terror that took hold of the party as more and more members were targeted, prompting a flurry of denunciations made as a form of self-defence.

The Communist Party nominally operated on a system of democratic centralism, according to which all party positions were elected, more powerful bodies answered to the less powerful, and party decisions were to be universally supported by the membership. In practice,

the concentration of power lay with the Politburo, established in 1919 and composed of members elected by the Central Committee, which controlled lower bodies within the government as well as institutions outside of the party, such as the Cheka and the Red Army.¹ Decision-making under Stalin even within the Politburo was never truly centralized, as even in the early days of his leadership he often made key decisions prior to Politburo meetings in private with his then-allies Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev, though in both this and later alliances Stalin was very much the primary partner.² This structure was important both because the third tenet of democratic centralism—that all decisions must be universally supported within the party—lay the groundwork for the excising of real and perceived dissidents, and because Stalin's disregard for democratic processes within the party, as well as the other members' inability or unwillingness to enforce this process demonstrated both his functional monopoly on power and his tendency to equate himself with the party.

In practice, the requirement for a unity of views within the party soon led to an equation of debate with factionalism, an ominous sign of the purges to come. The Tenth Party Congress, held in 1921, saw the banning of factions³ and the restriction of debate to special publications, a move Lenin claimed would strengthen the party. Late in the next year, he considered removing Stalin from his position as General Secretary due to his ongoing conflict with Leon Trotsky, effectively outlawing debate at all levels of the party.⁴ Early in his career, Stalin had taken a conciliatory stance on the issue of inner-party divisions, but 1921 marked an important—albeit somewhat ironic, considering it had nearly led to his removal—shift towards the Leninist idea of

¹ E. A. Rees, "Introduction," in *The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship*, ed. E. A. Rees (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 2, 19-23

² E. A. Rees, "Stalin as Leader, 1924-1937: From Oligarch to Dictator," In *The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship*, ed. E. A. Rees (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 24, 42

³ Rees, "Introduction," p. 2

⁴ Erik Van Ree, *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin: A Study in Twentieth Century Revolutionary Patriotism* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 129-130

party unity: shortly after the Tenth Party Congress, he wrote that he regretted his earlier policies and that parties were strengthened through internal purges. In the following years, as Stalin gained power and influence independently of Lenin, he required unity of views on all fundamental questions, permitting only minor criticism of the party, and only then if it was intended to strengthen the party as a whole.⁵ Similarly, he defined a faction as any group assembled to talk about the party's shortcomings not with the goal of improving the party but rather to change the party line.⁶ This is significant because it implies that the party line was *de facto* the best possible policy for the party— a group could assemble either to improve the party *or* to change the party line; improving the party by changing the party line must therefore be impossible. As such, once a decision had been made, party members were expected to defend it completely, and anyone who failed to do so— or even who was suspected of harbouring doubts— was to be “mercilessly destroyed.”⁷ In addition, Stalin placed emphasis on the consequences of an action or event over the intention behind it: if an accident or a casual meeting weakened the party in its struggle against internal and external enemies, it should be investigated and the people involved (or believed to be involved) prosecuted as if it had been a deliberate effort.⁸ This view was not isolated to Stalin but rather institutionalized within the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the Soviet Union's principal law-enforcement agency: Genrikh Yagoda, head of the NKVD from 1934 until 1936, believed that the goal of the police was not to react to existing threats but rather to prevent them from arising in the first

⁵ Van Ree, *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin*, pp. 129-131

⁶ Van Ree, *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin*, p. 133

⁷ Van Ree, *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin*, pp. 133-134

⁸ Hiroaki Kuromiya, “Stalin in the Light of the Political Bureau Transcripts,” in *The Lost Politburo Transcripts: From Collective Rule to Stalin's Dictatorship*, ed. Paul R. Gregory and Norman Naimark (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 46, 48

place.⁹ As a result, it was well-accepted within the party that an outward appearance of innocence did not guarantee their colleagues had not been engaged in harmful action or thought.

The principle of party unity may have been developed under Lenin, but its expression within the party soon became inseparable from Stalin's leadership, in large part because he exercised unprecedented control over the Politburo.¹⁰ As a result, his personal idiosyncrasies had a large influence on the functioning of the Communist Party as well as on the Soviet Union as a whole. Stalin harboured a deep and persistent fear of assassination— not completely unfounded given the power struggle in the years following Lenin's death— but which also caused him to suspect seemingly uncritical party members of secretly plotting against him¹¹ and that his enemies were both numerous, infecting every level of the party, and working together, even when the contradictory nature of their supposed views would have rendered this not only unlikely but actively counterproductive.¹² This was only compounded by his sensitivity to even the smallest hints of disloyalty (whether real or imagined),¹³ a strong belief in his own analytical abilities and capacity to discern what others were thinking,¹⁴ and a strong association of himself with the party— he said of two party members who had criticized him personally, “they are fighting not against Stalin but against the party and its line,”¹⁵ implying that he did not consider himself as separate from the party and as such, any criticism of him personally was a criticism of the party and thus effectively outlawed.

⁹ David R. Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 131

¹⁰ Rees, “Introduction,” p. 3

¹¹ Charters Wynn, “The ‘Right Opposition’ and the ‘Smirnov-Eismont-Tolmachev Affair,’” in *The Lost Politburo Transcript: From Collective Rule to Stalin's Dictatorship*, ed. Paul R. Gregory and Norman Naimark (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 103, 105

¹² Kuromiya, “Stalin in the Light of the Political Bureau Transcripts,” p. 58

¹³ Paul R. Gregory, *Terror by Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin (an Archival Study)* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 140

¹⁴ Van Ree, *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin*, p. 6

¹⁵ Kuromiya, “Stalin in the Light of the Political Bureau Transcripts,” p. 45

It was not long into Stalin's reign that the ideology of party unity began to be expressed in the form of inner-party purges, though they were markedly different from those of the Great Terror in scope and proceedings. The purges of the mid-1920s and early 1930s were significant for two reasons: first, they serve as a baseline against which the Great Terror can be compared, and second, because the genuine seeds of dissent upon which they were based lent credence to Stalin's belief that the party harboured innumerable enemies. One of the earliest purges was of Kamenev and Zinoviev's short-lived New Opposition— created shortly before and defeated at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1925— which called for the restoration of Leninist democratic centralism. Though the removal of anyone associated with the conspiracy from all levels of the party and state would be repeated in later purges, it was accomplished with a degree of political finesse long abandoned by the start of the Great Terror. This was true particularly in Stalin's dealings with Zinoviev, whom he allowed to remain in his position at the Comintern so that his removal the following year would appear to be at the request of the other party's member to that organization.¹⁶ The earliest purges were firmly based in reality, targeted towards those who had actually been involved in the opposition group in question, and executed with political care and consideration. The purges of the early 1930s followed the same general pattern. The year 1932 saw the removal of a handful of Old Bolsheviks, including Nikolai Eismont and Vladimir Tolmachev— among others— following a drunken meeting in which they were overheard discussing the necessity of Stalin's removal in order to avoid peasant uprisings in the wake of the devastating dekulakization and collectivisation campaigns. Though the alleged anti-Stalinist group did not exist as concretely as the New Opposition, the event had genuinely taken place and

¹⁶ Alexander Vatin, "'Class Brothers Unite!': The British General Strike and the Formation of the 'United Opposition.'" In *The Lost Politburo Transcripts: From Collective Rule to Stalin's Dictatorship*, ed. Paul R. Gregory and Norman Naimark (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 62

the members had plotted to remove Stalin as leader.¹⁷ Groups such as these were significant not just in that they confirmed Stalin's belief that the party was plagued by internal opposition, but also in that they validated these beliefs in the eyes of the party. In his later writings on the Great Terror, Nikita Khrushchev stated of the leadership during that period, "We blamed ourselves for being blind to the presence of enemies all around us. We thought we lacked Stalin's deep understanding of the political struggle and were therefore unable to discern enemies in our midst the way Stalin could."¹⁸

The fundamental difference between the purges of the Great Terror— which began with Nikolai Yezhov's Decree of the NKVD No. 00447 in July of 1937¹⁹— and the purges of the late 1920s-early 1930s lay in the former's sheer untargeted magnitude. Though Decree No. 00447 named fifty "contingents" to be targeted for arrest,²⁰ in practice the victims rarely belonged to any uniting group and were instead placed seemingly at random into undesirable categories, accused of being German spies, Trotskyites, or belonging to invented political parties. Arrests were fueled by the belief that the occasional torture and execution of someone who might be innocent was acceptable if it meant the guilty were caught as well— this justified not only the immense volume of arrests, interrogations, and executions, but also the targeting of victims' families.²¹ The Great Terror gained momentum in part because of the atmosphere of terror this fostered within all levels of the party: members quickly distanced themselves from old friends and allies who had fallen out of favour with Stalin²² and denounced their colleagues out of fear that not to do so would make them appear disloyal. After 1936, the Communist Party leadership

¹⁷ Wynn, "The 'Right Opposition' and the 'Smirnov-Eismont-Tolmachev Affair,'" pp. 100-101

¹⁸ E. A. Rees, "Stalin as Leader, 1937-1953: From Dictator to Despot," in *The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship*, ed. E. A. Rees (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 210

¹⁹ Gregory, *Terror by Quota*, p. 115

²⁰ Gregory, *Terror by Quota*, p. 115

²¹ Norman M. Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 55-56, 59

²² Simon Sebag Montfiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003), p. 209

no longer operated in service of a shared vision but rather on the desperate hope of securing their own survival and the survival of their families.²³ The inner-party purges of the Great Terror were in a sense an atrocity perpetrated by its victims, both in that no one but Stalin himself was safe from persecution— five of the 15 members of the Politburo and 98 of the 139 members of Central Committee were arrested within the first year-and-a-half of the purges²⁴—, meaning those who performed the arrests and executions could themselves be arrested and executed, and in that individuals were often targeted as a result of denunciations made by their own colleagues rather than as a result of investigations done by the NKVD.

The Great Terror rested on three pillars: the ideological foundation of the Communist Party which saw any form of dissension as weakening the party; its leader's paranoid fear of plotters and spies within the highest ranks of the party and the NKVD which caused the first pillar to be put into practice; and the perpetuation of the Terror by its victims, as anyone within the party apparatus could fall victim to the purges and thus targeted their colleagues and friends in hopes of sparing themselves and their families. The first pillar had been established under Lenin and refined in the early days of Stalin's leadership; by the start of the Great Terror, it had become so entrenched in the party as to be past change or discussion. The third pillar did not arise until the Great Terror had already begun— unlike the first two, it did not contribute to the start of the Terror but rather to its momentum and character. The difference between the purges of the 1920s and early 1930s and those the Great Terror must then have rested with the second pillar: Stalin's leadership. Stalin suffered the deaths of two people close him during the first half of the 1930s: the suicide of his second wife, Nadezhda, in 1932, and the assassination of his friend Sergei Kirov in December of 1934. While Stalin's daughter, Svetlana, claimed both events

²³ Rees, "Stalin as Leader, 1937-1953," pp. 207, 209

²⁴ Sebag Montfiore, *Stalin: Court of the Red Tsar*, p. 237

rendered him increasingly untrusting,²⁵ the circumstances surrounding Kirov's death do not leave Stalin entirely clear of suspicion. In particular, Stalin seemed eager to prevent a meeting between Kirov— with whom he had recently argued— and Sergo Ordzhonikidze, who had fallen ill with mysterious symptoms while traveling with Beria, a man who would become notorious for his skill with poison.²⁶ In addition, the position of Stalin's favourite— occupied by Kirov at the time— was always temporary and often fatal, a lesson learned by Kamenev and Zinoviev, who were pressured into confessing to Kirov's murder and executed in 1936,²⁷ as well as by successive NKVD heads Yagoda and Yezhov, both of whom were eventually sentenced as Germany spies.²⁸ As such, it is difficult to say whether Kirov's death came as a genuine shock and the assassination of a close friend drove Stalin to harsher, more extreme measures, or whether the combination of Stalin's natural paranoia, aging, and stress caused him to engineer or at least take advantage of the event. Either way, it resulted in the promotion of the two main agents behind the Great Terror: NKVD head Nikolai Yezhov, who was small, sickly, and an alcoholic, but also a tireless worker²⁹ who believed that in the persecution of enemies, it was "better too far than not far enough,"³⁰ and Lavrentiy Beria, who was put in joint charge of the NKVD as Stalin began to lose faith in Yezhov, and who, in addition to his skill with poison, was known for personally torturing his victims.³¹

The Great Terror was thus not the product of any great event or change, but rather of a strict requirement of a unity of views within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which, though it was not created with the goal of being used in vast, untargeted purges, meant that the

²⁵ Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*, p. 25

²⁶ Sebag Montfiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, pp. 145-146

²⁷ Sebag Montfiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, pp. 190, 201

²⁸ Gregory, *Terror by Quota*, p. 133

²⁹ Sebag Montfiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, pp. 241, 280

³⁰ Sebag Montfiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, p. 234

³¹ Sebag Montfiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, p. 281

party was built on a foundation that would make such an event not only justifiable but, in the eyes of its members, actually beneficial. That is not to say the Great Terror was inevitable— few things are. Joseph Stalin’s firm control over all levels of the party, his conviction that he was surrounded by enemies, and the influence of his personal favour in determining who held power within the party meant both the endless pursuit of those who held differing views and, as he grew increasingly distrusting into the 1930s, the promotion of people such as Yezhov and Beria who were willing to carry out his purges without restraint. The Great Terror might have begun with Stalin and Yezhov— Beria would gain prominence only later— but the flurry of denunciations that would come to characterize the period was in large part the doing of the party members themselves, fearful that not to participate would mark them as traitors.

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Rewiring Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Cognition: *Mansfield Park* and “The Laplander”
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ENGL 441

A generation before Charles Darwin published *On the Origin of Species*, his grandfather Erasmus Darwin speculated on human improvement: “it would not be too bold to imagine, that all warm-blooded animals were arisen from one living filament...possessing the faculty of continuing to improve by its own inherent artistry” (Connolly 31). Does mankind improve over time? Do some men, alternatively, *not improve* over time? Whereas *Mansfield Park* by Jane Austen considers improvement through the lens of architectural innovations, “The Laplander” by Charlotte Smith does so through the perspective of an unimproved cave-dwelling native. Both texts appear to initially support Darwin’s claim that the faculty of improvement does (or does not) exist, but as this paper argues, Austen and Smith subvert improvement discourse altogether by rewiring its cognitive schema.

As defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, schemas are “an automatic, unconscious coding or organization of incoming physiological or psychological stimuli” (“schema.1. b”). When eighteenth and nineteenth century audiences read *Mansfield Park* and “The Laplander”, they would have interpreted Thornton Lacey’s proposed changes, and the cave-dwelling native, respectfully, within the *schema of improvement*. In other words, readers would have unconsciously recognized references to eighteenth and nineteenth century improvement discourse. As this paper suggests, however, Austen and Smith then *interrupt* the unconscious recognition of improvement discourse, and in a Romantic turn, they defend those ostensibly unimproved and uncivilized. To elaborate further, I trace the Speculation game in *Mansfield Park* and “The Laplander” poem through the apparent support of improvement to its subsequent rejection.

Austen and Smith Enter the Schema

While playing Speculation, Henry Crawford strategizes to win both the game and Edmund's agreement for renovations to Thornton Lacey. Austen uses italics to emphasize Crawford's confidence when he asserts "Lady Bertram does *not* bid a dozen" as she attempts to do so in the game, and "*That* will be done" in reference to the farmyard's removal (Austen 196). Rather than making recommendations, Crawford frames his requests as factual statements.

In the Speculation scene, the game functions as an allegory for improvement discourse. Speculation involves "a great deal on chance in the hand one is dealt, but there is an element of strategy involved" (Vorachek 183). Both wealthy and charming, Crawford was dealt a lucky hand; however, he does not believe that Edmund's comparatively small inheritance should prevent him from improving Thornton Lacey. Crawford emulates Darwin's message that strategy in life, like in the game, involves one's "own inherent artistry". With the correct "artistry", Crawford also believes that Lady Bertram can win Speculation. Crawford's confidence reflects the belief that success is not just possible; it is *inevitable* with the correct strategy in mind.

It is also noteworthy that Crawford personifies Thornton Lacey when stating that the property "is capable of so much more", and that renovations will "give it a higher character" (Austen 196). Readers familiar with both the industrial revolution and self-improvement discourse would unconsciously acknowledge Crawford's statements within the schema of improvement. Crawford's domineering confidence replaces suggestions for Thornton Lacey with truth, as if its raising is a natural and necessary outcome. Through Crawford, Austen appears to suggest that life is like the Speculation game: if your cards are played right, improvement is a guarantee.

In contrast to Crawford's strategizing, the native in "The Laplander" lacks Darwin's suggested faculty of improvement. The native is left "shivering" as the sun sets, and "beholds with

fond regret the parting light” (Smith 1, 2). Smith’s description of “fond” regret could be interpreted in multiple ways, as the *Oxford English Dictionary* outlines: fond can mean “foolish, Silly”, “mad, deranged”, or “eager, glad” (“fond.1. a”, “fond.2”, “fond.4”). Whether foolish, insane, or pleased, the native’s fondness suggests he passively accepts the sun’s departure. Unlike Crawford, who multitasks energetically between Speculation and Thornton Lacey discussions, the native takes no action to improve his circumstances as the sun sets into the cold night.

When Darwin suggested that *all* warm-blooded animals could improve by their “inherent artistry”, did he believe that indigenous or enslaved people could also change their circumstances? Readers interpreting the text through the eighteenth and nineteenth century schema of improvement may have believed that the ability to improve applied to characters like Crawford, but not the native. The native’s inaction may have therefore fit in the improvement schema: as an uncivilized being, like an enslaved person, it may be unsurprising that the character would choose to “sink far away, beneath the darkening tide” instead of taking action (Smith 3).

Moreover, Smith’s use of “sink” and “darkening tide” function in contrast to Crawford’s language that Thornton Lacey is capable of “more” and should be raised to a “higher” status. Whereas the native’s attention moves below the surface into darkness, Crawford suggests Thornton Lacey could be elevated to a space symbolically closer to the sun and its light. In the first three lines, Smith implies that the native lacks the faculty of improvement, and by virtue of this lacking, the native shifts to an inferior position.

Rewiring The Schema From Within

Although Austen guides her readers to recognize improvement discourse, she also undermines Crawford’s message through Fanny’s quiet confidence. During Speculation, Fanny does not try to win, but attempts to help William before Crawford intervenes (Austen 197).

Similarly, when Crawford suggests renting Thornton Lacey to begin “improving, and *perfecting* that friendship and intimacy with the Mansfield Park family”, Fanny contrarily “betrayed no inclination either of appropriating any part of the compliment to herself or of strengthening his views in favour of Northamptonshire” (Austen 199).

Like Smith’s native character, Fanny does not strategize to improve her position. In the game, Fanny disengages with the idea of improvement and strategizes instead to be *generous*. Regarding Thornton Lacey, Fanny does not reveal her true feelings, but is *respectful*, nonetheless. Through Fanny, Austen presents a quiet confidence that results in an equally quiet resistance against improvement discourse. Improvement is not inevitable, as Crawford’s lines suggest; on the contrary, Fanny’s subversive “artistry” leaves her peacefully unimproved.

Drawing from Fanny’s responses, Austen rewires the improvement schema by privileging tradition over improvement. Fanny’s focus on *generosity* and *respect* reflect her Christian upbringing, and these values are upheld by Sir Thomas when he does not allow Crawford to move into Thornton Lacey because it “can be known only by a clergyman” (Austen 199). Moreover, as the Speculation game concludes, Austen writes that “It was time to have done with cards if sermons prevailed” (200). The unimproved, simple farm life that Crawford seeks to exile is what Austen raises: humans can strategize as they wish, but their destiny is ultimately controlled by God. Under God, wealthy mansions and simple farmyards are equal. As for Speculation, readers are reminded that at the end of the evening, it is just a game: there is no material benefit to Crawford’s strategizing.

Although Smith initially implies the native in “The Laplander” is uncivilized, she quickly challenges the schema of improvement. Like Fanny, the native has a quiet, religious confidence: he “knows, that springing from the eastern wave / The sun’s glad beams shall re-illumine his way”

(Smith 5-6). The native “knows” or has *faith* that the sun will not just return but come “springing” on the returning tide. The native’s apparent inaction in the first lines is explained by his confidence in the changing of the seasons. Smith draws reader attention to the “shivering native” only to undermine the assumption that the native is an unimproved figure from the past (1).

Smith goes further to emphasize the importance of faith by contrasting the native with “the sufferer” after the volta (9). The native’s attention may be drawn to the sun’s move below, but the sufferer looks over their life as if from above with misery: they lament “o’er the waste / Of joyless life” and “o’er the blank void” (Smith 9-10, 13). Whereas the native has faith that the sun will return, the sufferer perceives only the darkness. Smith casts those perceived to be below, or unimproved like the native and Fanny, as those with the strongest faith, and as those who avoid suffering.

The final line of “The Laplander” draws a connection between the heavenly sublime and Christianity, and like Austen, Smith disengages with improvement discourse. Smith accentuates the final line by extending its length beyond the rest and writes in reference to the sufferer that “For him those beams of heaven shall never shine again” (14). The sufferer is not just suffering; he is fallen from grace. Moreover, by writing that “for him” those beams of heaven will not shine, Smith suggests that the native does not share the sufferer’s fate. For the native, unimproved as he is, hope will lead to eternal light in heaven.

Conclusion

Whether *improvement* referred to the industrial revolution, slavery, or general self-development, readers from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were surrounded by its discursive presence. *Mansfield Park* and “The Laplander” can be included amongst texts that discuss improvement, but as I argued in this paper, Austen and Smith only superficially support

improvement discourse. Both authors draw readers in through the existing schema of improvement, but in a Romantic turn, they make the unconscious conscious by undermining the need to improve altogether.

Left alone with his wealth and failed strategies at the end of *Mansfield Park*, does Crawford become like the sufferer in “The Laplander”? If so, where does this leave our capacity for change, or our inherent artistry? Instead of referring to our strategies, Darwin’s inherent artistry *could* refer to our mindsets, or our ability to look past the world as a “blank void” to fill. Austen and Smith’s unimproved characters, Fanny and the native, detach from the need to control, and by perceiving the world as it is, they obtain a divine status. Uninterested in architectural innovations for style or shelter, Fanny and the native signify a different type of artistry that perhaps, as Darwin suggests, all of us warm blooded creatures can master.

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Racial Prejudice in the Media: How Journalism Failed the Central Park Five
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COMS 381

In a time marked by crime, racial tension and growing economic disparity, New York City found itself as the epicenter of many racially motivated attacks throughout the 1980s. All of this tension came to a head in 1989, a year marked by three high-profile racially motivated crimes involving minority youth. One of the biggest crimes to take place that year is most often referred to as the Central Park jogger case, wherein five young black and hispanic men ages 14 through 16 were wrongfully convicted of the brutal rape of Trisha Meili, a 28-year-old white woman. The Central Park 5 — Antron McCray, Kevin Richardson, Yusef Salaam, Raymond Santana, and Korey Wise — quickly found themselves the victims of a media firestorm propelled by mounting racial tension that would ultimately contribute to their wrongful convictions. Examining this event reveals journalism's role in the spread of information and its ability to influence public opinion. In this essay I explore the narratives and specific rhetoric pushed by many journalistic outlets that described the alleged perpetrators of the Central Park jogger attack as monsters, savages and feral beasts. These narratives helped drive harsh criminal justice policy, resulting in the wrongful conviction of the accused in spite of a lack of evidence connecting them to the crime. I argue this by examining the prejudicial environment that led up to the crime and through exploring how social media likely would have had a profound influence on the event, using the Knox/Sollecito case as an example of online innocence campaigns.

In the years leading up to the Central Park jogger attack, New York experienced heightened crime, racial tension and economic disparity that contributed to an environment where racially motivated crimes burgeoned. On September 15, 1983, a young black man by the name of Michael Stewart died at a Manhattan Subway Station after police placed him in a chokehold for writing in felt-tip marker on the wall (Wilkerson, 1985). A year later, on October

29, 1984, an elderly grandmother by the name of Eleanor Bumpers was shot and killed by a police officer after a botched eviction attempt (Raab, 1984). A few years later, on December 20, 1986, a white mob attacked three African American men in Howard Beach, a predominantly white community in the borough of Queens. This event resulted in the death of 23-year-old Michael Griffith (McFadden, 1986). All of these events were set against a backdrop of growing economic disparity, where the median income of whites was roughly twice the amount of blacks. All this was detailed in a Census Bureau report included in a 1991 New York Times article titled 'Rich Got Richer in 80's; Others Held Even', wherein the disparity in wealth was found to be 'much greater, partly because wealth reflects decades of differences in earnings, investment and the inheritance of property.' (Pear, 1991).

A New York Times/WCBS-TV News survey conducted in late 1991 revealed '6 in 10 whites and blacks said they lived in a neighborhood that was populated almost all or mostly by members of their own race.', revealing the highly segregated nature of many New York neighbourhoods throughout the 1980s. (Roberts, 1992) The analysis further communicated that in Brooklyn and Queens, 8 in 10 blacks with incomes above the poverty level would have to move to achieve total balance with comparable non-Hispanic whites, while in the Bronx, 6 in 10 would. Among households with a family income of \$100,000 or more, the number rose to 9 in 10 in order to integrate with non-Hispanic whites of the same income level. The problem of segregation was exacerbated further by discriminatory practices, such as Real-Estate Steering wherein real-estate agents took white customers to white neighborhoods and black customers to black neighborhoods (Smothers, 1987). In trying to explain the connection between housing separation and racial tensions, Rev. Anthony Failla of St. Finbars Roman Catholic Church stated "If all they know of blacks is what they see on TV and what is highlighted on news stories, then

relations between the races are bound to worsen.’ (Smothers, 1987) With all this in mind, the presence of racially motivated crimes and growing economic disparity directly resulted in a petri dish that cultivated widespread racial prejudice, contributing to the biases that formed journalism’s harsh criminal justice policy.

Evidently, most of the narratives published following the event of the Central Park jogger attack made use of rhetoric such as “monsters”, “savages” and “feral beasts” when referring to the accused, ultimately negatively informing and shaping public opinion. According to Jeremi N. Duru (2004, 1321), “blacks have long since been ‘perceived as only narrowly removed from the animal kingdom”, a belief that reflects the way European observers in Africa would refer to the blacks they encountered as brutish, bestial or beastly (1321). This inferior view in addition to them being viewed as sexually charged criminal beasts that whenever possible would rape white women, prompted the birth of the myth of the Bestial Black Man in America according to Duru (1324-1325). This myth has long since been used by racists to defend their worst racist violence, with Charleston Church shooter Dylan Roof reportedly telling churchgoers “You rape our women, and you’re taking over our country, and you have to go.” (Bouie, 2015). With this in mind, it’s no surprise seeing this kind of rhetoric dominate much of the coverage of the Central Park jogger attack, attempting to rationalize the accused's roles in the crime despite a lack of evidence. These narratives persisted years after the crime, even influencing the emergence of a new term to describe the crimes: wilding.

A New York Times article published a few days after the attack titled “Jogger's Attackers Terrorized at Least 9 in 2 Hours” was the first to coin the term ‘wilding’ (Pitt, 1989). The term was used to describe violent or disruptive actions or practices by a gang of youths and soon many newspapers began to adopt the term, quickly becoming a popular mainstay of journalistic

rhetoric for years after the Central Park jogger attack. According to Stephen J. Mexal, the term “wilding” served to further distance the crime and the accused from the standards of ‘white civilization’ (2013, 102). Because it was new and unknown, the term contributed to the sensationalization of the crime and soon contributed to news that sought to entertain, also known as info-tainment (Price, Welch, and Yankey, 2004, 39). Much of journalism’s coverage of the crime centered on sensationalism and polarizing opinions, though perhaps the most striking example is Donald Trump’s full-page ads he published in four newspapers that called for their execution.

On May 1, 1989, then-real estate developer Donald Trump paid to place full-page ads (fig. 1) in four newspapers, stating: “BRING BACK THE DEATH PENALTY. BRING BACK OUR POLICE!” and “I want to hate these murderers and I always will. I am not looking to psychoanalyze or understand them, I am looking to punish them ... I no longer want to understand their anger. I want them to understand our anger. I want them to be afraid.” (Ransom, 2019) Looking at his advertisements, it’s hard to ignore the role Trump played in shaping public opinion through his advertisements. According to Barry Sheck, founder of the non-profit Innocence Project, “It’s shocking and deeply troubling that after all of these years, he would not have recognized that by calling for the reinstatement of the death penalty, it contributed to an atmosphere that deprived these men of a fair trial,” (Ransom, 2019) Evidently, the police were found to have coerced the accused into confessing to a crime they did not commit. This should have been enough to produce doubt concerning their culpability, however journalism’s role in promoting racially biased narratives had the effect of promoting the belief that these men were guilty. All this despite a lack of evidence incriminating them, leading us to question how social media might have affected this case?

In recent years, social media has become an important tool when it comes to miscarriages of justice. Online innocence campaigns have increasingly taken root, using the communication medium as a place for discourse wherein miscarriage of justice campaigners may promote competing accounts of innocence and guilt. According to Lieve Gies, the internet has resulted in a significant expansion of the ‘repertoire of collective action’ and has been a “prominent factor in the rise of ‘participatory civics’, a type of activism that is driven by a desire to impact on single causes through digital media rather than to commit to broadly drawn conventional political movements”. Gies further explains that not only does social media offer miscarriage of justice campaigners their own space to discuss and challenge decisions taken by the criminal justice system, but also a space to contest “dominant media interpretations of a particular crime, effectively providing the wider public with competing accounts of innocence and guilt.” (Gies, 2016, 723).

With this in mind, I believe social media plays an integral role when it comes to providing a voice for wrongful conviction campaigns. Take for example the case of US exchange student Amanda Knox and her Italian co-defendant Raffaele Sollecito, who were convicted in 2009 of the murder of British student Meredith Kercher. Social media was used to mobilize a campaign against their conviction, drawing support from a wide range of internet users (Gies, 2016, 724). According to Gies, “Founding members of the campaign were able to reach out to others online on a scale that was previously unthinkable, leading to the recruitment of more supporters who proved very dedicated to the cause but who also brought with them a level of expertise that would have been much more difficult to access otherwise.” (724).

Examining the innocence campaign in the Knox/Sollecito case reveals an important distinction between social media discourse and mainstream media discourse. Whereas the

innocence campaigners were able to rely on flaws in the forensic investigation and the first trial in arguing their case through social media, mainstream media is typically found to gloss over procedural safeguards (727). As such, social media discourse opens a floodgate of new ideas and opinions that may not be reflected in mainstream media, though it's important to note social media's continued reliance on conventional news media to promote their message. With this in mind, the innocence campaign was successful in their bid to exonerate the accused, revealing the use of social media as an online discourse for miscarriage of justice campaigns has the effect of swaying public opinion, similar to journalism's role in the Central Park jogger attack, and may influence changes within the criminal justice system through the exchange and spread of opinions via online.

Though the Central Park five were exonerated nearly two decades ago, they tend to resurface in mainstream media from time to time. The release of the 2019 web drama television miniseries titled "When They See Us" based on the Central Park jogger attack explored the lives and families of the five male suspects and reignited interest in the case. With this renewed interest comes an important question: Could such a miscarriage of justice happen again? It's important to note that the biggest factors culminating in the wrongful conviction of the central park five were arguably the underlying racial tensions, economic disparity in New York in the 80s' as well as the media's failure to resist public pressure and their rush to judgement. While the media has learned a great deal when it comes to handling criminal cases in the years since the crime took place, there are still stress fractures in our society that threaten our democracy and the delivery of justice. Even examining the United States over the past few years since the election of President Donald Trump reveals a polarized society, with hate groups and racial prejudice becoming even more prominent. With this in mind, by looking at the case of the Central Park

five, we are reminded by the legal principle that one is considered innocent until proven guilty, and it is this doctrine that we must continue to abide by for the sake of all those who have been wrongfully convicted.

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**BRING BACK
THE
DEATH PENALTY.
BRING BACK
OUR POLICE!**

What has happened to our City over the past ten years? What has happened to law and order, to the neighborhood cop we all trusted to safeguard our homes and families, the cop who had the power under the law to help us in times of danger, keep us safe from those who would prey on innocent lives to fulfill some distorted inner need. What has happened to the respect for authority, the fear of retribution by the courts, society and the police for those who break the law, who wantonly trespass on the rights of others? What has happened is the complete breakdown of life as we knew it.

Many New York families — White, Black, Hispanic and Asian — have had to give up the pleasure of a leisurely stroll in the Park at dusk, the Saturday visit to the playground with their families, the bike ride at dawn, or just sitting on their stoops — given them up as hostages to a world ruled by the law of the streets, as roving bands of wild criminals roam our neighborhoods, dispensing their own vicious brand of twisted hatred on whomever they encounter. At what point did we cross the line from the fine and noble pursuit of genuine civil liberties to the reckless and dangerously permissive atmosphere which allows criminals of every age to beat and rape a helpless woman and then laugh at her family's anguish? And why do they laugh? They laugh because they know that soon, very soon, they will be returned to the streets to rape and maim and kill once again — and yet face no great personal risk to themselves.

Mayor Koch has stated that hate and racism should be removed from our hearts. I do not think so. I want to hate these muggers and murderers. They should be forced to suffer and, when they kill, they should be executed for their crimes. They must serve as examples so that others will think long and hard before committing a crime or an act of violence. Yes, Mayor Koch, I want to hate these murderers and I always will. I am not looking to psychoanalyze or understand them. I am looking to punish them. If the punishment is strong, the attacks on innocent people will stop. I recently watched a newsman trying to explain the "anger" in these young men. I no longer want to understand their anger. I want them to understand our anger. I want them to be afraid.

How can our great society tolerate the continued brutalization of its citizens by crazed misfits? Criminals must be told that their CIVIL LIBERTIES END WHEN AN ATTACK ON OUR SAFETY BEGINS!

When I was young, I sat in a diner with my father and witnessed two young bullies causing and threatening a very frightened waitress. Two cops rushed in, lifted up the thugs and threw them out the door, warning them never to cause trouble again. I miss the feeling of security. New York's finest once gave to the citizens of this City.

Let our politicians give back our police department's power to keep us safe. Unhackle them from the constant chant of "police brutality" which every petty criminal bullies immediately at an officer who has just risked his or her life to save another's. We must cease our continuous pandering to the criminal population of this City. Give New York back to the citizens who have earned the right to be New Yorkers. Send a message loud and clear to those who would murder our citizens and terrorize New York — BRING BACK THE DEATH PENALTY AND BRING BACK OUR POLICE!

Donald J. Trump
Donald J. Trump

72/FBI Ad., NY, NY 10022

Figure 1: A full-page advertisement paid for by Donald Trump and published in four New York newspapers on May 1st, 1989. Image retrieved from The New York Times, accessed April 13, 2020 <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/nyregion/central-park-five-trump.html>

The Resource Curse & Institutional Quality: The Impacts of Natural Resource Abundance on Recent African Oil Producers

Alessandra Chan

POLI 359

Introduction

Why does Chad have lower levels of both development outcomes and democratization than other relatively recent African oil producers? An International Monetary Fund Report states that “Chad became an oil producer in the early 2000s and although the onset of oil production and exports led to some improvements in development indicators, the gains of the last 15 years were not permanent.”³² One would expect that a natural resource boom would support development within the country, but the opposite has often been observed, like in Chad’s case. Resource curse theory has emerged out of this observation where specific scholars have argued that natural resources are a test of institutions.³³ When political institutions are robust, an abundance of oil may have a neutral or positive effect on democratization and development outcomes but, as the resource curse theory predicts, if a country’s political institutions are weaker, a boom in natural resources can actually have negative impacts on democratization and development. Thus, institutional quality determines whether a country’s development outcomes and level of democratization will be positively or negatively impacted by natural resource abundance.

This paper proceeds as follows: First, we provide a brief overview of the literature on the resource curse and argue for the importance of taking into account the institutional quality of the country prior to becoming resource rich. We then develop a theory about how institutions

³² International Monetary Fund, “Chad: Selected Issues,” *IMF Country Report*, no. 19/259 (2019): 4, <https://www.imf.org/~media/Files/Publications/CR/2019/1TCDEA2019003.ashx>.

³³ Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource Curse*,” *Economic Journal* 116, no. 508 (2006): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01045.x>.

determine how a country will respond to natural resource booms, focusing particularly on how political elites take advantage of natural resource abundance through patronage, which leads to the inefficient allocation of resources and investments and ultimately results in lower development and lower levels of democratization. Third, we operationalize the concepts of institutional quality, development, and democracy and outline our research design using the countries: Ghana, Uganda, and Nigeria. Fourthly, we discuss the evidence: We test our hypothesis using Human Development Index (HDI) values and democratization scores. The fourth section presents our findings and implications and concludes the paper.

Literature Review

Although its existence is still debated among scholars, there are three sides of the resource curse theory that aim to describe the resource curse and its specific effect on resource rich countries.³⁴ Firstly, the Dutch Disease models explain how the abundance of natural resources causes losses in production externalities due to the shrinkage of the manufacturing sector,³⁵ which leads to slow economic growth. Secondly, the “Decentralized political economy models”³⁶ focus on the actions of entrepreneurs, individuals outside the formal government institutions.³⁷ It departs from the reasoning of the ‘Dutch Disease’ models through arguing that “the lack of evidence for institutional decay caused by resource abundance”, which is a point made by the Dutch Disease models, “is not sufficient to dismiss the role of institutions.”³⁸ They

³⁴ Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig, “It’s the Rents, Stupid! The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,” *Energy Policy* 37, no. 12 (2009): 5318, <https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.055>.

³⁵ Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” *NBER Working Paper Series*, no. 5398 (1995): 6, <http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.3386/w5398>.

³⁶ Kolstad and Wiig, “It’s the Rents, Stupid!,” 5319.

³⁷ Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource Curse*,” 9.

³⁸ Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 3.

add that “natural resources put the institutional arrangements to a test, so that the resource curse only appears in countries with inferior institutions.”³⁹ The resource curse, or when natural resource abundance leads to a decrease in economic growth, only affects countries that possess ‘grabber friendly institutions,’ which refer to lower quality institutions that promote rent-seeking.⁴⁰ Thirdly, the “Centralized political economy models”⁴¹ argue that patronage, which refers to “the way in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support”⁴² leads to inefficient allocation of resources because political elites are focused on staying in power and do not take into account what is socially efficient in the long term.

According to the centralized political economy model, “the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these can determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes.”⁴³ This model builds off the theoretical basis of the decentralized model as it supports the significance of institutions in determining whether natural resource abundance will be beneficial or detrimental to a country. A number of studies have found that “[t]here is an inverse association between natural resource abundance and several measures of institutional quality.”⁴⁴ The literature has dismissed the argument that

³⁹ Refer to note 7 above.

⁴⁰ Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 12.

⁴¹ Kolstad and Wiig, “It’s the Rents, Stupid!,” 5319.

⁴² Alex Weingrod, “Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties*,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10, no. 4 (1968): 379, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500005004>.

⁴³ James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. “Political Foundations of the Resource Curse.” *Journal of Development Economics* 79, no. 2 (2006): 450, <https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.008>.

⁴⁴ Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth.” *Journal of Development Economics* 59, no. 1 (1999): 48, [https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1016/S0304-3878\(99\)00005-X](https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1016/S0304-3878(99)00005-X).

this correlation is purely spurious and the quality of a country's political institutions have been found to be connected to a country's economic growth.⁴⁵ Our hypothesis is derived from the third model because the weakness in Chad's institutions is the distinguishing factor setting Chad apart from the other oil-producing countries, Ghana, Uganda, and Nigeria in terms of development and democratization.

Concepts & Research Design

Institutions are defined as “prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions.”⁴⁶ This definition touches upon how institutions within themselves are based on collective agreement and are built by the people who make decisions as to what constitutes them. The political institutions of a country “lay down rules about who deserves what and should provide them with it.”⁴⁷ Thus, the quality of institutions and the allocation of resources depends on those in power to make decisions. These decisions in turn determine the country's level of development and democratization. Development refers to “the process of enlarging people's freedoms and opportunities and improving their well-being”,⁴⁸ which is evident in a country's investment in human capital (e.g., education and healthcare). Democratization refers to a regime's progression towards becoming a democracy, which is a

⁴⁵ Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS-COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES," *Economics & Politics* 7, no. 3 (1995): 209, <https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00111.x>.

⁴⁶ Elinor Ostrom, *Understanding Institutional Diversity* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3. https://books.google.ca/books?id=LbeJaji_AfEC&lpg=PR11&ots=kw9EVTkp3R&lr&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false.

⁴⁷ Kolstad and Wiig, “It's the Rents, Stupid!,” 5321.

⁴⁸ “About Human Development,” Measure of America of the Social Science Research Council, accessed April 28, 2020, <https://measureofamerica.org/human-development/>.

regime that is accountable to the majority of the population and is open to changes in which parties constitute government.

We elect to test our hypothesis empirically by employing a Most-Similar-Systems, Design, comparing the countries, Ghana and Uganda to Chad. Nigeria will also be used for comparative checking to test whether institutional quality is a factor which determines whether a country’s development outcomes and levels of democratization are positively or negatively impacted by natural resource abundance. Chad is a landlocked oil-producing African country with a population of 15.48 million people. It became recognized as an oil-producing country in 2003, when the Darfur crisis was occurring in Sudan. Being landlocked, the country is more likely to be affected by political contention occurring in neighbouring states. The President Idriss Déby and his party, the Patriotic Salvation Movement, have been in power since his military overthrow of the previous leader, Hissène Habré in December of 1990. Up until 2005, the President was limited to two five-year terms until a 2005 constitutional amendment abolished these limits.⁴⁹

Table 1.0 Most-Similar-Systems Design

| | Chad | Ghana | Uganda | Nigeria |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Similarities | | | | |
| Control of Natural Resources | State-owned | State-owned | State-owned | State-owned |
| Political System | Presidential (President acts as Head of State and Head of Government) | Presidential (President acts as Head of State and Head of Government) | Presidential (President acts as Head of State and Head of Government) | Presidential (President acts as Head of State and Head of Government) |
| Year of Independence | 1960 | 1960 | 1960 | 1960 |
| Cause (X Variable) | | | | |

⁴⁹ Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2019: Chad,” Freedom House, accessed April 28, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/chad/freedom-world/2019>.

| <i>Hypothesis:</i> Institutional Quality | Poor | Strong | Relatively Strong | Relatively Strong |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Outcomes (Y Variable) | | | | |
| Development Outcomes ⁵⁰ (the higher, the more developed) | 0.401 | 0.596 | 0.528 | 0.534 |
| Level of Democratization ⁵¹ (the higher, the more democratic) | 1.61 (Authoritarian) | 6.63 (Flawed Democracy) | 5.02 (Hybrid) | 4.12 (Hybrid) |

The countries offer excellent test cases, in that development outcomes and levels of democratization are higher than that of Chad and all the countries are relatively recent oil producers, excluding Nigeria. Nigeria became recognized as an oil-producing state in 1958 while under British colonial rule, not becoming independent until 1960 like the majority of former African colonies. This makes Nigeria an interesting case because although it has experienced natural resource abundance for longer, it has not surpassed Ghana in terms of development and democratization. Uganda became a recognized oil-producer shortly after Chad in 2006 and Ghana followed suit in 2010. The countries also all have presidential systems and all of them are unitary and have unicameral legislatures except for Nigeria, which is a federal state that has a bicameral legislature. Uganda provides a good comparison because like Chad, it has a President who has been in power since 1986 and has removed term-limits, but it has higher development and democratization outcomes. Ghana also provides an interesting case as it has the highest

⁵⁰ United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report 2019” (ISBN: 978-92-1-126439-5, New York, New York, 2019), 306-307.

⁵¹ Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Democracy Index 2019,” *The Economist Intelligence Unit* (2019): 43, <http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-2019.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=democracyindex2019>.

scores of development and democratization out of all four countries, which puts it in stark contrast to Chad.

Operationalization & Evidence

With no perfect way in which to capture the concepts of development and democratization, we measure them as closely as possible using the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index, respectively.

Table 1.1 2019 Human Development Index Rankings⁵²

| Rank | Country | HDI Value | Life Expectancy at Birth | Expected Years of Schooling | Mean Years of Schooling | Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (PPP \$) |
|------|---------|-----------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| 187 | Chad | 0.401 | 54.0 | 7.5 | 2.4 | 1,716 |
| 159 | Uganda | 0.528 | 63.0 | 11.2 | 6.1 | 1,752 |
| 158 | Nigeria | 0.534 | 54.3 | 9.7 | 6.5 | 5,086 |
| 142 | Ghana | 0.596 | 63.8 | 11.5 | 7.2 | 4,099 |

The reason why we are using the HDI is because it aims to cover three dimensions of human development: (1) a long and healthy life, which is assessed by life expectancy at birth (2) knowledge, where the expected years of schooling for children of school entering age and the mean years of schooling for adults ages 25 years and older are taken into account, and (3) a decent standard of living, where they measure Gross National Income (GNI) per capita with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) considered.⁵³ These three dimensions capture our definition of development well as they are crucial in determining individuals' access to opportunities as well as their capacity to take advantage of those opportunities. It must also be noted that Nigeria has

⁵² UNDP, "Human Development Report 2019," 302-303.

⁵³ UNDP, 303.

the highest GNI per capita yet does not have the highest development outcomes. This indicates that the economic prosperity of a country, although it may have a large contribution to a country's capacity to promote development, is not the sole factor that determines a country's development outcomes.

Table 1.2 Democracy Index 2019⁵⁴

| | Overall Score | Global Rank | Regional Rank | I Electoral Process and Pluralism | II Functioning of Government | III Political Participation | IV Political Culture | V Civil Liberties | Regime Type |
|----------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Chad | 1.61 | 163 | 42 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.67 | 3.75 | 2.65 | Authoritarian |
| Ghana | 6.63 | 55= | 5 | 8.33 | 5.71 | 6.67 | 6.25 | 6.18 | Flawed Democracy |
| Uganda | 5.02 | 99 | 16 | 4.33 | 3.57 | 4.44 | 6.88 | 5.88 | Hybrid |
| Nigeria | 4.12 | 109 | 20 | 5.17 | 3.93 | 3.33 | 3.75 | 4.41 | Hybrid |

We are using the 2019 Democracy Index because it captures five elements of democracy, which are important in determining how democratically accountable political elites are to the majority of the people and how open a country is to changes in power.

To measure institutional quality, we will be using the same measures as above but will be focusing on the differences between past HDI values and Democratization Scores and current ones (refer to Appendix A). It is important to take into consideration past HDI values and democratization scores because it allows us to get a clearer picture of the institutional quality of a country before they became resource rich. The data from Table 2.0 under Appendix A shows that Chad had the lowest development outcomes to begin with and thus, had the weakest political institutions starting out. Development outcomes are dependent on how well the political elite

⁵⁴ EIU, "Democracy Index 2019," 43.

allocate resources and invest within human capital. This in turn depends on the democratic accountability of these elites to the majority of the public because if these elites are not kept in check, the revenue from natural resource abundance can be invested within themselves and within maintaining their power rather than assisting a country's development. The relative consistency in democratization scores and regime types in both Chad and Uganda (refer to Table 2.1 under Appendix A) can both be attributed to how there has not been a change in leadership in Chad, since 1990 and in Uganda, since 1986. Despite having a long incumbent leader who has also removed term limits, Uganda still has higher development outcomes and democratization. Uganda also has a higher democratization score than Nigeria, which further supports that a long incumbent leader does not necessarily cause weakness in institutions, although it can be a contributing factor.

It must be noted that a significant factor in determining the institutional quality of a country is whether or not an opposition party has won in any past elections. Whether or not an opposition party has won and if there was a successful change in leadership demonstrates the level of dominance current political elites have over decision making. If political elites possess an excess of power, their political institutions will be weaker as there will be a lack of democratic accountability. This lack of accountability will make them more likely to use the revenue from natural resources for their personal interests and to ensure that they are able to maintain their excess of power. Opposition parties have won in Nigeria, although relatively recently in 2015,⁵⁵ and in Ghana, which has had regular changes in leadership. Uganda and Chad have not experienced changes in leadership and thus, opposition leaders have not been able to win an election, which indicates that these two countries are more susceptible to the negative impacts of

⁵⁵ "Nigeria Election: Muhammadu Buhari Wins Presidency," BBC New, April 1, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32139858>.

resource booms with Chad as the most vulnerable. The main aim of the hypothesis is to demonstrate that the institutional quality of a country actually has a role in determining whether a country will suffer from the 'resource curse' or experience benefits or no change at all. The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis as it demonstrates how countries with weaker political institutions are more likely to succumb to the 'resource curse' due to the lack of accountability, which increases the likelihood of inefficient allocation of resources and limited investment in development.

Conclusion

While natural resource booms are typically seen as beneficial to countries, the opposite often happens to be the case. The same phenomenon, termed the resource curse, has occurred in Chad. Chad's lower development outcomes and levels of democratization, despite experiencing a boom in oil, in comparison to other oil-producers: Ghana, Uganda, and Nigeria has been a topic of interest. Overall, the empirical evidence is in favour of our hypothesis, which suggests that political institutions determine how a country will respond to an abundance of natural resources. The research design could have been modified to account for variables such as the rule of law (i.e., the checks and balances within relations between the legislative and executive powers and the efficacy of the judiciary) and political contention. Our design has given new insight into the significance of institutions in resource curse theory and has further supported that one does not always need to look at the macro-economic side as the political implications of the resource curse are important as well.

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Appendix A:

Past & Present Human Development Index (HDI) Values & Democratization Scores

Table 2.0 Human Development Index Values Then (2000)⁵⁶ & Now (2019)⁵⁷

| | HDI Values | |
|----------------|-------------|------------|
| | <i>Then</i> | <i>Now</i> |
| Chad | 0.298 | 0.401 |
| Uganda | 0.395 | 0.528 |
| Nigeria | 0.484* | 0.534 |
| Ghana | 0.483 | 0.596 |

*Data taken from 2010 as there was no data for 2000

Table 2.1 Democracy Index Scores, Then (2006) & Now (2019)

| | Democratization Score | | Regime Type | |
|----------------|---------------------------|------------|---------------------------|------------------|
| | <i>Then</i> ⁵⁸ | <i>Now</i> | <i>Then</i> ⁵⁹ | <i>Now</i> |
| Chad | 1.65 | 1.61 | Authoritarian | Authoritarian |
| Uganda | 5.14 | 5.02 | Hybrid | Hybrid |
| Nigeria | 3.52 | 4.12 | Authoritarian | Hybrid |
| Ghana | 5.35 | 6.63 | Hybrid | Flawed Democracy |

⁵⁶ UNDP, “Human Development Report 2019,” 306-307.

⁵⁷ UNDP, 302-303.

⁵⁸ EIU, “Democracy Index 2019,” 21-22.

⁵⁹ Laza Kekic, “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy,” *The World in 2007* (2007): 4-5, https://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf.

Media, the Consumer, and Popular Dance in the 21st Century
Chloe Nelson
DNCE 481
Introduction

It is well known that in the age of the internet, media of all forms dominates the lives of North Americans. Our lives have become increasingly digitized, and with the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic this has never been more apparent. However, media and technology are not simply tools at our disposal to be used for entertainment or convenience. Rather, the inevitable role of capitalism and consumerism affects and directs almost every digital interaction we have. When analyzing reality television and social media, it is evident that the intersection between consumerism and individual digital interactions is increasingly larger. This also impacts how the medium of dance is represented and which dance forms are considered ‘popular’. For many, shows like *So You Think You Can Dance*, *World of Dance*, and *Dancing with the Stars*, as well as social media platforms like Instagram, YouTube, and TikTok, are the only sources of dance representation in their lives. In this paper, I will examine the most popular forms of dance witnessed on these platforms, including hip hop, acrobatics, and ‘competition’ contemporary. Specifically, I will seek to investigate the role that an increased reliance on media has had on popular dance in the 21st century, and in turn the effect that this representation of dance has on the audience’s perception of it. Through this analysis, I will demonstrate that popular dance has become a means to an end rather than an end unto itself. The actual movement portrayed through the media has lost its meaning and importance; rather, it merely acts to ‘sell’ a message to the audience via movement. In short, while media has helped increase the visibility of dance, the ways in which it does so actually undermine how dance as an *art* is perceived in society.

The Good

Like many things in the digital era, media and technology have had some positive impacts on dance. Perhaps the most valid argument in favour of the media's role in the dance world is the drastic increase in exposure that has occurred as a result of TV shows and social media. *So You Think You Can Dance* is moving into its 17th season, and *World of Dance* is one of NBC's most watched shows, with 4.4 million viewers tuning in to its most recent season.⁶⁰ On social media, one can find an increasing number of dance celebrities (often former stars of dance TV shows) whose followings are on par with other social media influencers: Maddie Ziegler of *Dance Moms* fame has 13.7 million Instagram followers as of November 2020- a following competitive with popular YouTube celebrity David Dobrik who has 14.4 million.⁶¹ TikTok, a platform that originated with dance and lip-syncing content, has 850 million monthly users (as of October 2020).⁶² These numbers indicate a growing number of non-dancers consuming and recognizing dance - something that the performing arts community is constantly striving for. What is even more striking is the influence that the mediatization of dance has had on non-dancers *participating* in dance. *SYTYCD* partnered with Michelle Obama for several years to promote dancing as a healthy lifestyle option for kids, and the majority of TikTok content is made up of regular people of all ages and abilities performing choreography to match a trending song. As Marita Cardinal notes in her article on dance in reality TV, "highlighting dance in reality TV programs promotes the popularity of dancing in general and may even inspire people to pursue dance instruction or participate in dance as a lifestyle activity."⁶³

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1. Will Thorne, "TV Ratings: 'World of Dance' Twirls Upwards, NBC Easily Wins Tuesday Night," *Variety*, 2020, <https://variety.com/2020/tv/news/world-of-dance-americas-got-talent-tv-ratings-1234638735/>.
 2. "Top 200 Dance Instagram Influencers Most Followed in 2020," Feedspot Blog, accessed Nov 27, 2020
 3. Brandon Doyle, "TikTok Statistics - Everything You Need to Know," Wallaroo Media, accessed Nov 27, 2020
 4. Marita Cardinal, "Deciphering Dance In Reality Television: The Good, The Questionable, And The Unconscionable," *Journal of Physical Education, Recreation & Dance*, 84:1(2013): 7.

There are also some instances in which mediatized dance has contributed to social causes. *SYTYCD* has presented a few routines targeting social issues like race, sexuality, and gun violence in recent years, including Travis Wall's "It Takes a lot to Know a Man"⁶⁴, which showcases a male dancer wearing makeup and women's clothing battling a female dancer who represents a society that will not allow gender nonconformity. Some TikTok users have also utilized the popularity of dance content to spread information during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests in the US, taking advantage of the boost in exposure that dancing videos have on the platform and adding accompanying text that shared protest information. These instances show the potential of the media to support dance's contribution to social change by giving it a global voice that may not be achievable in the studio or theatre. This increased visibility of dance in a mainstream space, as well as the media's creation of a space for social commentary, would not be possible without the expanding role of the media in our daily lives.

An Aesthetic not an Art

When describing a piece that I was scheduled to perform at the University of Calgary, one of the first things I said to my family members (who had not seen me dance since I started my post-secondary training) was "just so you know, it's not very 'dancey' like you're used to." What I did not realize at the time was that this made-up adjective of 'dancey' was actually summarizing what now defines popular dance styles: a sequence of virtuosic turns, jumps, kicks and flips that have an obvious balletic influence, paired with quick, sharp movements which highlight the intense emotion being portrayed by the dancer. My family and I (some of whom have dance backgrounds and some who do not) had been so heavily exposed to these characteristics of popular dance through both the media and competition dance, that they had

5. "Darius Hickman & Taylor Sieve – Contemporary – SYTYCD 15 Finale," *YouTube*, video retrieved Dec 3, 220

understood what I meant by the ‘dancey’ parts of the art; dance now consisted of tricks and technical moves and the artistic, somatic, or intellectual practices that sometimes came with dance were simply additional factors that could not exist without virtuosic movement to support them. This is a perception that is widely shared among audiences of mediatized dance.

In their examination of society’s internalized ideas around dance (what they call ‘Common Senses’), Doolittle and Flynn discuss the Common Sense that “Efficient is better than Expressive.”⁶⁵ The connection they make between expressiveness being seen as ‘immoral’ and the resulting emphasis on the physicality of dance rather than the expression draws some clear parallels to current popular dance. In a society where athletics are drastically more valued than the arts (as exemplified by the differences in funding, audience engagement, and salaries of professionals) one can see how the traditionally athletic aspects of dance translate more easily to a larger audience. Social media dance accounts are full of young dancers doing extreme over splits, acro tricks, or fouetté turn sequences. In many cases, there are no accompanying choreographic or artistic elements to these tricks, perpetuating the seemingly superior role of strength and physicality over expressive movement.

The competition format of performing also caters to these athletic values, since it makes dance more like a sport with winners and losers. A competitive element theoretically creates higher stakes for the audience and, thus, is considered more engaging. The most popular televised dance shows are either competitions in and of themselves (ex: *SYTYCD*, *World of Dance*, *Dancing with the Stars*), or are based around dance in a competitive setting (ex: *Dance Moms*, *Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders: Making the Team*). *World of Dance* quickly established itself as a showcase for flashy hip hop groups with huge tricks and gymnastic-like contemporary

6. Lisa. Doolittle & Anne Flynn, “Human Rights- Not Like a Document, Like a Dance,” in *Right to Dance*, ed. Naomi M Jackson (Banff Centre Press, 2004), 274-275

soloists performing trick after trick, but with a sad expression, somber music, and a story-like narrative. Judges blatantly ask contestants for flashy moments, and contestants who cannot keep up with the increasing demand for gymnastic athleticism do not last long in the competition. Season 3 contestant Briar Nolet, for example, consistently impressed the judges with flashy routines full of gymnastic movement. In many instances, her solos had a large percentage of acrobatic movement and very little artistic movement, and she was rewarded for this by making it to the season finale of the show.⁶⁶

This aesthetic- and virtuosic-centered approach to dance leaves little room for artistic exploration and promotes the perception that dance is only about one's ability to do an oversplit or an aerial. The expressive experience is left ignored by both audiences and dancers. TV and social media actively promote an athletic and competitive sense of dance that does not exist in the world of professional dance outside of television, which furthers the current sociocultural state that undervalues the arts.

A Market for Emotion

With physicality and virtuosity so highly valued in media representations of popular dance, where does this leave the emotional aspect that is so central to dance as an art? I would argue that the virtuosity seen in movement can also be seen in the emotive elements of performance in the media. The ability to make its spectators *feel* something separates dance from sports, even while the competition format equates the two forms. The response of the media to this potential for kinaesthetic empathy⁶⁷ has been to highlight and magnify its effects as much as possible - to the extent that the extreme portrayals of emotion become similar to other tricks performed solely for the sake of audience value. Susan Foster discusses the role that emotion

7. "World of Dance S3 E10", *NBC*, video retrieved Dec 3, 2020

8. Jaana Parviainen, "Kinaesthetic Empathy," *Dialogue and Universalism* 13, (2003): 151-162

plays in competitive dance in her article “Dance and/as Competition in the Privately Owned US Studio”; as she details, performing a small number of simplified emotions at maximum volume instigates a larger audience (and judge) response, which is in turn reflected in high scores when combined with a virtuosic athleticism.⁶⁸ Foster, and Colleen Dunagan author of *Consuming Dance: Choreography and Advertising*, both discuss emotion as a commodity that can be delivered through dance, and Dunagan links this ‘commodity of affect’ seen in dance performance to the strategic use of producing and capitalizing on emotion that is seen in the advertisement industry.⁶⁹ This link with advertisement highlights the reason for TV and social media interest in extreme emotion - to sell. Audiences want to experience a change in emotion while watching televised dance shows, so the shows cater to routines that maximize emotional response. This is perhaps most clearly exemplified by the contemporary genre, where narratives that are likely to connect with a large audience due to their referencing of relationship troubles, illness/loss of a loved one, or battling one’s inner demons are among the most popular routines in a season.

In her analysis of the ‘lyrical’ dance style commonly seen in competitions and on television (what might also be called contemporary nowadays), dance scholar Jennifer Fisher reflects on the relationship between storytelling and movement, suggesting that the movement offers “a structural rather than a story element. It’s there automatically, before the story, not as a result of it.”⁷⁰ She suggests that this style of dance is a threat to the kind of dance that can be deeply meaningful, a sentiment which is echoed by Foster.⁷¹ Dancers on shows like *SYTYCD*

9. Susan Foster, “Dance and/as Competition in the Privately Owned US Studio,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Dance and Politics*, (2017): 19

10. Colleen Dunagan, “Consuming Dance: Choreography and Advertising,” (Oxford University Press, 2018): 17-47

11. Jennifer Fisher, “When Good Adjectives Go Bad: The Case of So-Called Lyrical Dance,” *Dance Chronicle* 37(3): 321

12. Foster, “Dance and/as Competition in the Privately Owned US Studio,” 1-19

know the story of their piece before they learn it and have pre-determined emotions that come from this that make the audience feel what they are expecting to feel, rather than developing it from the movement itself.

Kate Elswit, a dance researcher at the University of London, describes how these storylines are paired with three elements: a pre-performance package, the performance itself, and the judges' comments, which convey as much of the appropriate emotional response to an audience as possible. This setup makes the actual movement itself only a small part of the routine and minimizes its importance. Without the package and judges' comments telling the audience what the story is and why they should feel sad, audiences would not be able to discern the storyline based on movement alone; in short, any combination of common contemporary steps can tell any heavily emotional story if it is presented with the right TV packaging.⁷² Dance scholar Heather Harrington also notes that the element of viewing dance on a screen further distances the audience from any story that may be developing from the movement itself, and removes any element of self-expression or exploration for the dancer, who is solely focused on reaching an audience that is not even in the room.⁷³ By viewing emotion as an audience-focused commodity rather than as an experiential process paired with movement for the dancer, these media representations are missing the deeply meaningful and complex relationships between dancer and audience that make dance so valuable and unique.

The Role of Consumerism

Just as the world of dance has been irrevocably changed by the increasing influence of the media, the role the media plays in society has been inherently influenced by the neoliberal

13. Kate Elswit, "So You Think You Can Dance Does Dance Studies," *TDR* 56(1): 133-42

14. Heather Harrington, "Consumer Dance Identity: The Intersection Between Competition Dance, Televised Dance Shows and Social Media," *Research in Dance Education* 21(2): 178-180

Western society that utilizes such media. Television and social media companies' ultimate goal is to make money, and this is very clearly seen in current representations of dance in the media. In 1997, Foster made some impressively prophetic observations through her discussion of the dancer's 'hired body' in response to early on-screen representations of dance on MTV and similar platforms⁷⁴; this body was capable of drawing from a large variety of forms and techniques in order to mold itself into any combination of style or form. The body became a purely physical object that can be constructed into whatever a choreographer desires; it was also built with an emphasis on physicality and external perception, creating a distance between the body and the sense of self (to add to the distance created by the screen). This idea of the 'hired body', which manifested as a result of a boom in televised representations of dance, has only become more relevant as social media has become dominant in advertising and media; it is now a necessity to have a large social media presence in order to find consistent professional work. This concept is both a result of and a contributor to current media representations of dance. Harrington referenced Foster's 'hired body' in relation to televised dance and societal norms as well, noting that "the *SYTYCD* dancer must be versatile and able to skim all dance genres. The dance aesthetic seen on *SYTYCD* – fast, literal, flashy – is embedded in the American psyche."⁷⁵

A consumer-driven dance industry has effects on more than just the movement of its dancers. As with any consumable product, there is always a socially constructed 'ideal' that is deemed to be better than its alternatives and this ideal is usually tied to whiteness, youth, heteronormativity, a thin physique and hyper-sexualization. In the realm of dance, where the body itself is the commodity, a body that encompasses all of these things becomes the ideal. As

15. Susan Foster, "Dancing Bodies" in *Meaning in Motion: New Cultural Studies of Dance*, ed. Jane Desmond (Duke University Press): 1997, 253-256

16. Harrington, "Consumer Dance Identity" 177

such, dancers in today's industry must conform to whichever hegemonic ideal is reigning in the media. The most followed social media accounts are consistently young, white, thin women or girls, and trending dance routines that feature sexualized movement are common. Consequently, this type of content attracts advertisers and sponsors, which further encourages dancers on social media to strive for the ideal. This idealized consumer dancing body is also seen almost universally on TV dance shows, where contestants are consistently young, attractive, and gender-conforming. When the media constantly shows and praises this representation of a dancing body, it tells dancers and non-dancers alike that this is what a dancing body is supposed to look like and reinforces a hegemonic standard for success with little tolerance for diversity.

Conclusion

As a dancer with both competition-style and post-secondary modern training, I see a distinct difference in the two forms - differences which are then heightened by the media's representation of dance. The media's consumer-driven model has resulted in the promotion of popular dance styles which undermine the aspects of dance which are deeply meaningful and a mode of self-expression and exploration, leaving little room for dance forms or dancing bodies that do not fit the hegemonic mold. While people have been increasingly exposed to dance as a result of its rising presence on TV and social media apps, the type of dance that is represented creates a societal perception of dance as a product rather than an art. Harrington offers a harrowing warning about the growth of this form of dance:

The idea of exposing dance to a wider audience to build knowledge and appreciation of the art form may not impel people to support dance outside the comfort of their screen, especially if the dance does not look like what they have seen on the show.⁷⁶

17. Harrington, "Consumer Dance Identity" 177

The question I then pose is this - is an increased public engagement with dance worth it if what they are engaging in does not include the elements that make dance a viable medium of cultural and personal expression? By continuing to place value on physicality, virtuosity, and the external, is this representation of dance doing more damage to its image than good? These queries are not black and white, and I do not feel that I can answer them concretely in one essay. I find many elements of popular dance in the media to be problematic, but I still enjoy watching *SYTYCD*, and I still follow dancers and dance accounts on Instagram. I could argue that there is inherent value in exposure of any kind; however, the current path that increasingly favours hegemonic ideals is worrisome to say the least. I do not think that the television model of reality TV dance shows will be changing anytime soon, nor do I think that the ideal popular dance body will ever be completely abolished. But if other forms of dance and other types of dancing bodies could *also* get more exposure, then perhaps it could bring enough attention to the aspects of dance that are currently so undervalued as to give audiences more perspective about all that dance can encompass and accomplish. Eye-catching movement and carefully constructed emotional stories are not what make dance a unique outlet for physicality and artistry. Creativity, self-expression, internal exploration, and artistry must have room to blossom in a digital sphere, and, if showcased, could also have a genuine impact.

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The Assessment & Treatment of Psychopathic Offenders

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PYSC 493

The Treatment of Psychopathic Offenders

Psychopathy is a controversial personality disorder, characterized by emotional, behavioural, and relational traits such as anti-social behaviour, manipulation, lack of empathy or guilt, and egotism. It also involves detachment from emotions and some social cues, and impaired emotional sensitivity (Patrick et al., 2009). For the general public, psychopathy is a misunderstood concept, often used along with words like “crazy” or “mentally ill”, and typically while referring to people who would not actually have true psychopathic tendencies (Edens, 2006). This disorder is frequently seen within popular Western media, and has been present in other cultures through varying portrayals, which may contribute to the misuse of the term by the public. Throughout time, the scope of behaviours or traits associated with psychopathy have varied from encompassing all mental disorders to involving the specific disorder characterized by the traits mentioned earlier (Skeem et al., 2011).

Defining & Measuring Psychopathy

The diagnosis of psychopathy has been highly influenced by the existence of another disorder in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (5th ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013), antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). ASPD is characterized by a recurrent history of criminal, antisocial, or violent behaviour, usually beginning in childhood (Skeem et al., 2011). While ASPD and psychopathy are similar, scales measuring psychopathy have weaker correlations to ASPD, indicating that the two are different constructs (Hare, 2003). These scales also tend to examine different aspects of each disorder. For example, psychopathy measures tend to focus on underlying personality traits extrapolated from behaviour, while ASPD measures focus on observable criminal and antisocial behaviours. It is

important to distinguish between the two disorders as most offenders with psychopathic traits are diagnosed with ASPD, but not everyone with ASPD can be classified as a psychopath (Olver, 2016).

While there is no formal diagnosis of psychopathy through any psychological or psychiatric organization, the assessment of psychopathic traits is frequently used in legal and criminal justice matters, and psychopathic traits are often referred to by clinicians. Psychopathy is typically measured using a 20-item scale, the Psychopathy Checklist-revised (PCL-R, Hare, 2003). Scores range from 0 to 40, with higher scores indicating higher levels of psychopathic traits. A cut off score of 30 is used to classify individuals as psychopaths, but high scores nearing 30 are still informative of that individual's personality traits. People without psychopathic traits typically have a score of 5-6 points. The checklist assesses relational, affective, and behavioural aspects of the disorder, but items can be divided into two factors: Factor 1 represents interpersonal and affective aspects of psychopathy, while Factor 2 is related to chronic antisocial behaviours that form a pattern or lifestyle (Hare, 2003). These two factors can be further divided into two sub-factors each. Factor 1 is composed of the subfactor "Interpersonal" (which assesses manipulative and superficial behaviours, lying, and egotism) and the subfactor "Affective" (which assesses lack of empathy and guilt, and shallowness of emotions). Factor 2 is composed of the subfactor "Lifestyle" (which is related to impulsiveness, irresponsibility, and lack of realistic goals) and the subfactor "Antisocial" (which deals with delinquency, versatility in crime, and poor behavioural control). The four subfactors are used to comprehensively assess for traits like shallow affect and lying which are harder to observe than traits like past delinquency or criminal versatility (Hare, 2003).

Even without the presence of an official psychopathy diagnosis, this label can have important consequences for individuals in legal and social settings (DeLisi et al., 2010). For example, court cases that involve psychopathic offenders cannot be defended with a claim of insanity as psychopaths are aware of the difference between right and wrong (Pozzulo et al., 2018). In cases with younger offenders, psychopathy has been shown to result in more severe rulings against them (Pozzulo et al., 2018). In the United States, PCL-R scores can even be used as justification for a death penalty sentence. Higher scores on measures of psychopathy like the PCL-R are typically correlated with criminal recidivism, sexual violence, a longer criminal career, and failure to comply with the terms of conditional release (Olver & Wong, 2006). Individuals who have psychopathic tendencies make up a high percentage (15-25%) of the prison population in the United States, but only around 1% of the overall public, demonstrating a strong link between psychopathy and crime (Hare, 1996). This powerful association has created a pervasive stigma for individuals with psychopathic traits, both in the general public and within the practice of mental health professionals.

Psychopathic Offenders & Treatment

Due to factors relating to how individuals with psychopathic traits behave during treatment, there is a high level of pessimism from mental health professionals surrounding interventions for psychopathy (Salekin, 2002). Individuals with psychopathic traits tend to have difficulties during treatment due to lack of motivation and resistance to interventions involving change (Ogloff et al., 1990), which will be discussed in more detail later. A psychopathy diagnosis is a strong predictor for non-completion of therapeutic interventions, with one study finding it being associated with up to a 30% increase in dropout rates within one program (Olver et al., 2011). It was found that the affective subfactor of psychopathy, which involves shallow

affect and impairment in empathy, was the most correlated to individual failure in a therapeutic intervention (Olver & Wong, 2011). Another factor affecting the treatment of psychopathic offenders is that they tend to form weaker relationships overall, and therefore typically have a weaker bond with their therapist or staff. The affective subfactor seems to also be associated with lower therapeutic working alliances due to more shallow affective connections to staff (Olver, 2016).

Individuals with psychopathic traits also tend to behave poorly during treatment, and have a lower quality therapeutic work ethic. Higher scores on the lifestyle subfactor, involving impulsivity and lack of realistic long-term goals, are related to lower performance of therapeutic tasks such as reflecting on past actions during treatment (Olver, 2016). Individuals with psychopathic traits typically show less improvement in treatment than individuals without these traits. In one study looking at over 150 men attending a therapeutic program intended to reduce violent behaviours, there was a negative relationship between PCL-R and individual improvement as treatment progresses (Olver, 2016). This means that higher psychopathy scores will likely lead to less change through therapeutic interventions. Some of these negative outcomes may be due to the fact that individuals with psychopathic traits sometimes behave aggressively by being verbally or emotionally abusive, and make threats or intimidate others (Wong et al., 2012). They are typically disinclined to accept feedback and can sometimes become hostile. In a group setting, this behaviour may disrupt the therapeutic progress of other patients and staff. This is contrasted with the fact that some individuals with psychopathic traits may behave pleasantly and be adept at interpersonal interactions across different situations (Wong et al., 2012). However, these skills are sometimes used for negative actions like manipulating staff or patients, breaking boundaries, and pitting staff against each other. These

adverse outcomes indicate a need for the examination of the treatment programs available for individuals with psychopathy to reduce dropout rates and increase treatment success.

Types of Treatments

One meta-analysis conducted on studies relating to psychopathy treatments found that many different types of interventions were used (Salekin, 2002). Most studies included used a psychoanalytical approach, followed by therapeutic communities, then cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), and lastly using electroconvulsive shock therapy (ECT). The meta-analysis revealed that 60% of patients with psychopathic tendencies improved after treatment (Salekin, 2002). CBT had the highest success rate of all the treatments (62%), followed by psychoanalytical approaches (59%). ECT and therapeutic communities had low success rates (22% and 25% respectively), as the control groups who received no treatment in the studies analyzed had a 20% success rate.

While the CBT and psychoanalytical success rates seem good, the studies had many design limitations (Olver, 2016). Many of the studies used a design that has not been replicated, or predated rules and professional guidelines of ethical and effective treatment. Some of the studies did not use the PCL-R to identify participants with psychopathy and used looser criteria for the diagnosis. Further, only 8 of the 42 studies analyzed included a control group who did not receive treatment. After treatment, only 13 of the 42 studies followed up with patients, and even fewer measured criminal recidivism (Salekin, 2002). Lastly, the criteria used to indicate the success of the treatment varied greatly, with some stating a higher capacity for guilt or empathy, and others focusing on misconduct and reduction in criminal behaviour.

Despite such data, the meta-analysis concluded that psychopathy can be treated (Salekin, 2002). In a more recent meta-analysis, newer studies involving treatments of psychopathy were

featured (Salekin et al., 2010). Eight of the studies involved adults, and 5 were on children and adolescents. All of the studies used PCL-R criteria for diagnosis and mostly used CBT. Results of the meta-analysis indicate that while individuals do improve, effect sizes are small, and greater change occurred within the child or adolescent samples (Salekin et al., 2010). Through this analysis, they were able to begin examining traits of successful and unsuccessful treatments for psychopathy.

Successful Treatments

It is important to ensure ethical and evidence-based practices when dealing with this vulnerable group of patients, prone to violence and mental health concerns. Some of the treatments in the studies reviewed in the meta-analyses by Salekin (2002) and Salekin et al. (2010) did show potential in achieving good outcomes for psychopathic offenders. CBT is generally the most successful course of treatment, but more specific features of effective treatments will be discussed. One article on treatments for psychopathy mentions that most treatments have lacked in meeting standards for effective interventions (Simourd & Hoge, 2000). The standards for achieving effective and ethical interventions typically involve the risk, need, and responsivity (RNR) principles. The risk principle involves matching the intensity of the treatment to the level of risk displayed by the individual. Thus, individuals with higher risk of offending are given a higher dose of treatment. This can involve having more access to resources or having individual counselling sessions in addition to group ones (Simourd & Hoge, 2000).

The need principle is based on the assessment and subsequent change of dynamic risk factors related to offending, which are usually the causes of antisocial or criminal actions. Dynamic risk factors can include a negative peer group, substance use, lack of employment, and more. Eliminating these factors should decrease antisocial behaviour and make it more difficult

to maintain and is a process that is prioritized in effective therapeutic interventions (Simourd & Hoge, 2000). This prioritization may allow offenders to further focus on the treatment by decreasing external negative influences. Lastly, the responsivity principle indicates that therapeutic interventions must be adapted to fit the needs of the specific group of patients, due to the use of cognitive behavioural methods which involve responsivity to treatment as a basis for change in behaviour (Simourd & Hoge, 2000). This adaptation should encompass personality traits, cognitive abilities and overall functioning within client groups. On an individual basis, staff must also take into account culture, preferred learning methods, and even motivational styles to maximize treatment effectivity.

Unsuccessful Treatments

In both meta-analyses by Salekin (2002) and Salekin et al. (2010), it was stated that the unsuccessful treatment programs for psychopathy mostly used a design involving a therapeutic community. This design operates on the idea that an environment of healing that is beneficial to helping create positive changes in behaviour can be created. However, there is no standard way of creating this environment, which may be one of the reasons for the high failure rates of therapeutic communities (Olver, 2016). In one popular study by Rice et al. (1992) featuring a Canadian therapeutic community operating in the 1970's, all of the patients were offenders with mental disorders. The treatment they received was very intensive, with it lasting 80 hours per week on average. The treatment consisted of the offenders being put in a room together to discuss their issues and solve problem behaviours in individuals as a group. The staff had almost no contact with the patients, and hallucinogenic drugs were often administered to reduce resistance to treatment (Rice et al., 1992). This study led to very interesting results post-treatment. In offenders without psychopathy, 22% of those who were treated committed a new

violent offense, compared to 39% of those who were untreated. In psychopathic offenders, 77% of those who were treated committed a violent offense, and only 55% of those who were untreated did. This seems to indicate that the therapeutic community treatment made individuals with psychopathy worse, although the study evaluated clearly demonstrates a treatment environment that is unsuited for these types of offenders (Olver, 2016). The results of this study made a strong impact on mental health professionals' attitudes towards interventions for psychopathy, and falsely indicates that psychopathic offenders are not only incapable of benefitting from treatments, but that it worsens their symptoms. Due to this, it is worthwhile to specifically examine the features of this and other similar programs to evaluate what makes them unsuitable for psychopathic individuals.

Typically, the unsuccessful programs (I.e. therapeutic community programs) involved higher intensities of treatment, which was too much for most individuals with psychopathic tendencies (Olver & Wong, 2011). The usual high-intensity treatment programs have limits of 15 hours per week over 9 months, while the previous therapeutic community study mentioned had over 80 hours per week. Although this would likely violate today's ethical standards for research, it was approved by the ethics board at the time (Rice et al., 1992). Further, programs within therapeutic communities neglected to match the treatment intensity to the level of disorder experienced by the offender. This meant that some offenders were highly overtreated, and some lacked adequate treatment (Olver & Wong, 2011). Due to little contact between patients and staff, there was a lack of guidance and modelling of positive or prosocial behaviours. The patients were surrounded by others who acted similarly to them and mostly did not improve, leading to missed opportunities to learn interpersonal skills (Olver, 2016).

Finally, unsuccessful programs tended to have unrealistic goals for treatment outcomes in individuals with psychopathic traits. Examples of unlikely or inappropriate treatment goals include the development of warmth or guilt. Some skills emphasized in therapeutic communities, like showing empathy through interpersonal interactions, can even be misused by some psychopathic individuals for harmful purposes like manipulation (Olver, 2016). While the therapeutic interventions used in these communities did help psychopathic offenders gain some self-insight, often they did not address the issues that brought them into treatment in the first place. These issues can include antisocial behaviours and lack of education or resources, which would also help these individuals reintegrate into their community (Olver, 2016).

Current Treatments & Future Directions

A model for the treatment of psychopathy based on RNR principles has been developed by Wong et al. (2012). It is made up of two different components, one of them being the Interpersonal component and the other being the Criminogenic component. The first component focuses on treating symptoms associated with Factor 1 of psychopathy using the responsivity principle. The second component involves managing the criminogenic needs or dynamic risk factors of offenders, using the principles of risk and need. The basis for this model of treatment is that the primary goal of interventions for psychopaths is reducing violent or criminal and antisocial behaviours. It also founded on previous research results indicating that Factor 1, involving affective and personality traits related to psychopathy, is stable throughout the lifespan of individuals, but that violent and antisocial traits related to Factor 2 tend to diminish as individuals age (Olver, 2016). This is consistent with research on non-psychopathic offenders, such that criminal behaviour is found to decrease with age.

It is not surprising that psychopathic traits stay relatively stable through time, and thus targeting individual's personalities during treatment may not be very successful. There is a lack of evidence showing that treatments focusing on affective or personality traits can lead to reduction of violent behaviour (Wong et al., 2012). However, Wong and colleagues' (2012) research has demonstrated that targeting dynamic risk factors or criminogenic needs using RNR principles does lead to lower recidivism in psychopathic offenders. An important point for mental health professionals or all staff interacting with these individuals to remember is to have clear communication with patients and staff, management of one's own emotions, and the modelling of positive behaviours (Olver, 2016). Staff in these programs would require training to be aware of RNR principles, and apply them to interactions with psychopathic individuals. Mental health professionals should attempt to retain these individuals in treatment, or at least maximize its length. It may also be beneficial to target several criminogenic needs at a time, for example by having individuals participate in programs for substance abuse and sexual violence simultaneously (Wong et al., 2012). Ideally, the treatment will allow these individuals to replace their antisocial or violent responses with more effective and prosocial ways of behaving through the use of CBT modules.

Therapeutic interventions for psychopathy are controversial within the public sphere and practice of mental health professionals. Due to the previously highly variable methods of treatments offered to individuals with psychopathic tendencies, conflicting evidence has existed as to whether treatments for psychopathy are effective or not. However, in the past two decades, psychopathy treatment has greatly improved in its efficacy with the rise of an evidence-based model of treatment based on RNR principles (Olver, 2016). Wong et al.'s (2012) model has led to a decrease in pessimism towards improvement of psychopathic symptoms from mental health

professionals, by providing a way to manage psychopathy symptoms. Contrary to popular belief, psychopathic offenders can benefit from treatment and there is no evidence indicating that effective treatment (i.e. that involves RNR principles) worsens their symptoms. Clinicians should educate themselves on the management of behaviours interfering with the treatment of psychopathic offenders, and reduce their own bias and stigma towards this complicated disorder. As research in this field continues, it is hoped that the success of therapeutic interventions for psychopathic individuals will increase, improving overall outcomes for this vulnerable group.

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Fighting for the Spotlight: The Implications of Post-War Sexist Culture on Female Artists
Genevieve DeNault
ARHI 333

The inherent sexism of the Post World War Two era found women back in the kitchen, instead of their newfound freedom as breadwinners and factory workers.^[1] Added to that, the historic practice of only recognizing female artists due to their connection with “powerful and well-known men”^[2], was a hindrance for any female artist of the time, but none more so than Lee Krasner and Yoko Ono. While they were both successful artists, both received different perceptions to their artwork based on the men they married. Jackson Pollock and John Lennon (it is telling that neither needs introduction) unintentionally undermined their respective partners’ careers due to the post-war reconstruction culture as well as the lasting influence they had on the world. This influence, and the underlying sexism, has carried through to this decade, so much so that one cannot mention Krasner or Ono, without first thinking of Pollock or Lennon.

Although her famous husband was certainly a hindrance to her later practice, in Lee Krasner’s mind, sexism was not the root cause.^[3] Instead, even when faced with a female minority, she still possessed a distinct sense of equality and self. Joan Marter, in her brief article with Margaret Barlow titled “Parallel Perspectives”, states that Krasner was in fact “a formidable, well-connected young modernist before she met Pollock”^[4]. This suggests that she could have in fact had a successful career, with a lasting legacy, had she not met Jackson Pollock. Unfortunately, she did and as such there was (and still is) an underlying sexist influence that hindered her success and fame. Partly her husband is to blame, however, society after the war can perhaps be named as the larger cause.

As was common with the time, women, and especially Krasner, brushed off sexist comments, and continued along with their lives. For that day and age, to be told, as Hans Hofmann said of Krasner’s work, that, “this is so good, you would not know it was done by a

woman”^[5], was, unfortunately, the norm. In more modern society, however one can plainly see the underlying sexism, the inequality concerning women and thus the constant battle that female artists had to go through, purely to get a chance at the same success as their male counterparts. As such, perhaps in a way marrying, especially to a successful male artist, was the best way to ensure that one’s work would not be forgotten, albeit at the cost of the suppression of their creativity. Helen Molesworth, in her podcast for the Getty Recording Artists series, with Lari Pittman and Amy Sillman, further reinforces that women, given the same opportunities as men, could be excellent artists. She states that “women artists who were connected to powerful men, tended to be excellent artists”^[6]. She argues that however wonderful their talents were, when, “as an artist, one is equal to other artists, but as a woman, one is not considered equal to men”^[7], the inequality between the two diminishes the accomplishments of these female artists. This further reinforces the inequal ground upon which female artists stood in comparison to male artists. Even with their incredible talents, the inherent sexism present in Post Second World War society forced women to go mainly unnoticed unless connected to powerful and successful men – as Lee Krasner was to Jackson Pollock, and Yoko Ono to John Lennon.

The shadow of World War Two and the Post-War reconstruction had a different effect on Ono, however. As a Japanese citizen as well as a female artist in America, Ono had different perceptions of what the end of the war meant. Helen Molesworth, when speaking to Catherine Lord in a podcast for the Getty Recording Artist’s series about Ono, spoke of this saying, “we ultimately ended up talking about the long shadow of WWII and it’s resonances in Ono’s work”^[8] – for Krasner the shadow of WWII put her back into the role of woman and wife, rather than that of successful artist, but the implications for Yoko Ono were much different.

As a Japanese Citizen, after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, her Buddhist-inspired, pacifist, “zen” style of artmaking is telling. Living on American soil in the early 1950s and producing work in the 1960s, her pieces were both culturally echoed through Martin Luther King Jr., and the Black Civil Rights Movement, as well as a product of her learning to “shake hands with her American victors”^[9]. *Cut Piece* (1964) (one of her earlier but most well-known performance pieces) is then, while still a pacifist statement, a piece that also contains the suggestion of war and of the helplessness of refugees. Catherine Lord described the link as saying that *Cut Piece* (1964), “bears the traces and the memories and the images of war and refugees, and people wandering about gravely injured, with shredded clothes, in a state of poverty”^[10]. This comes as a contrast to the common perception of it as a piece on “passive femininity and violence against that femininity and disempowerment of ‘the woman’[sic]”.^[11] Instead, Catherine Lord argues that it is both extremely private and excruciatingly public, both giving the audience a place as performer and voyeur. This interplay between artist and audience allowed for both more and less power in a time where power over women was common and power *to* women was rare. This makes Ono unique, allowing her to stand, at least slightly, separate from her husband’s shadow; something Krasner was unable to do.

With first-wave feminism came the emphasis on self-representation for female artists in a way that recaptured their autonomy, their sexuality and themselves. It allowed for more freedom and breathing room and started to even the inequalities between men and women and, as such, between male and female artists. For Krasner, this came too late, as Pollock’s success was already established and his place in history secured. For Ono, however, this allowed her to produce works like *Cut Piece* (1964) which contains a message that is both culturally and

socially significant even as it ages. This is not to say, however, that this shift did not come without consequences. Abigail Solomon-Godeau, in her essay, *The Woman Who Never Was: Self-Representation, Photography, and First-Wave Feminist Art*, states that Ono, “presents herself as an impersonal screen, a field of projection, upon which what is otherwise culturally and socially disavowed, repressed or even taken for granted may be ritualistically expressed”^[12]. This is taken to mean that once the audience realizes there are no consequences, it opens the door to the whims of the audience, be it kindness or cruelty. Due to that, Ono holds much less power than she normally would over a physical or even an instructional piece. Instead the audience’s actions were determined spontaneously, and she is left to deal with the results. Perhaps this was purely an outcome of the fact that there were no immediate aftereffects, however, tensions from the rise of feminism, to the shock of post-war reparation efforts, to the looming Vietnam War likely played a part in the impact of this piece and the seeming powerlessness of the artist.

Ono, however, was not truly powerless. At the same time, as she had no choice but to succumb to the impulses of the audience, she also held them in her hands, wrapped around her fingers to see what she would do next and how far she might go. On some subconscious level perhaps they realize the implications of participation, yet they still wait with bated breath for the next step. It is in this way that Ono is at once powerless and holding all the power. Solomon-Godeau, after allowing that the artist becomes a blank canvas upon which people can do anything, also argues that, “the artist is anything but passive, insofar as she is the cultural producer and impresario of the aggression, misogyny or violence she solicits or actively controls”^[13], meaning that insofar as Ono instigates and starts the act (in this case *Cut Piece* (1964)), she still has control over how it goes. An example of this can be seen in Marina Abramović’s piece *Rhythm 0* (1974), a piece that mimics *Cut Piece* (1964) however with higher

stakes and ten years apart. The six-hour durational piece, during which she endured torture at the hands of her audience, ended abruptly when she stood up to leave and the remaining crowd fled, fearing the consequences of being both the active instigator and the passive bystander in an art piece gone cruel. As Solomon-Godeau argues then, had Ono done the same thing, the power shift would have been just as abrupt, proving that Ono purely played the powerless, but in truth, held all the power. Therefore the ability that Ono had, and the leg up that the rise of first-wave feminism gave her, allowed for her to slightly separate herself from the legacy of her famous husband, instead of falling victim to the era, as Krasner did.

Thus the cultural shift of the Second World War, where women went from factory heroes to housewives again, played a detrimental role in Lee Krasner's artistic career. Further hindering her artistic genius, she soon married Jackson Pollock, a man considered to be one of America's most influential painters. As such Lee Krasner's inability to detach herself from Pollock's shadow until becoming his widow was an unfortunate product of the times. With the rise of first-wave feminism however, Yoko Ono was able to create pieces that helped to establish her as an artist in her own right without being completely overshadowed by her famous husband, although the two are still compared and often one cannot mention the one without the other. This allowed a greater shift within modern art and gave breathing room for female artists to practice without sacrificing their chance at success, allowing women to have the spotlight, and create a lasting legacy.

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Patterns of Obesity
Steph McClennon
ANTH 589

Obesity is a global public health concern. In 2017, obesity was attributed to 4.7 million premature deaths, which represents 8% of deaths worldwide (Roser & Ritchie, 2017). Obesity is a risk factor for several leading causes of death, including heart disease, stroke, diabetes, various cancers, and musculoskeletal disorders (WHO, 2020). Global obesity prevalence has nearly tripled in the past four decades (WHO, 2020). That said, obesity prevalence is not equally distributed across all countries. In fact, there is a ten-fold difference in obesity prevalence between some countries (e.g., between India and the United States) (Roser & Ritchie, 2017). Additionally, low- and middle-income countries are dealing with a double burden of undernutrition and obesity (WHO, 2020). This means that undernutrition and obesity may co-exist in the same country, community and even in the same household (WHO, 2020). There is also variation in obesity mortality. We can compare countries with the same prevalence of obesity and notice substantial differences in mortality. For example, the prevalence of obesity in both Fiji and Canada is 30%, but the obesity death rate in Fiji is 6.6 times greater than in Canada (Roser & Ritchie, 2017). Obesity is clearly an issue, but what cultural and biological variables can explain this variation? To better understand variation in obesity vulnerability, I have conducted an anthropological literature review of primary sources on predictors of obesity. Weight is determined by energy balance, or the difference between energy intake and energy expenditure. Obesity is the result of an energy surplus, but this doesn't fully explain why some people are obese. In fact, obesity etiology is complex and multifactorial. In this literature review, I will describe the factors that shape obesity vulnerability through the life cycle, from the developing environment *in utero*, to childhood experiences, to obesogenic stressors in adulthood, to population-level nutrition transition and obesogenic built environments. Understanding the

context that produces obesity can help anthropologists tailor culturally informed health interventions.

Definitions

This paper is an anthropological literature review on the factors that shape vulnerability to obesity, from an anthropological perspective. The anthropological perspective is holistic and interdisciplinary, connecting branches of knowledge to produce a more complete understanding of the human experience. The anthropological perspective is also cross-species, cross-cultural and diachronic. That is, anthropologists may ask how a given phenomenon (e.g., obesity) is expressed in our nonhuman primate relatives, in other cultures, and in past populations to understand how context shapes that phenomenon. So, to conduct an anthropological literature review on obesity, I took a cross-species perspective to understand how obesity is expressed in nonhuman primates, a cross-cultural perspective to understand how obesity varies between and within different cultural contexts, and a diachronic perspective to understand how our evolutionary history might explain some of the variation in obesity.

This paper concerns patterns of overweight and obesity. Obesity and overweight describe abnormal or excessive fat accumulation that can impair health (WHO, 2020), but this can be difficult to measure, so instead we use body mass index to define overweight and obesity. Body mass index (BMI) is weight-for-height measured in kilograms per metre squared (kg/m^2) (WHO, 2020). Overweight is defined by BMI from $25.0 \text{ kg}/\text{m}^2$ to $29.9 \text{ kg}/\text{m}^2$, and obesity is defined by BMI greater than $30.0 \text{ kg}/\text{m}^2$ (Table 1) (WHO, 2020). BMI above $30.0 \text{ kg}/\text{m}^2$ is significant because it describes weight at or above the 95th percentile for age, sex and height (WHO, 2020). That is, 95% of healthy people will have a BMI below $30.0 \text{ kg}/\text{m}^2$. BMI has some limitations. For example, BMI doesn't account for muscle mass, so athletes may be deemed 'overweight'

even if they have a low or healthy body fat percentage (Roser & Ritchie, 2017). Additionally, for a given BMI, women and older individuals tend to have a higher body fat percentage (Roser & Ritchie, 2017), which means BMI is a less accurate proxy of adiposity for women and older individuals. Adiposity, like obesity, is defined here by excessive body fat. BMI is a useful population-level tool as ‘underweight’, ‘healthy’ and ‘overweight’ BMI are the same for both sexes and adults of all ages (WHO, 2020), but like any tool, it’s important to acknowledge its limitations.

Table 1

Body Mass Index and nutritional status

| BMI (kg/m²) | Nutritional status |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| < 18.5 | Underweight |
| 18.5-24.9 | Normal weight |
| 25.0-29.9 | Overweight |
| > 30.0 | Obesity |

Note. BMI categories were retrieved from the World Health Organization (WHO, 2020).

One predictor of BMI is the nutrition transition. Nutrition transition is defined here as large-scale dietary changes that affect populations (Dufour & Bender, 2012). ‘Nutrition’ in nutrition transition includes diet and nutritional status, which is a measure of health (Dufour & Bender, 2012). Humans have been through several nutrition transitions in our evolutionary history, including the transition to agriculture during the Neolithic (Dufour & Bender, 2012). In this paper, nutrition transition refers to recent changes in diet that emphasize animal source foods and vegetable oils, and decrease cereal grain, fruits and vegetables (Dufour & Bender, 2012).

Methods

This literature review takes an anthropological perspective of the variables that shape vulnerability to obesity. I began my literature review by looking at epidemiological data on obesity from Our World in Data and the World Health Organization. I noticed that there was considerable variation in obesity prevalence and mortality between countries, so I continued my search, looking for factors that shape obesity prevalence. To find appropriate papers, I used three search engines: Anthropology Plus (<https://www.ebsco.com/products/research-databases/anthropology-plus>), Annual Reviews (<https://www.annualreviews.org/>) and Google Scholar (<https://scholar.google.com/>). The search terms I used were ‘obesity’ AND ‘developing environment’ OR ‘DOHaD’ OR ‘epigenetics’ OR ‘etiology’ OR ‘nutrition transition’ OR ‘obesogenic environment’. Since anthropology is holistic and interdisciplinary, these papers came from a variety of disciplines, including human ecology, primatology, nutrition science and pediatrics. My criteria for acceptable literature included peer-reviewed journal articles, narrative and systematic reviews, meta-analyses, and book chapters. In addition to the literature review, I also created a model to illustrate the factors that shape obesity vulnerability (Figure 1). I added variables to my model while reading the papers and added arrows after completing all my readings.

Background

Obesity is a global public health concern. Globally, in 2016, 39% of adults and 18% of children were overweight or obese (WHO, 2020). Over the past four decades, mean BMI has increased for both men and women (Roser & Ritchie, 2017), and obesity prevalence has nearly tripled (WHO, 2020). That said, obesity prevalence varies between and within countries. In fact, there is up to a tenfold difference between countries in obesity prevalence (Roser & Ritchie, 2017), and within some countries there is a double burden of undernutrition and obesity (WHO,

2020). For example, stunting and obesity co-occur in several Latin American countries, including Mexico, Chile and Brazil (Rivera, Barquera, Gonzalez-Cossio, Olaiz, & Sepulveda, 2004). Obesity death rates are higher in middle-income countries (15%) than in high-income countries (8-10%), which may be explained by the high prevalence of obesity coupled with poorer healthcare systems and poorer overall health (Roser & Ritchie, 2017). There is also variation in obesity prevalence by sex: in 2016, 11% of men and 15% of women were obese (WHO, 2020). The variation between and within countries in obesity prevalence and mortality requires more fine-grained contextualized studies, which anthropology is well-positioned to provide. Understanding the factors that shape obesity vulnerability in different contexts can inform our understanding of obesity and allow anthropologists to tailor intervention programs for each community.

The etiology of obesity is context-specific and complex. Figure 1 illustrates a few of the known variables that shape vulnerability to obesity, including development *in utero* and early childhood, the developing environments of our matrilineal ancestors, adverse childhood experiences, stress, sex, nutrition transition and the built environment. Figure 1 also illustrates some of the ways that these factors interact. For example, the effect of adverse childhood experiences on obesity is exacerbated by poverty (Gardner et al., 2019), and obesogenic built environments may overlap with neighbourhoods that produce ACEs (McDonnell & Garbers, 2018). In the following literature review, I will consider some of the variables that shape vulnerability to obesity, including the built environment, nutrition transitions, sex, stress, adverse childhood experiences, development *in utero* and early childhood, and the relationship between hormones and energy balance.




Figure 1. Factors that shape vulnerability to obesity.

Hormones and energy balance

Weight is determined by energy balance, which accounts for energy intake and expenditure. Obesity is the result of an energy surplus, but how do people get there? Humans and other animals have evolved a set of checks and balances that tell us when to eat and when to stop. Leptin is an important part of this as it signals energy stores, which helps balance net energy (Sharrock et al., 2008). Leptin is complicated: high levels of leptin can either prevent weight gain *or* make an individual leptin resistant and promote weight gain (Tomiyama, 2019). However, the relationship between leptin and fat stores varies between sexes and ecological contexts (Sharrock et al., 2008). For example, among Tsimane youth in lowland Bolivia, the relationship between leptin and adiposity was stronger for females and weaker for males (Sharrock et al., 2008). These sex differences may arise from different evolutionary pressures on males and females (Sharrock et al., 2008). The relationship between leptin and adiposity also changes through time: as females approach reproductive maturity, the relationship between leptin

and adiposity strengthens (Sharrock et al., 2008). Thus, leptin is a more important signal of energy stores for females, especially as they approach reproductive maturity. Leptin suppresses appetite, while ghrelin stimulates it and heightens food reward processes (Tomiyama, 2019). Ghrelin is also complicated, as ghrelin decreases after non-emotional eaters are provided with food, but does not decrease among emotional eaters (Tomiyama, 2019). Population-level differences in the relationships between these hormones and obesity begins *in utero* (Sharrock et al., 2008).

The development of obesity starts *in utero*

Between some populations, there is a tenfold difference in obesity prevalence (Roser & Ritchie, 2017). This variation can be explained in part by differential vulnerability to obesity, which is shaped by early environments (Thompson, 2012). Here, it may be useful to take an evolutionary perspective on obesity by studying our non-human primate kin. For example, we can study obese captive marmoset who show similar symptomatology to obese humans (i.e., high fasting glucose and high triglycerides) (Power, Ross, Schulkin, & Tardif, 2012). A longitudinal analysis of 33 captive marmoset infants found differences in adiposity around weaning at one-month post-birth, and differences in body mass by six months (Power et al., 2012). Maternal adiposity and diet predicted birthweight but did not predict adiposity later in life (Power et al., 2012). The initial divergence in adiposity may occur during lactation, but the growth pattern may also be affected by gestational conditions in utero (Power et al., 2012). Although diet had a significant effect on adiposity at six months, it was no longer a significant predictor at 12 months (Power et al., 2012). This study on captive marmosets had some weaknesses related to validity. For example, 'normal' neonate body composition and adiposity was measured from two dead neonates, whose body composition might not reflect the normal, healthy body composition of

marmosets, as they died early. That said, it highlights how early environments shape vulnerability to obesity.

Differential vulnerability to obesity is shaped by early environments, which includes developing conditions *in utero* and newborn feeding practices. For example, unlike formula, breastmilk contains bacteria that shape the infant gut microbiome (Thompson, 2012). Gut microbiota play a role in host energy balance by processing indigestible polysaccharides into simple sugars and short-chain fatty acids (Thompson, 2012). Bacteria vary in their energy extracting capabilities, so variation in microbiome composition can affect infant growth and adiposity, as well as long-term energy absorption (Thompson, 2012). Breastmilk differs from formula in other ways, too. For example, breastmilk has higher concentrations of long chain polyunsaturated fatty acids, which have protective effects against inflammation, obesity and cardiometabolic disease (Thompson, 2012). Adipokines and hormones in breastmilk are also involved in the programming of neuroendocrine pathways for appetite regulation, which means that breastmilk can have long-term effects on hunger and satiety cues (Thompson, 2012). On the other hand, formula has more protein and is more calorically dense than breastmilk, which can have lasting effects on body composition. In fact, formula-fed babies show higher adiposity than breastfed babies, and the high protein content of formula may program babies for later-life obesity as early exposure to high protein enhances secretion of insulin and insulin-like growth factor 1 (Thompson, 2012). Developmental conditions *in utero* and infant feeding can also interact with each other to influence adult health. For example, the effect of low birthweight on high blood pressure and diabetes can be exacerbated by postnatal catch-up growth (Kuzawa, 2005). These biological factors, including micronutrient and macronutrient composition of

breastmilk and formula, also interact with the social and behavioural context of newborn feeding to shape vulnerability to obesity (Thompson, 2012).

Obesity vulnerability is shaped *in utero* and during infant feeding by biological factors like breastmilk and formula macronutrient composition, but vulnerability also shaped by epigenetic alterations. That is, signals transmitted from the parent to the offspring can affect offspring gene expression and therefore phenotype (e.g., through DNA methylation) (Kuzawa, 2005). Although both parents send signals that may contribute to obesity vulnerability, the intrauterine environment seems to be more significant. For example, the magnitude of association between maternal obesity and umbilical cord blood cytosine-phosphate-guanine dinucleotide (CpG) methylation is stronger than the association between paternal obesity and methylation (Kappil, Wright & Sanders, 2016). Cord blood CpG methylation is important for obesity vulnerability as it predicts child obesity and adiposity (Kappil et al., 2016). Exposure to environmental pollutants, like polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, BPA and dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, can also lead to obesity and increased adiposity, although effects may only appear in later generations (Kappil et al., 2016).

Intrauterine conditions and early feeding practices shape vulnerability to obesity, but might this be adaptive? Hales and Barker (2001) proposed the thrifty phenotype hypothesis, which suggests that the associations between poor fetal and infant growth and subsequent development of the metabolic syndrome, which includes obesity and diabetes, can be explained by permanent changes in glucose-insulin metabolism that result from poor nutrition in early life. This means that babies who face poor nutrition in early life become more efficient extracting energy from foods, which may be adaptive if the perinatal conditions match the conditions later in life (i.e., if there is food scarcity throughout the life cycle). In the case of environmental

mismatch, where nutritional scarcity *in utero* is followed by nutritional abundance post-birth, obesity may develop. There are several pathways that a thrifty phenotype may be ‘programmed,’ including DNA methylation, maternally and paternally imprinted genes that influence the tug-of-war between fetal demand and placental supply, and information communicated to the fetus across the placenta via maternal capacity to supply nutrients and metabolites (Kuzawa, 2005). This hypothesis assumes that the fetus has access to a reliable signal of long-term nutritional conditions (Kuzawa, 2005). For long-lived humans who live in environments characterized by seasonal fluctuations and ecological and climatic variability, the immediate intrauterine environment might not provide a reliable long-term signal (Kuzawa, 2005). Rather than offspring vulnerability to obesity being shaped by the immediate intrauterine conditions, there may be an integrated matriline signal of long-term nutritional conditions (Kuzawa, 2005). In fact, after controlling for maternal gestational age, maternal birthweight is the strongest predictor of offspring birthweight, which suggests that matrilineal fetal growth matters for offspring vulnerability to obesity (Kuzawa, 2005). For this reason, it’s important that obesity interventions focus not only on the individual but on the matriline.

Obesogenic stress in childhood

Biological factors, including the composition of infant foods and epigenetic alterations, interact with social experiences in childhood to shape obesity vulnerability. This might include exposure to adverse childhood experiences (ACEs), which are associated with greater risk of health problems across the lifespan (CDC, 2019). ACEs are traumatic events suffered by people under 18 years of age, including abuse, neglect, parental conflict, mental illness and substance abuse (Javier, Hoffman, & Shah, 2019). ACEs are widespread and common: in the US, 61% of adults had exposure to at least one ACE, 16% had experienced four or more ACEs (CDC, 2019).

In eastern Europe, a majority of respondents reported experiencing at least one ACE (Bellis et al., 2014). Risk of exposure to ACEs isn't equally distributed, as women and ethnic groups are at greater risk of exposure to four or more ACEs (CDC, 2019). Exposure to ACEs is associated with health-harming behaviours, including physical inactivity (Bellis et al., 2014), which may contribute to obesity. Additionally, ACEs are associated with chronic inflammation in adulthood, increased adiposity, decreased leptin sensitivity and increased C-reactive protein, which is a marker of inflammation (Mutlu, Bildic, Erten, Aras, & Tayfur, 2016).

ACEs are associated with health-harming behaviours and chronic inflammation in adulthood, but ACEs may also have effects on health during adolescence. For example, a prospective study on adolescents in Ireland ages 9 to 13 found that exposure to ACEs before 9 years of age was associated with greater risk of obesity at 13 as well as weight gain between 9 and 13 years of age, independent of physical activity, dietary intake, parental obesity and household income (Gardner, Feely, Layte, Williams & McGavock, 2019). Poverty seems to play an important role in determining the effect of ACEs on obesity, as adolescents living in households in the bottom 20th income percentile showed a stronger relationship between ACEs and BMI (Gardner et al., 2019). These are remarkable results, but they are difficult to compare with other studies, as the authors did not use a standardized questionnaire. Instead, they used interviews to determine a list of relevant adverse experiences. In this study, exposure to ACEs shaped vulnerability to adolescent obesity.

Exposure to ACEs can have a measurable effect on adult obesity. In one study of Turkish adults, obese participants were significantly more likely to have experienced physical neglect, emotional abuse, sexual abuse and physical abuse than non-obese participants (Mutlu et al., 2016). Surgical operation during childhood was a significant predictor of obesity (Mutlu et al.,

2016), although surgery may point to underlying health issues rather than childhood adversity that shapes vulnerability to obesity. The generalizability of this study is also limited, as this study sampled far fewer men (n=46 obese, 35 nonobese) than women (n=111 obese, 122 nonobese). That said, this study suggests that ACEs may shape vulnerability to later-life obesity.

Obesogenic stress in adulthood

Stressors and traumatic events during childhood may shape vulnerability to later-life obesity, but stressors during adulthood also contribute to rising levels of obesity. Stress can lead to obesity through cognitive, behavioural, physiological and biochemical pathways (Tomiya, 2019). For example, stress undermines self-regulatory cognitive processes including executive functioning, and can inhibit cognitive emotional regulation (Tomiya, 2019). This means that stress makes people more susceptible to unhealthy eating (Tomiya, 2019). To alleviate stress-related negative emotions, people may eat more or eat differently when they're under stress, and may decrease physical activity (Tomiya, 2019). This response to stress isn't universal, as some people respond to stress by increasing physical activity (Tomiya, 2019). Stress may also disrupt sleep, which may lead to weight gain, as shorter sleep duration decreases thermogenesis and thus decreases energy expenditure (Tomiya, 2019). Shorter sleep also increases fatigue, which means sleep deprived people might be less inclined to exercise, and people who are sleep deprived report being hungrier (Tomiya, 2019). Both of these factors may contribute to energy surplus and weight gain. From a biochemical perspective, perceptions of stress are followed by a physiological cascade in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis; this cascade includes cortisol (Tomiya, 2019). Cortisol triggers processes that lead to weight gain and obesity, as cortisol encourages eating and promotes abdominal fat deposition (Tomiya, 2019). Additionally, gut microbiota can respond to and generate stress. In fact, gut microbiota affect

emotions and behaviour through afferent body-to-brain neural signaling via the vagus nerve, generation of hormones and neurotransmitters, and immune signaling (Tomiyama, 2019). The relationship between weight gain and stress goes both ways: stress can lead to weight gain, but weight gain can also lead to stress because of stigma and anti-fat culture (Tomiyama, 2019).

Nutrition transitions

There is a ten-fold difference in obesity prevalence between cultures (Roser & Ritchie, 2017). What can explain this variation? Part of this can be attributed to nutrition transitions, which include recent dietary shifts away from cereal grain, fruits and vegetables towards more animal source foods and vegetable oils (Dufour & Bender, 2012). Models can be used to understand nutrition transitions. For example, Barry Popkin's model proposes five stages of the nutrition transition: (1) collecting food; (2) famine; (3) receding famine; (4) degenerative disease; and (5) behavioural change (Dufour & Bender, 2012). Stage 1 is best represented by contemporary foragers whose diets are high in carbohydrates and animal protein but low in fat, like the Kalahari !Kung San (Dufour & Bender, 2012). These contemporary foragers show no evidence of obesity (Dufour & Bender, 2012). This category also includes high latitude foragers whose diets are high in saturated animal fat and low in carbohydrates, and who also show no evidence of obesity (Dufour & Bender, 2012). In our evolutionary past, stages 2 and 3 are represented by a decline in overall health following the beginning of intensive agriculture. This decline in overall health was not the consequence of famine, but rather the consequence of a consistent lower-quality diet (Dufour & Bender, 2012). Today, among populations in stages 2 and 3, there is a continuum from food insecurity to severe food shortage and famine (Dufour & Bender, 2012). Populations can survive chronic hunger or short-term food shortages but cannot survive famine, so 'famine' and 'receding famine' may be inappropriate labels for these stages

(Dufour & Bender, 2012). Stage 4 is where many populations are today, with diets high in fat and sugar but low in fiber (Dufour & Bender, 2012). Here, there is a continuum from increases in sugar and vegetable oils, to increases in animal source foods, processed foods and eating away from the home (Dufour & Bender, 2012). Stage 4 is associated with a parallel reduction in physical activity, which may lead to increased BMI and obesity (Dufour & Bender, 2012). However, this decrease in physical activity is primarily seen among urban males, while physical activity has increased for everyone else (Dufour & Bender, 2012).

The nutrition transition model is useful for identifying broad patterns that may lead to obesity, but it is also problematic because it obscures variation within and between populations, which limits our understanding of the problem (Dufour & Bender, 2012). For example, some populations defy the categories as they experience a double burden of undernutrition and obesity (WHO, 2020). Additionally, individuals with higher socioeconomic status tend to be closer to the nutrition transition predictions than low socioeconomic individuals (Dufour & Bender, 2012). That said, the relationship between income and obesity prevalence is nonlinear (Dufour & Bender, 2012), which may suggest that the relationship between nutrition transition and obesity is not fully explained by socioeconomic status or income. Variation within and between populations suggests that we need contextualized, fine-grained studies to better understand the relationship between nutrition transition and obesity (Dufour & Bender, 2012).

In some Latin American countries undergoing nutrition transitions like Chile, Brazil and Mexico, obesity prevalence decreases as socioeconomic conditions improve (Rivera et al., 2004). For example, in Chile, women with the lowest socioeconomic status are twice as likely to be obese as women in the highest socioeconomic status (Rivera et al., 2004). So, in Chile, Mexico and Brazil, obesity prevalence has a negative relationship with socioeconomic status. In Senegal,

there is a positive relationship between obesity prevalence and socioeconomic status (Cohen et al., 2019). The positive relationship between obesity and socioeconomic status in Senegal may be explained by urbanization, migration to urban centres and social valorization of fatness among African populations (Cohen et al., 2019). In Senegal, there are sex differences in obesity vulnerability, as women are 3.6 times more likely than men to be obese (Cohen et al., 2019). Among Surui in Brazil, women with high socioeconomic status had higher BMI than women with low socioeconomic status, while men with high socioeconomic status had lower BMI than low socioeconomic status men (Port Lourenco, Ventura Santos, Orellana, & Coimbra, 2008). Among Surui, nutrition transition and new vulnerability to obesity correlates with the emergence of intragroup differences in socioeconomic status (e.g., houses with tile floors and six or more modern appliances, versus houses with earthen floors), which have influenced dietary habits and physical activity patterns (Port Lourenco et al., 2008). So, among Surui in Brazil, the relationship between socioeconomic status and obesity vulnerability varies between sexes (Port Lourenco et al., 2008). These three case studies highlight the importance of understanding context, as socioeconomic status, urbanization and other cultural variables have varying effects on health outcomes, including obesity, between populations.

In some contexts, urbanization and transculturation predict obesity vulnerability. For example, among three Venezuelan Amazonian communities, BMI and stature increased with the degree of transculturation to modern lifestyles (Hidalgo et al., 2014). Hidalgo and colleagues (2014) examined obesity prevalence in Mahecoto, Platanillal and Coromoto, and found the highest prevalence of child overweight (10%) and obesity (5%) in Coromoto, the most transculturated village, followed by Platanillal (3% child overweight), and no overweight or obese children in Mahecoto. Like in some other Latin American countries, these communities

experience a double burden of obesity and undernutrition, but it varies between communities. For example, Mahecoto shows the highest prevalence of child stunting, which is an indicator of chronic poor-quality diet with micronutrient deficiencies, while Coromoto shows the lowest prevalence of stunting (Hidalgo et al., 2014). In these contexts, transculturation and nutrition transition explains vulnerability to obesity.

Nutrition transitions and an increased reliance on the market economy are associated with dietary changes, reduced physical activity and increased alcohol consumption among Xavante Indigenous groups in Pimentel Barbosa in the Brazilian Amazon (Welch et al., 2009). Over time, these changes have led to increased adiposity and increased BMI (Welch et al., 2009). In fact, average BMI increased from a 'healthy' BMI (23.8 for males, 22.0 for females) in 1962 to an 'overweight' BMI (27.8 for males, 27.9 for females) in 2006 (Welch et al., 2009). In this population, there is also a positive relationship between adiposity, BMI and socioeconomic status, but the relationship is stronger for females, which may be explained by gender roles and food sharing (Welch et al., 2009).

Across the world, many populations are experiencing nutrition transitions. Between countries, there is variation in how nutrition transitions affect obesity. There is also variation within countries and within communities. For example, in Senegal and in modernized Venezuelan Indigenous villages, higher socioeconomic status and degree of transculturation are associated with increased obesity prevalence. In some other contexts, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico, socioeconomic status shows a negative relationship with obesity prevalence. This suggests that not everyone is equally affected by socioeconomic change (Welch et al., 2009), so it's important to understand context when developing obesity intervention programs.

Obesogenic built environments

Structural changes, like urbanization and increasing dependence on market economies, can result in obesity, but *physical* structures can also explain some variation in obesity. For example, speed limit and urban sprawl are positively associated with obesity, while obesity shows a negative association with street connectivity and access to greenspace, public transport, bike lanes and sidewalks (Jia, 2020). Access to food in the built environment also shapes obesity vulnerability. For example, access to convenience stores and fast-food restaurants is positively associated with obesity, while access to supermarkets, grocery stores, full-service restaurants and fruit and vegetable markets is negatively associated with obesity (Jia, 2020). Understanding the social context as well as the built environment can inform more effective public health interventions (Jia, 2020).

What makes an effective intervention program?

So, a number of variables shape vulnerability to obesity, from the manner in which an infant is fed to the experiences that individual has during their childhood, from the experiences of an individual's parents or grandparents to the built environment they inhabit. Obesity etiology is complex, but clinical and public health interventions tend to prioritize proximal factors like diet and exercise over ultimate factors. These ultimate factors include the developing environment, exposure to ACEs, socioeconomic inequality and the built environment. Since matrilineal fetal growth predicts offspring vulnerability to obesity, effective interventions might focus on the matriline rather than the individual (Kuzawa, 2005). The developing environment shapes offspring vulnerability, but the effect of maternal diet and adiposity on offspring obesity vulnerability can be reduced with maternal exercise (Kappil et al., 2016). Although exposure to ACEs can shape obesity vulnerability, and although there is evidence that screening for ACEs is beneficial, screening for ACEs is not often incorporated into regular pediatric practice (Javier et

al., 2019). ACEs may go unrecognized in childhood and may remain unaddressed into adulthood. In fact, few interventions have been reported that address ACEs when trying to deal with obesity (McDonnell & Garbers, 2018). Where ACEs are addressed, like in trauma-informed group therapy for obese women with exposure to ACEs, interventions are associated with a reduction in PTSD symptoms and an increase in overall mental health (McDonnell & Garbers, 2018). Interventions should also address healthy ways of coping with stress and negative emotions (e.g., by encouraging exercise as a relaxing and stress-reducing activity) (McDonnell & Garbers, 2018). While it is important to address the factors that shape vulnerability to obesity, it is also important to address interpersonal discrimination and obesity stigma, as these have been shown to increase stress and obesity vulnerability, especially among non-white people (McDonnell & Garbers, 2018). Urban planning can also be an effective obesity intervention strategy, as the built environment shapes obesity vulnerability (Jia, 2020). Finally, access to high-quality information, education and adequate income can facilitate positive behavioural changes (Rivera et al., 2004). These changes can be supported by implementing food policies that facilitate healthful diets (Rivera et al., 2004), while ensuring that everyone has safe access to physical activity (Jia, 2020).

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to investigate the factors that shape vulnerability to obesity. Obesity is a global public health concern. In 2016, 39% of adults and 18% of children globally were overweight or obese (WHO, 2020). That said, there is a tenfold difference in obesity prevalence between countries. Some of the factors that shape obesity vulnerability, and which might explain some of this variation, include epigenetic alterations *in utero*, matrilineal fetal growth patterns, composition of infant feeds, exposure to ACEs, stress, nutrition transition

and the built environment. In each context, it's important to understand sex, as sex also shapes obesity vulnerability. Interventions should focus not only on proximal factors, like diet and exercise, but also on the ultimate factors that shape obesity vulnerability. Given the immense variation between and within countries, future research should focus on understanding the specific contexts that shape obesity, while also using methods that facilitate cross-cultural comparisons, like standardized questionnaires.

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To Work Towards an Inclusive Future, We Must First Acknowledge the Past: An Examination of Residential School Memorials as Counter-Monuments

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COMS 591

The preservation of history plays a key role in the effective, successful orchestration of the future, one that is mindful of mistakes made in the past and is non-exclusionary. In order for the future of a nation or community to be non-exclusionary, the commemoration of the past must also be so, even if it involves recalling traumatic events or mistakes some would rather leave forgotten. Monuments and memorials are physical sites of memory where commemoration can take place. According to historian Jay Winter (2010), “Sites of memory are places where groups of people engage in public activity through which they express ‘a collective shared knowledge [...] of the past, on which a group’s sense of unity and individuality is based’ (Assmann 15)” (p. 61). However, a group cannot express that collective shared knowledge that develops a sense of unity if the site itself does not exist, therefore excluding certain past events from collective history and dominant understandings of what is deemed worthy of commemoration. This is what the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC), now known as the National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation (NCTR), aims to rectify through several “Calls to Action” that demand and encourage proper, adequate commemoration of the history of the Indian residential school system in Canada. Thus, this essay examines the construction of (typically) government-funded residential school memorials as unique counter-monuments engaging in the work of counter-memory that aim to educate the public, celebrate survivors, and redress cultural amnesia by drawing a largely unacknowledged part of Canadian history into national, collective memory.

The TRC – in its final report released in 2015 before its transition to the NCTR – issued two key “Calls to Action” regarding the construction of monuments for residential school commemoration: Call to Action 81 and 82. The former:

call[s] upon the federal government, in collaboration with Survivors and their organizations, and other parties to the Settlement Agreement, to commission and install a publicly accessible, highly visible, Residential Schools National Monument in the city of Ottawa to honour Survivors and all the children who were lost to their families and communities. (Government of Canada, 2019, Commemoration section, para. 9)

Call to Action 82 demands the same except instead of the federal government it is geared towards provincial or territorial governments, and instead of stopping at a national monument it calls for public, highly visible residential school monuments in each capital city (Government of Canada, 2019). Thus far, the government of Canada has not fully completed either of these actions although the official website mentions that “work on Call to Action 81 is in early planning stages” (Government of Canada, 2019, Commemoration section, para. 10). Moreover, several municipal governments, in collaboration with members of the community, have built monuments dedicated to commemorating residential schools and their survivors in several cities such as Winnipeg, Manitoba (see Figure 1) and Toronto, Ontario (see Figure 2). Although these monuments emerge with governmental involvement through funding, oversight, or approval, they are often suggested by the community, or elders and survivors themselves. Furthermore, their origins and purpose are part of what deems them a unique form of counter-monument.

In the case of the engraved stone monument in Winnipeg, it was suggested by a survivor of a residential school named Nelson James, prior to his death. Although he was unable to see the unveiling of it, he emphasized its importance saying that “such a monument needed to be in a public place where many would see it and gain an understanding of what happened in that dark part of Canada's history” (CBC News, 2014, para. 4). The turtle monument in Toronto – although part of “a collaboration between Toronto Council Fire Native Cultural Centre, the

Province of Ontario and the City of Toronto” (Johnson, 2018, para. 2) – was designed by Anishinaabe artist Solomon King. A key purpose of it too is to “offer an opportunity for Indigenous and non-Indigenous people to learn about the history represented through the project” (Johnson, 2018, para. 13). A third, prominent monument is the Witness Blanket project (see Figure 3): “a large scale art installation, made out of hundreds of items reclaimed from Residential Schools, churches, government buildings and traditional and cultural structures including Friendship Centres, band offices, treatment centres and universities, from across Canada” (Witness Blanket, n.d., The project section, para. 2). As a blanket is considered a universal symbol of protection and is also an item worn in various Indigenous ceremonies, the monument incorporates those ideas into an art piece carved out of wood displaying meaningful physical objects. It serves as a “traveling” national monument that not only honours the children (both those that were lost and those who survived) but symbolises ongoing reconciliation. It tours around Canada being displayed at various venues with the latest exhibition including interpretive panels, an in-gallery film, and a digital interactive element to enhance the commemorative and educational experience. It also has a digital application where users can interact with a virtual version of the blanket, click on various objects, and learn about their origins. These elements are part of what makes such monuments different from traditional memorials, establishing them as a unique form of counter-monument.

Many Canadian monuments, such as the National War Memorial, have been “found to be better suited to celebrating heroic deeds than to remembering traumatic pasts” (Cooper-Bolam, 2018, p. 62). They tend to be celebratory or serve to memorialise an honourable, purposeful sacrifice. Commemorating residential schools, a traumatic event in which the loss of life was unnecessary, cannot be done the same way. Moreover, according to James Young (1993), a

primary function of counter-monuments is “to jar viewers from complacency, to challenge and denaturalize the viewers’ assumptions” (p. 28). In the case of residential schools, viewers’ assumptions are informed by a lack of education and effective memorialisation on the matter. Educating the public about the traumatic event through monuments or memorialisation is part of discouraging a repetition of history. In addition, the past must be properly acknowledged and understood for present issues – that have resulted from the ongoing, systematic, inter-generational effects of those past traumatic events – to be addressed. Honarine Scott (n.d.), a Healing Programs Coordinator in the Indigenous Ministries Circle, mentions how “too often we say never again without changing the conditions that led to cultural genocide” (para. 5). Therefore, to effectively encourage inter-generational and community healing, the greater national public must be jarred from complacency, know what happened, and be educated about the historical roots of these contemporary issues so they can implement effective policies or practices to address them.

Another aspect that makes these residential school memorials unique forms of counter-monument is the continuous promotion of healing and strengthening inter-generational bonds. Therefore, a traditional listing of names – recording loss of life – “could prove problematic” because “rather than honouring the resilience of Survivors and the endurance of Indigenous cultures under conditions of cultural genocide, this inscription of names could undermine these very accomplishments” (Cooper-Bolam, 2018, p. 67). Thus, these residential school memorials “resist a single ‘design standard’” (Cooper-Bolam, 2018, p. 68) and adopt a form more suitable to their purpose that both acknowledges the atrocities of a tragic event while also celebrating the survivors of it. Monuments like the Witness Blanket, incorporating the stories of survivors, objects belonging to the lost or deceased as well as objects contributed by members of the

community, not only educate the greater Canadian public but also construct stronger bonds between generations. By engaging in this memory work, these memorials allow a trauma-based community of memory – defined by Irwin-Zarecka (1994) as one based on a shared, tragic experience – to “transition from unspoken bonding to outspoken... activity that [allows] the community of memory [to acquire] public resonance” (p. 51) with Canadians and future Indigenous generations. Their unique form that both honours survivors and remembers the dead also ensures that both groups’ stories manage to live on as an important part of Indigenous and Canadian history.

In addition to celebrating survivors and educating the public, residential school memorials also engage in redressing cultural amnesia. The TRC’s various calls to action (including Call to Action 81 and 82) suggest that Canada has largely left its dark history of cultural genocide unacknowledged via lack of proper commemoration. In Paul Connerton’s (2008) piece on types of forgetting, one notable type is that of repressive erasure. This involves an act of state that forcefully attempts to destroy objects that commemorate certain people or events “with the explicit purpose of casting all memory of them into oblivion” (Connerton, 2008, p. 60). However, this form of erasure can also be covert and non-malign. Connerton (2008) gives the example of The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York where “the collection of oriental and other types of non-western art... are invisible from the Great Hall”; therefore, “exhibiting a master narrative, [in which] the museum’s spatial script is overt in its acts of celebratory remembrance, covert in its acts of editing out and erasure.” (p. 61). Similarly, by excluding certain stories from Canada’s history through a lack of commemoration, a grand narrative develops that covertly solidifies dominant national values including ideas about which communities or people are worth remembering and which are not. For instance, monuments

honouring John A. Macdonald commemorate Canada's first prime minister and engage in overt acts of celebratory remembrance regarding his achievements by placing his statues in front of important institutions of power like city hall buildings. However, John A. Macdonald also played a significant role in establishing residential schools and systems against Indigenous people. Pushing that aspect of his work aside also covertly edits out the repercussions of his actions and the experiences of Indigenous people in Canada. This has resulted in recent protests and activist work calling for the removal of his statues. Yet, the TRC and other members of the community have asserted that removing 'controversial' monuments is not enough; the repressive erasure and cultural amnesia must be rectified by erecting "statues and monuments highlighting great Indigenous leaders, or highlighting exactly which Indigenous groups live in a particular place and their contributions to Canadian life" (McMahon, 2020, para. 5) as well as building residential school monuments that force Canada to acknowledge its dark history and move forward with efforts of reconciliation. The turtle sculpture monument, the idea for which originated from the TRC and survivors or Indigenous artists, rather than "official" government institutions, finds its home outside Toronto City Hall. By siting it in a space outside an institution of power, a space where a John A Macdonald statue may have once stood in another province, the monument engages in a symbolic dialogue with the site. A dialogue that calls for official acknowledgement of ignored experiences; thus, addressing repressive erasure and countering traditional, exclusionary practices of top-down commemoration in Canada.

Ultimately, although Canada still has a long way to go to with satisfying the TRC's calls to action, this examination of several residential school monuments demonstrates how the country is slowly on its way to redressing cultural amnesia, celebrating the survivors whilst also honouring the dead, and educating the nation by engaging in the work of counter-memory.

Residential school monuments – despite being partially funded for or overseen by government institutions – act as unique forms of counter-monuments different from traditional Canadian sites of memory. Instead of emerging via a “top-down approach [that] proclaims the significance of sites of memory as a materialization of national, imperial, or political identity” (Winter, 2010, p. 63), governments are prompted by organizations like the TRC, by members of the community, Indigenous artists, elders, and residential school survivors who declare the monuments’ significance as materializations of inclusive national history. An inclusive national history that acknowledges its mistakes, whose effective preservation and commemoration can be used to construct an inclusive future for the nation and all its people.

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Appendix




Figure 1. A screenshot of the residential school monument in Winnipeg taken from the CBC news video coverage of its unveiling. From CBC News. (2014, May 26). Residential School Students Honoured with Monument in Winnipeg. Retrieved November 27, 2020, from <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/residential-school-students-honoured-with-monument-in-winnipeg-1.2654447#:~:text=1%3A47-.A%20monument%20to%20honour%20those%20who%20attended%20residential%20schools%20in,was%20a%20residential%20school%20survivor>



Figure 2. The turtle sculpture monument prior to its placement outside Toronto City Hall. From Scott, H. (n.d.). A Residential School National Monument in Every Capital City. Retrieved November 27, 2020, from <https://www.united-church.ca/blogs/round-table/residential-school-national-monument-every-capital-city>



Figure 3. The Witness Blanket monument in its entirety, built to resemble a woven blanket out of wood carving and physical objects. From Witness Blanket. (n.d.). A National Monument to recognize the atrocities of Indian Residential Schools. Retrieved November 27, 2020, from <http://witnessblanket.ca/#!/explore/>

‘If we do not fight now, it will be too late, and our children will curse us for our callousness’: Militant Motherhood and Intersectionality in the Anti-Pass Activism of the Federation of South African Women, 1954-1955.

Riley Jewel Bohach

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“All mothers are human beings, and must be prepared to face death in the fight for rights for our children” stated Lilian Ngoyi⁷⁷ at the April 17th, 1954 inaugural conference of the Federation of South African Women (FSAW).⁷⁸ Speaking to a group of 150 predominantly black, overwhelmingly women delegates -representing some 230,500 individuals across South Africa⁷⁹- Ngoyi continued with sobering bluntness: “it is our duty to die if we have to.”⁸⁰ On that day, from the Johannesburg Trades Hall, South Africa’s first women led, multi-racial, and national in focus activist organization was born.⁸¹ Along with Ngoyi, other famous leaders such as Ida Mntwana, Fatima Meer, Hilda Watts, Dora Tamana, and Ray Alexander created, “with joyful enthusiasm” and “single-minded determination,” a platform where the voices of women would be granted autonomy and validity amidst the broader anti-apartheid movement.⁸² However, the focus on a uniting womanhood, particularly through militant motherhood, did not supersede the stark reality of the colonially induced racial injustices faced by the majority non-white members. The Ngoyi quote ends: “we must fight ourselves. Almighty won’t do it for us. The history of the past 300 years has proved that.”⁸³

⁷⁷ For a summary of Lilian Ngoyi see for example: Christine Qunta, “Lilian Madediba Ngoyi: (1911-80), in *Women in Southern Africa*, ed. Christine Qunta (London: Allison and Busby, 1987): 112-114; Rebecca Hensley, “Lilian Ngoyi,” *In Your Face Women*, PRX, March 1, 2013, <https://beta.prx.org/stories/93167>.

⁷⁸ FSAW, “Report of the First National Conference of Women held in the Trade Hall, Johannesburg, South Africa April 17th 1954,” *Records of the Federation of South African Women*, (ca. 17.04.1954): Ac 1.6.2. pg. 9.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pg. 1.

⁸⁰ Quoted in Nicholas Grant, *Winning our Freedoms Together: African Americans & Apartheid, 1945-1960* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 175.

⁸¹ FSAW, “Invitation to attend a Conference to Promote Women’s Rights,” *Records of the Federation of South African Women*, (ca. 17.05.1954): Ac 1.1. pg. 1.

⁸² FSAW, “Report of the First National Conference of Women,” pg. 1.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pg. 9.

The FSAW's life as an organization spanned from 1954 until 1963. However, during the organization's infancy, specifically from 1954 until 1955, its ideological framework was established. Although an assuredly anachronistic label, the FSAW's recognition that "the struggle for women's rights is... part of the struggle for the emancipation of the African, Coloured and Indian people and of the working class as a whole"⁸⁴ was intersectional in nature.⁸⁵ Significantly, the commitment to incorporating race, class, gender and sex in the organization's structure was further reflected in the central issue around which FSAW "women and mothers" mobilized: the anti-pass movement.⁸⁶ Simply put, the anti-pass struggle was the praxis through which the FSAW's intersectional approach was solidified.

To demonstrate the relationship between theory and praxis within the FSAW's early activism, the theoretical framework underscoring this paper's analysis of the organization's archived documents must first be established. Following, a brief sketch of the pass-system and women's organizing against it prior to the 1950s will be given to understand the historical foundation upon which the FSAW was built. An in-depth analysis of select speeches given during the inaugural conference will then take place to understand the organization's ideology. Lastly, the FSAW's first major anti-apartheid protest will be examined to demonstrate how the intersectional rhetoric of the inaugural conference was successfully translated into the organization's activism.

Before discussing how militant maternalism united the intersecting areas of class, race, and sex within the FSAW, the epistemological foundations of this study must be established.

⁸⁴ FSAW, "Circular letter," *Records of the Federation of South African Women*, (23.05.1955): Ab 1. Pg. 1.

⁸⁵ For an overview of intersectionality see: Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bildge, *Intersectionality* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016); National Association of Independent Schools (NAIS), "Kimberle Crenshaw: What is Intersectionality?," *Youtube*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ViDmfQ9FHc>.

⁸⁶ The phrase "as women and mothers" is repeated consistently throughout the FSAW archive. See for example: FSAW, "1956 26 items," *Records of the Federation of South African Women*, Ad 1.3. pg. 13, 17; FSAW, "Resolutions," *Records of the Federation of South African Women*, Ba 2.1.2. pg. 7.

This holds especially true as the concept of a uniting element of womanhood: motherhood, is being argued as the basis for group solidarity. Under the most elementary of circumstances trying to analyze a non-western, non-white, colonized region or culture through a western, white, and non-colonized positionality is highly contentious. As the South African academic Christine Qunta highlights, such “authors tend to employ theoretical assumptions and a methodology which hamper or in some cases preclude a realistic assessment of the subject matter [black Africa].”⁸⁷ This predisposition has been especially rampant within white feminism. bell hooks, another black activist and academic, expands on the idea that because of a fabricated or fantasized ‘universal sisterhood’ white feminists feel entitled to make assumptions about, and speak for, black women. hooks labels such academia as inherently racist and classist.⁸⁸ Simply put, “white women in academia are oppressors.”⁸⁹

Treating this oppressive relationship with the solemnity it demands, the documents discussed below will be viewed through theoretical lenses put forth by black, predominantly African, women. Such scholarship requires that a few key points about African women generally, and their activism specifically, be made explicitly clear. To begin, simply because the study highlights motherhood does not negate other non-sexed or non-gendered positionalities. For, as gender scholar Oyèrónké Oyèwùmí states, “it would be counterproductive in the African setting to single out gender... as the primary source and focus of political agitation.”⁹⁰ The FSAW’s fight for gender equality will not be removed from the fight against “the main enemies

⁸⁷ Christine Qunta, “Preface,” in *Women in Southern Africa*, ed. Christine Qunta (London: Allison and Busby, 1987): 11.

⁸⁸ bell hooks, “Sisterhood: Political Solidarity Between Women,” *Feminist Review*, no. 23 (1986): 129.

⁸⁹ Nkiru Nzegwu, “O Africa: Gender Imperialism in Academia,” in *African Women & Feminism: Reflecting on the Politics of Sisterhood*, ed. Oyèrónké Oyèwùmí (Asmara: African World Press, Inc., 2003), 147.

⁹⁰ Oyèrónké Oyèwùmí, “Introduction: Feminism, sisterhood, and *Other* Foreign Relations,” in *African Women & Feminism: Reflecting on the Politics of Sisterhood*, ed. Oyèrónké Oyèwùmí (Asmara: African World Press, Inc., 2003), 2.

of black women:” imperialism and colonialism.⁹¹ Conversely Patricia Hill Collins’ idea that “black motherhood” has been wielded as a weapon to fight the “intersecting oppression of race, class, gender, sexuality and nation” will govern this study’s engagement with motherhood and should be kept in the front of mind.⁹²

There are two prerequisites for fully understanding the FSAW: the pass system and the long tradition of women’s organized resistance to it. Both phenomena are not only interconnected but are in turn predicated on the various forms of European influence in South Africa, from first contact to apartheid.⁹³

In 1985, writing a year before the abolition of the pass system,⁹⁴ British born anti-apartheid activist Hilda Bernstein stated that for the non-white South African “there is no freedom of movement in their own country.”⁹⁵ This was as true in the moments before the ending of the apartheid system as it was when pass laws were first enforced against enslaved African’s in the Cape in 1760.⁹⁶ Although increasingly crippling under the National Party,⁹⁷ throughout pass laws’ centuries long lifespan, essential and perpetuating characteristics were maintained. Passes were an intranational passport system, tying non-white workers to their white

⁹¹ Qunta, “Preface,” 18.

⁹² Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 175-176.

⁹³ As a vibrant South African historiography concerned with the colonizer/colonized relationship exists, an in-depth engagement with colonization/decolonization generally will not take place. For more expansive overviews see for example: Roger B. Beck, *The History of South Africa* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000); Nancy L. Clark and William H. Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (New York: Routledge, 2016); Adrian Guelke, *Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid: South Africa and World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Timothy J. Stapleton, *A Military History of South Africa: From the Dutch-Khoi Wars to the End of Apartheid* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010).

⁹⁴ Guelke, *Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, 18.

⁹⁵ Hilda Bernstein, *For their Triumph and for their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa* (London: International Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa, 1985): 127.

⁹⁶ Michael Savage, “The imposition of Pass Laws on the African Population in South Africa 1916-1984,” *African Affairs* 85, no. 339 (1986): 181.

⁹⁷ Clifton Crais and Thomas V. McClendon, *The South Africa Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 279.

employers, thus controlling where non-whites could live, travel, and work. Perhaps the most significant characteristic of passes was their ability to modernize and reimage a system of slavery: disempowering Africans from acquiring higher wages and by extension allowing white employers to limit labour costs and optimize profits.⁹⁸ As historian Keith Shear summarizes, this restrictive system ensured both economic and social oppression, making pass laws “*fundamental to the maintenance of white supremacy and the system of racial economic exploitation* [emphasis added].”⁹⁹ Or, to quote a contemporaneous perspective: “there is nothing in the country that makes an African a prisoner... more than the operation of pass laws.”¹⁰⁰ One aspect of the pass laws which did change once apartheid was enacted was their extension to women.

Prior to the 20th century, passes were a form of both gendered and racialized subjection “under which African men ha[d] suffered” alone.¹⁰¹ The reason for the exclusion of women rested not in some enlightened view of female emancipation. Rather, because so few African women worked outside of the home, governments did not deem it necessary to issue them passes.¹⁰² The first attempt at extending pass laws to women came in 1913, shortly after the Union of South Africa had gained power and created a state separate from the British and governed by white people alone. Although the passes were not to be universal, the threat they posed immediately catalyzed women dominated protests.¹⁰³ These anti-pass demonstrations were

⁹⁸ FSAW, “Memorandum on the Pass Laws and the issuing of Reference Books to African Women,” *Records of the Federation of South African Women* (ca. 1958) Cb 1.5.1. pg. 1.

⁹⁹ Keith Shear, “At War with the Pass Laws?: Reform and the Policing of White Supremacy in 1940s South Africa,” *The Historical Journal* 56, no. 1 (2013): 207.

¹⁰⁰ The National Consultative Committee, “Memorandum on Anti-Pass Campaign,” *Records of the Federation of South African Women* (25.10.56), Eb 1.1. pg.1

¹⁰¹ FSAW, “Memorandum on the Pass Laws,” pg. 1.

¹⁰² Cheryl Walker, *Women and Resistance in South Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1991), 27.

¹⁰³ Guelke, *Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, ix.

not only successful, but marked the beginning of “the struggle against passes... sometimes fiercer, sometimes quieter” within South Africa.¹⁰⁴

Although conflict over passes, and their extension to women, continued to flare up throughout the first half of the 20th century, the election of the apartheid government in 1948 -the National Party- ushered in an era of unprecedented oppression and resistance.¹⁰⁵ When, in 1950, a leaked government document once again proposed extending passes to women, it was seen not as “the beginning of the struggle but only a new phase.”¹⁰⁶ Women immediately sought to resist the passes because they were degrading and reinforced the system of white domination; moreover, they would result in the loss of women’s movement between townships, the tightening of preexisting service contracts, as well as mandating medical examinations for those living within towns.¹⁰⁷

Women also feared the possibility of imprisonment, “of being torn from their home and their children,” if unable to produce a pass.¹⁰⁸ Just as the threat of passes in 1913 sparked mass protests, the reintroduction of passes as a national threat caused an upsurge in women’s activism. In 1952, the same year the proposed passes for women were meant to take effect, “South African women in different towns began discussing the need for and possibilities of” an organization which would be directly representative of, and beholden to them.¹⁰⁹ The seeds for what would soon become the FSAW were planted.

Now that a general understanding of both pass laws, and women’s opposition to them, has been established, a more in-depth study of the FSAW can take place. It is worth stating that

¹⁰⁴ FSAW, “National Consultative Committee Document on the Struggle Against Passes,” *Records of the Federation of South African Women* (undated), Eb 1.6. pg. 1.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pg 1-3.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Walker, *Women and Resistance*, 129.

¹⁰⁸ FSAW, “Memorandum on the Pass Laws,” pg. 1.

¹⁰⁹ FSAW, “Report of the First National Conference of Women held in the Trade Hall,” pg. 1.

the FSAW was not the sole women's organization involved in anti-pass activism, nor was the pass system the only issue around which the FSAW mobilized. The FSAW worked in tandem with many other women's organizations –chief among them being the ANC Women's League, as well as various trade unions, religious groups, and the Communist Party of South Africa.¹¹⁰ The deeply intermeshed relationship between the ANC Women's League and the FSAW can be seen in: the cross organizational presidencies of Mntwana and then Ngoyi,¹¹¹ the 1956 co-publication of *Women in Chains*,¹¹² and the numerous letters sent between the respective leaderships coordinating membership, political positions, and protests.¹¹³ In short, the FSAW defined their activism as being “not to compete, or weaken, or take away from any other organization... But to STRENGTHEN [sic] by our work within them. To add to them – to add to ourselves by working amongst them.”¹¹⁴

The inaugural conference of the FSAW set much of the tone for the activism which was to come. The first speech given that evening was from one of the event's key organizers, Ray Alexander. Born in Latvia in 1913, Alexander immigrated to South Africa at the age of 15 – fleeing anti-Semitic and anti-communist persecution- and was a lifelong women's rights and worker's rights activist.¹¹⁵ The rhetoric espoused throughout her speech demonstrates that Alexander believed all those present, regardless of race, class, or political position, were united. This unity came from her belief that “all women of the whole world, on whom falls the responsibility for the welfare of their homes are growing more and more aware of the need to

¹¹⁰ Grant, *Winning our Freedoms Together*, 173.

¹¹¹ Bernstein, *For Their Triumphs*, 87.

¹¹² FSAW, “Women in Chains,” *Records of the Federation of South African Women* (ca. 1956) Cb 1.8.1.

¹¹³ See for example: FSAW, “Letter from R. Alexander to I. Mtwana,” *Records of the Federation of South African Women* (2.09.1954), Aa 2; FSAW, “Correspondence,” *Records of the Federation of South African Women* (ca. 1959), Ae 4.3.

¹¹⁴ FSAW, “Lady into Women,” *Records of the Federation of South African Women* (Undated), Ai 4. pg. 1.

¹¹⁵ Veronica Belling, “The Making of a South African Jewish Activist: The Yiddish Diary of Ray Alexander Simons, Latvia, 1927.” *Jewish Culture and History: Jewish Migration and the Archive* 15, no. 1-2 (2014): 110-111.

participate actively in the struggle.”¹¹⁶ None of this rhetoric, however, gave the impression that women all experience their oppression uniformly. For example, Alexander rhetorically asks, “what is the position of the African, Coloured and Indian women of this country?” Answering that “they have no political rights, no right to elect or be elected on the governing bodies of the country.”¹¹⁷ There is no ignorance to the fact that “it is a government of Europeans only [who] to maintain power... makes laws discriminating against African, Indian and Coloured people.”¹¹⁸

The next person to speak was the “Youth Leaguer, moving spirit among women, orator and heckler” Ida Mntwana.¹¹⁹ Then, in her fifth year in the presidency position of the ANC Women’s League, Mntwana gave an impassioned speech about the significance of “lay[ing] the foundation for the future role that will be played by the women in the struggle for freedom.”¹²⁰ Through her speech Mntwana expands on Alexander’s points on an active, uniting motherhood, stating that:

gone are the days when the place of women was in the kitchen and looking after the children. Today, they are marching side by side with men in the road to freedom... we have come together, women of all races, to co-ordinate our efforts into one great army capable of shaping the future destiny of our children.¹²¹

Like Alexander before her, Mntwana positioned this united activism as being geared towards fighting the apartheid system. Speaking to the fear that many felt towards challenging the nationalist government, Mntwana ended her speech with the now famous quote: “If we do not fight now, it will be too late, and our children will curse us for our callousness.”¹²²

¹¹⁶ FSAW, “R. Alexander,” *The Federation of South African Women* (17.04.1954), Ac 1.5.1. Pg. 2.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pg.1.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Drum Magazine*, quoted in Walker, *Women and Resistance*, 92.

¹²⁰ FSAW, “Report of the First National Conference of Women held in the Trade Hall,” pg.4.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² *Ibid.*

As the night wore on, the ideological frameworks of Alexander and Mntwana were repeated by woman after woman (and one man), from various factions of South African society. For example, Fatima Meer, a devout Ghandian and freedom fighter¹²³, shed light on how “Indian women in South Africa suffer from disabilities that arise from two sources... as non-Europeans, and secondly as members of a society which gives them very few rights.”¹²⁴ Mr. Duma Nokwe, member of the ANC Youth League, spoke to the connection between women’s political (specifically communist) activism and the liberation of Africans. Drawing on China as an example of successful emancipation, Nokwe argued that Chinese women had directly aided in “the historic struggle to crush the feudal oppression,” therefore abolishing women’s “double enslavement.”¹²⁵ Henrietta Osterich, Dora Tamane, and Florence Matonela, amongst others, spoke directly to the role which the FSAW would play in the anti-pass struggle. Although many women who spoke that night are worthy of quoting, the words of Hetty Du Preez, Garment Workers’ Union representative, are perhaps the best way to sum up the conference: “The Government is slashing the people – what are the mothers going to do about it?...Women of Africa, let us promise to stand together, to go forward.”¹²⁶ In effect, over the course of the evening, the FSAW’s intersectional framework was created and curated.

Following their first conference, the FSAW initially struggled to establish the organizational fervor and broad-based engagement necessary to lead a successful, national campaign. The catalyst for propelling the FSAW to national preeminence eventually came on October 27th, 1955 when “a mass deputation of women of all races to go to Pretoria to protest

¹²³ Devi Moodley Rajab, *Women: South Africans of Indian Origins* (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2011), 26.

¹²⁴ FSAW, “Report of the First National Conference of Women held in the Trade Hall pg. 4.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, pg. 6

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pg. 9.

against Bantu Ed. [sic] and all other legislation” was successfully mobilized.¹²⁷ The idea for a deputation was conceptualized in early August of that year, at the Congress of Mothers called together by the FSAW.¹²⁸ Throughout the planning of the protest, the FSAW stayed true to their intersectional framework. This is significant as the rhetoric espoused during the inauguration was able to overcome both the administrative and discriminatory obstacles stacked against an on the ground, activist campaign. The commitment to embodying the theory within the practice can be seen in the correspondence between organizers and: internal members of the FSAW, external allies, and, most significantly, adversaries in the local and federal government.¹²⁹

Although slightly more difficult to study due to a lack of documentation of the protest itself,¹³⁰ with the available evidence it is apparent that the FSAW continued their commitment to uniting a diverse set of women, through militant motherhood, at the deputation itself. To begin, the women involved refused to backdown despite police raids of FSAW members’ houses and attempted blocking of buses transporting women to the protests.¹³¹ Referred to by Helen Joseph as “an attempt to intimidate all organizations which oppose fascism and racial discrimination,” the bravery and determination of such women epitomizes militant motherhood.¹³² The commitment to incorporating a multiracial cohort of women is also exemplified in the four key leaders at the protest itself: Ngoyi, Joseph, Rahima Moosa, and Sophia Williams. These leaders

¹²⁷ FSAW, “Report of the World Congress of Mothers,” *Records of The Federation of South African Women* (undated) Ae 2.5.3. pg.2.

¹²⁸ FSAW, “Circulars Announcing the Meeting in Support of the World Congress of Mothers,” *Records of The Federation of South African Women* (27.07.1955) Ae 2.1. pg. 1.

¹²⁹ FSAW, “Correspondence,” *Records of The Federation of South African Women* (19.08.1955) Cb 2.1.2. pg. 2-20; FSAW, “Correspondence,” *Records of The Federation of South African Women* (11.10.1955) Bb 1. pg. 7.

¹³⁰ Here, the inability to access *We Now Demand* by Julia C. Wells must be painfully acknowledged.

¹³¹ FSAW, “Correspondence,” Bb 1. pg. 7.

¹³² Ibid.

represented women from African, white, and Indian communities, further underscoring the FSAW's commitment to being a multi-racial organization.¹³³

Despite all obstacles, between 1,000 and 2,000 women protested that October day, thenceforth establishing themselves as a force which the government could no longer ignore or trivialize. One such example of this was the government's agreeing to meet with FSAW representatives in 1956, a request which was denied leading up to the 1955 deputation.¹³⁴ Significantly, the deputation at the Pretoria was not only the first major success of the organization, but it also marked the pivot point in the FSAW's activism from being broadly anti-apartheid to explicitly anti-pass.¹³⁵ Not quite a year from this initial protest, an estimated 20,000 women under the banner of the FSAW, once again returned to the Pretoria in an immense demonstration of opposition to pass laws.¹³⁶

Four years after the FSAW's unprecedented show of governmental opposition, the world awoke to a surge of headlines announcing not a success, but a tragedy: a tragedy which would eventually become known as The Sharpeville Massacre.¹³⁷ With 69 people killed and at least 180 more wounded, the events of March 21st 1960 propelled the violent and racist reality of apartheid South Africa into the global spotlight.¹³⁸ However, as awareness was being ignited abroad, at home "the Sharpeville Massacre marked the end of an era."¹³⁹ Following the massacre, a five-

¹³³ Walker, *Women and Resistance*, 187.

¹³⁴ FSAW, "Correspondence," Cb 2.1.2. pg. 15-17; FSAW, "Correspondence," *The Federation of South African Women* (1.06.1956) Cb 2.2.2. pg. 12.

¹³⁵ This phenomenon is highlighted in: Walker, *Women and Resistance*, 185. However, the FSAW archive itself gives the clearest example of this. Following 1955, document's concerned with passes all but take over the archive.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ "Dozens Killed in Sharpeville," *The Guardian* (22.04.1960), pg. 1; "54 Dead, 191 Hurt in Riots: Army Called out in Cape Outburst," *Rand Daily Mail* (22.04.1960), pg. 1; "63 Dead in South African Riots," *The Daily Telegraph* (22.04.1960), pg. 1; "50 Killed in South Africa As Police Fire on Rioters," *The New York Times* (22.04.1960), pg.1

¹³⁸ See for example: John Freeman, "At Home and Abroad," *BBC Home Service Basic*. Television Program (08.04.1960); Norman Phillips and Pierre Berton, "Sharpeville Massacre Sparks International Condemnation," *Close-Up*. CBC Television Interview (17.04.1960).

¹³⁹ Bernstein, *For Their Triumphs*, 97.

month State of Emergency was declared allowing the government to ban both the ANC and the newly formed Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).¹⁴⁰ The FSAW was simultaneously thrown into disarray. After losing essentially all membership due of overlap with the outlawed ANC Women's League,¹⁴¹ followed by the governmental banning of elected FSAW leaders, alongside drawn out political trials and numerous imprisonments, the organization was slowly stripped of political prowess and significance. Continuing to struggle for the next three years, in 1963 the FSAW ultimately recognized that it had become "impossible for the Federation to continue to function as an organization."¹⁴² Despite never officially dissolving, the FSAW's crusade "to unite women in the fight to end discrimination against them as women, and as black women – in work and in society" was in effect, ended.¹⁴³

Following the Sharpsville Massacre, Ngoyi's proclamation that "all mothers... must be prepared to face death in the fight for rights for our children. It is our duty to die if we have to" resounded as a prophecy rather than a rallying cry.¹⁴⁴ However, in 1954, Ngoyi's words set the tone for the exciting beginning and not the tragic end of the FSAW. The first two years of the FSAW's existence were fundamental in first defining, and secondly testing the organization's theoretical framework. The events which facilitated the ingraining of the FSAW's ideology were the 1954 inaugural conference and the 1955 Pretoria demonstration.

The attunement to the relationality of race, class, sex and gender within the FSAW can be accurately described as intersectional. In the apartheid context, the FSAW united these intersecting identities under the banner of militant motherhood in order to combat the extension

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 84.

¹⁴¹ FSAW, "The Federation of Women," *Records of The Federation of South African Women* (undated) Ab 3. Pg. 3.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid., pg. 1.

¹⁴⁴ FSAW, "Report of the First National Conference of Women, pg. 9.

of the pass system to Black women. From start to finish FSAW, “women and mothers” understood that “we must fight ourselves. Almighty won’t do it for us. The history of the past 300 years has proved that.”¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

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**Michael Jordan Versus Michael Qiaodan:
Chinese Trademarking and the Jordan Case**
Shaziah Jinnah
COMS 401

As quoted from Shakespeare, “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose By any other name would smell as sweet.” (Shakespeare & Durband, 1985). What is in a name? Is it merely a way that society indicates an association through language or does it attribute to quality and authenticity? This is a question pondered as far back as Shakespearian times, and still remains prevalent today primarily in the world of intellectual property, specifically trademarks. For six-time NBA Finals MVP, Michael Jordan, his name is representative of his reputation, achievements, and infamous basketball shoe and clothing brand under Nike, Jordan Brand (and Air Jordan). In Canada and America, the prevalence of Jordan Brand is embedded in our culture, so it can come as a surprise that a “deceiving” Chinese company operated within the law for 12 years before a lawsuit was filed against them for trademark infringement by Jordan. The American basketball megastar, has been known as Qiaodan (pronounced cheow-dahn (Wee, 2016)), the pinyin transliteration of his name in Mandarin, or “乔丹” in Chinese characters, to the more than one billion people in the People’s Republic of China since his 1984 Olympic appearance (Chatterton, 2013). Qiaodan Sports Co. is a sportswear company based in the Chinese southern province of Fujian (Wee, 2016) that built its multi-million-dollar brand on the notoriety of Jordan and has registered more than 100 trademarks in China associated with Qiaodan (Baker III, Liu, Brison, & Pifer, 2017).

In 2012, Jordan began a four year long legal battle contesting primary trademarks, including his transliterated name. A trademark is defined as “uniquely visible marks of identity associated with products, services, and organizations” (Hawkins, 2019) and in many cases like this one, protects consumers from confusion with product associations and brands. Ultimately,

Jordan partially won his lawsuit in 2016 but the process displayed the battle that many transnational corporations undergo considering trademarks in China. Jordan argued that the communication of the brand was misleading as the Chinese associated Qiaodan Sports with Jordan Brand, while there has never been an involvement with Nike or Michael Jordan (Wee, 2016). This paper will discuss the complicated realm of Chinese trademarking, beginning with a brief history of intellectual property and trademark laws in China as compared to common law countries. I will go on to explore the Jordan case and finally discuss similar cases and the future of international trademarking in China.

The trademark finds its roots in maker's marks from the middle ages and like copyright, is protected by registration (Hawkins, 2019). In China, trademarks can be traced back to the Northern Zhou Dynasty (556- 590 AD), during which merchants used marks, like a maker's mark, to distinguish their products (Chang, 2014). Although they have early roots for trademarking and have "been at the forefront of scientific discovery and technological invention" for its history of 5,000 years, developments in the formal regulation and protection of trademarks by the government are young (Chang, 2014, p. 341). The establishment of the Chinese Communist Party did not help progress intellectual property law as the individual ownership aspects did not align with the party's ideology (Chang, 2014). In time though, reform came. In the 1980s World Intellectual Property Organization treaties were starting to be signed and China began to conform more with the TRIPS agreement, leading up to China becoming a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Chang, 2014). The China Trade Mark Office (CTMO) administers Chinese trademarks, and the appeal function is administered by the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board (TRAB) (Chang, 2014).

All of this development did not address the issues in which trademark squatters- like Qiaodan- find their opportunity. Trademark squatters are defined as the following by Chang (2014):

A company or individual who registers another party's brand name as a trademark and then uses the trademark in connection with the sale of counterfeit goods or in an effort to otherwise profit from the goodwill of the genuine brand name owner. (p. 339)

A primary difference between intellectual property law in common law countries (Canada, United States, Australia etc.) and China is that common law rights do not exist, meaning they do not follow a first to use system of the mark (Garraffa, 2017). Instead, their regime is based on a first- to- file basis, and no prior evidence of use of the mark is required to file (Garraffa, 2017). Specifically important to companies like Qiaodan is the fact that "it is not illegal to register the Chinese transliteration of an overseas mark" (Garraffa, 2017, p. 237). Several other factors of China's trademark policies also open the door for trademark squatters including their requirement of single- class filing opposed to the multi-class filing that is in place in Canada and the U.S. This system implements "one mark, one class per trademark application" protocol, requiring you to file a trademark application for 45 class groups and the multiple subclasses in each to be fully protected (Garraffa, 2017). Apple fell victim to this when they registered the trademark for the iPhone in the wrong subcategory, which they soon found out when expanding its release as Hanwang Technology had filed their application to trademark iPhone in the correct one. Following litigation, Apple was left to pay \$3.65 million dollars to Hanwang for the rights to the correct trademark (Chang, 2014). China's stringent definitions for being "well known" also denies many popular unregistered marks of the "extensive rights and privileges given under Chinese Trademark Law" that potentially allow owners to "exclude others

from registering, reproducing, or translating the mark across all categories of trademarks” (Chang, 2014, p. 347). The Madrid Protocol is an option for international recognition of a trademark, and China is a member (Hawkins, 2019). Issues with filing through the Madrid system can lead to problems as not all subclasses may be covered, and it can take a longer time for CTMO to consider your application.

Ultimately, a major “loophole” in Chinese trademarks is the area where Michael Jordan and Nike made their main mistakes in protecting their trademark overseas, the language barrier and Chinese names. According to Hsiao and Parker who authored an article on the Jordan case for Finnegan, Chinese brands can rise as “the market creates a name for the western brand over time, even though the name has not been authorized by the company” (Parker & Hsiao, 2016). A Chinese name for a company is often created through translation, transliteration as in the Jordan/Qiaodan case, concept (for example, BMW’s Chinese name means “treasure horse”), or nicknames that are created by the media or consumers (Parker & Hsiao, 2016). As in the Jordan case, someone will jump at the opportunity to trademark the Chinese name for a company, as generally the application(s) filed by the original company neglect to cover the Chinese monikers. This golden opportunity for trademark squatters can become quite an epidemic. The World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO, determined that in 2009 the China Trade Mark Office (CTMO) “received a quarter of all trademark applications worldwide” and after adjusting for difference factors was found to have “2.3 times more trademarks than the U.S.,” who hold the second highest amount (Chang, 2014, p. 340).

The case between Michael Jordan and the company using his transliterated Mandarin name, Qiaodan Sports, is an embodiment of the deeply rooted issues in China’s trademark laws. In the 1990’s, Nike expanded Air Jordan to China as Michael and basketball in the country were

exploding with popularity (Parker & Hsiao, 2016). Nike, as a large multinational corporation, did their due diligence in registering the English name Jordan as a trademark in China but made their first mistake in neglecting to trademark the Chinese characters or phonetics for Jordan (Garraffa, 2017). With the knowledge of the Chinese trademark system as explained in the previous paragraphs, it is easy to see how Qiaodan Sports was able to capitalize on the opportunity to build a multi- million dollar business from Nike's blunder. Beginning with their registered trademark for 'Jordan' in Chinese characters in 2000, Qiaodan Sports built an empire. With their continuation of trademark registrations that were related to the real Michael Jordan, they expanded to owning more than 5,700 stores across China with an annual sales of roughly \$500 million U.S. dollars by 2015 (Parker & Hsiao, 2016). By 2013 they had filed close to 80 registrations, and as the courts later found out, these included anything from a silhouette logo similar to the infamous "Jumpman" logo (view in appendix) to the English and Chinese names of Jordan's sons (Baker III, Liu, Brison, & Pifer, 2017; Garraffa, 2017) (Parker & Hsiao, 2016).

Possibly the greatest mistake on Nike and Jordan's part, aside from not applying for the trademarks initially, was that they simply just waited too long to take action. In China, there is a five year invalidation period for trademarks, during which it would have been much cheaper and easier for Jordan to dispute these registrations that infringe on his own (Parker & Hsiao, 2016). Unfortunately, that opportunity was long gone when Michael Jordan started to take actions to cancel Qiaodan's trademarks in 2012 (Parker & Hsiao, 2016). Instead, a four year legal battle ensued within China's Trademark Appeal Board, Beijing First Intermediate Courts, and Beijing High People's Court in which Jordan made 78 appeals and lawsuits (Garraffa, 2017). To briefly summarize the proceedings, Jordan claimed breaches under China's Trademark Law and the

Anti-Unfair Competition Law. As discussed by Garraffa (2017) with regards to the Trademark Law:

The player claimed the breach of article 41, by maintaining that his behavior (in China's market) represented a "2001 implementation of the 'People's Republic of China Trademark Law' (the 'Trademark Law'), Article 41, paragraph 'In other improper means to obtain registration' within meaning of the (described) situation. He also invoked article 10, n.8, of the same law, by claiming that: "the disputed trademark registration and use of the product will cause public sources cause misidentification, disrupting the normal market order, adverse influence..." (p. 236)

And as Garraffa outlines the breach in regards to the Competition Law:

The player claimed the breach of the general principle of good faith, as well as article 5 of the law (on Chapter II, "Acts of unfair competition"), according to which a company may not use, without authorization, "the name, packaging or decoration peculiar to well-known goods or using a name, packaging or decoration similar to that of well-known goods, so that his goods are confused with the well-known goods of another person, causing buyers to mistake them for the well-known goods of the other person", or "the business name or personal name of the other person on his own goods, leading people to mistake them for the goods of the other person". (p.236)

Jordan also appealed to Article 31 as his final straw, "by maintaining that: "trademark dispute undermined MichaelJordan (Michael Jordan) prior name right and prior portrait, a 'Trademark Law' Article 31 'damage existing prior rights of others', within the meaning of the (described) situation" (Garraffa, 2017, p. 236). Jordan was unsuccessful in all these litigations, and on June 18, 2015, the Beijing Higher People's Court rejected the lawsuit brought forward by Jordan and

would not invalidate Qiaodan's multiple trademarks deciding that “乔丹” is “a common American surname” (Garraffa, 2017). Essentially, Jordan lost these initial cases because Qiaodan Sports beat Nike and Jordan the to punch, and legally created and expanded their business within China, capitalizing on the first to file system. The exceptions given in some “famous” trademark cases were not honored, as being recognized as “famous” in China is a high threshold to establish, and in the eyes of the court, the six- time NBA Champion did not qualify.

Now, fast forward to 2016, the case has made it way to the Chinese Supreme Court. Jordan finally found partial success in his attempts to have Qiaodan's many trademarks canceled on December 8 when “the court supported three out of ten appeals filed by Jordan” granting him the personal name rights over “乔丹” (Parker & Hsiao, 2016). Still though, the seven other appeals which included the trademarks for the Pinyin version, “Qiaodan” and their silhouette logo were unsupported. This potentially was on the same basis as the Beijing Higher People's Court's decision that reiterated “Qiaodan is not the only name that corresponds to ‘Jordan’, as Jordan for the Anglo-American (is a) common surname” and that the silhouette was deemed to “not clearly reflect the characteristics of the characters look” (Garraffa, 2017, p. 236).

Despite losing majority of the appeals, Jordan was still very successful in his wins. The success can be attributed to the cancellation of Qiaodan's trademark for “乔丹”, as that is the most commonly used form of the company's name in China (Parker & Hsiao, 2016). The success is rooted in the fact that Nike and Jordan get the clear the air of any potential connection between the official brand or superstar and Qiaodan Sports Co. and reassure that the message is heard by Chinese consumers. As told to the New York Times, “Nothing is more important than protecting your own name, and today's decision shows the importance of that principle,” Mr. Jordan said (Wee, 2016). NPR retrieved the following statement from Michael Jordan after the win:

“Over the past three decades, I have built my reputation and name into a globally recognized brand. From my earliest playing days in the NBA, through my trip to China last fall, millions of Chinese fans and consumers have always known me by my Chinese name, 'Qiaodan.' Today's decision ensures that my Chinese fans and all Chinese consumers know that Qiaodan Sports and its products have no connection to me.”

Michael Jordan (Kennedy, 2016)

It seems that the Five Year rule and the major mistake by Nike to not resolve the trademark issues in that time frame will continue to haunt them as it likely will prevent the pursuit of further, and probably unwinnable, cases.

Jordan was able to recontrol the rights to his name, but for the masses the win can be seen as an even greater triumph. Primarily, bad faith, practices with the intent to deceive, was recognized by the Chinese Supreme Court in the case of Qiaodan as their trademark registrations for everything “Jordan” and “23” were brought to light (Parker & Hsiao, 2016). It can be recognized now that Qiaodan is a “known infringer” and have built their company “on the goodwill associated with Jordan’s brand power” (Parker & Hsiao, 2016). The Chinese courts sent a message with this ruling that is encouraging to brand owners who have faced the roadblocks created by the Chinese trademark system when trying to expand to the country. The New York Times quoted the executive vice president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Global Intellectual Property Center, Mark Elliot stating “The court has called an intentional foul and sent a clear message of deterrence to those who file trademarks in bad faith,” (Wee, 2016).

This is positive news for the many brands who have already experienced the wrath of the system, including New Balance, who was sued for using their own name in Chinese characters by a Chinese individual who actually owned the trademark already. The result of the courts

ordered New Balance to pay \$15.8 million in April 2015, later reduced to just \$1 million, for allegedly infringing on a trademark (Awdeh, 2016). A more internal case involved a Chinese basketball player, Yi Jianlian, who played in the NBA for a short while. Yi sued a Chinese sporting goods company, Yi Jian Lian Sports, that registered “his” name under a trademark. The difference between this similar case and the Jordan case is that Jianlian won because of Article 31 of trademark law, a fight Jordan did not win. The People’s Republic of China’s Civil Law was considered, and the TRAB honored his right to his name and reputation (popularity) as a citizen, a consideration not made for Jordan (Garraffa, 2017). These cases can be considered to further the notion that Chinese Law can be unfriendly to visitors (Wee, 2016), particularly in business.

While the ruling in the Chinese Supreme Court can hurt the aforementioned trademark squatters, the lack of success with judgements in the lower courts are still worrisome for those pursuing trademarks and business in China. As explored through the history of Chinese trademarking and the Jordan case, it is evident that the main form of protection from squatters and subsequent costly litigation is to discover and register Chinese translations and transliterations of your brand as soon as possible. If you miss out on that step as Nike did, it is imperative that action is taken within the first five years of a trademark for the name being registered. Waiting over ten years to take action against Qiaodan was detrimental and allowed them to build an empire. In fact, Jordan’s “first legal action was issued only in 2012, about 12 years after Qiaodan’s first registration” (Garraffa, 2017, p. 237). How the actions of Qiaodan Sports Co. were not on the radar of Nike and Jordan’s lawyers is baffling, but has lead me to the conclusion that there needs to be reform in the laws and discourse surrounds China’s trademark regulations. The fact that many American and European brands such as Reebok, Gucci, Tesla,

Starbucks, Adidas (Garraffa, 2017), Hermes, Land Rover, and fellow basketball star Kobe Bryant (Chang, 2014) have suffered the same misfortune with Chinese trademarking in expansion causes alarm. While the argument can be made that these companies just need better lawyers, as mentioned in the discussion of the history of Chinese trademarks, the naming loopholes, class system, and the extremely high number of trademarks represent nothing short of an economical ploy. The reasons behind trademarks and their employment for human communication needs to be revisited. The sight of progress on the horizon, as promised in verdicts like the Jordan case, is hopeful though.

Revisiting the introductory Shakespeare quote, is authenticity behind a name? Through my exploration of the Chinese trademark system and Jordan versus Qiaodan, I believe it is. Jordan's goal throughout the process of his legal battles was to remove the confusion that the over one billion people of China faced with the Qiaodan brand that employed multiple techniques to create an illusion of a connection to the authentic Michael Jordan. That has been partly achieved by Jordan reclaiming his name in Chinese symbols, “乔丹”. The “three name” reality, class system, and stringent definition for “well known” that plagues trademarking English brands in China proves to defeat the purpose of a trademark, which is to “legally protect a word, symbol or other identifier that distinguishes a specific brand's goods or services from those produced by other brands” (Baker III, Liu, Brison, & Pifer, 2017, p. 96). That being said, further consideration also needs to be given to the copyright issues that also can ensue and contribute to the image of a brand. Overall, this paper's investigation into the system that defeats so many multinational companies displays the major effects of how trademarking can affect human communications and in fact impede on one of its original purposes of protecting the daily consumer from mass confusion.

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Appendix



On the left: Jordan Brand Logo

On the right: Qiaodan Sports Logo

Photo retrieved from <https://hypebeast.com/2018/3/jordan-brand-countersued-qiaodan-sports>

Nuclear Deterrence in the Context of the Cold War and the Nuclear Optimist-Pessimist Debate

Eula Mengullo

POLI 585

In the end of World War II, the global realm witnessed the devastating losses in Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the American dropping of the first atomic bomb. Since then, nuclear technology and capability has only evolved to be even more destructive. The events of the Cold War further escalated the tensions of these highly advanced and destructive weaponry from being launched. Specifically, the Cuban Missile Crisis of nineteen sixty-two has brought not just the United States, Cuba, and Soviet Union, but also its neighbor states if not the entire world, into total annihilation. However, despite of the damaging capabilities of these nuclear arsenals, some scholars nevertheless argue for its proliferation, citing the Cold War era as an example of how the total destructiveness of these weapons produces effective deterrence. Two of the key prominent scholars debating in this field are Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, with Waltz advocating for proliferation and Sagan on the opposite of the spectrum. This essay will study the contentious debate of nuclear proliferation and disarmament in the context of the Cold War and how scholars of proliferation seemingly mitigate the fact that nuclear ownership has brought the superpowers to the brink of total destruction. In critically analyzing the arguments between nuclear optimism and pessimism, this study will comprehensively discuss the several factors that acts as the driving forces behind two opposing views on nuclear acquisition.

In October of nineteen sixty-two, the United States, or rather, the entire western hemisphere encountered the gravest threat to its survival when the United States' spy planes discovered the missile sites in Cuba deployed by the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁶ This discovery would be

¹⁴⁶ *Cuban Missile Crisis: Three Men Go to War*. Films On Demand. 2012. Accessed July 21, 2020. <https://fod.infobase.com/PortalPlaylists.aspx?wID=102628&xtid=151202>.

the beginning of what is now known as the “most dangerous thirteen days in the history of mankind.”¹⁴⁷ The sentence itself conveys the sheer horror of what it was like to live in a time where nuclear brinkmanship was almost palpable. However, despite the evident costs and destructiveness of nuclear materials, modern nation states still continue to acquire them, thereby raising the crucial question regarding their necessity in the contemporary age.

The evidence that most scholars of nuclear proliferation refer to is the period of the Cold War. The premise of this argument is usually rooted in the historical events that deterred the then two superpowers, Soviet Union and United States, from launching their nuclear weapons against each other. However, one must also not overlook the events that brought the two superpowers to the brink of total destruction. The reason for Soviet Union’s deployment of these missiles could be several, although a few can be attributed to its coordination with Fidel Castro of Cuba. Firstly, having declared Cuba a socialist state in the nineteen sixty,¹⁴⁸ Castro had developed strong ties and worked closely with Nikita Khrushchev given their ideological alliance. Furthermore, Castro agreed to the establishment of missile sites within his domestic territory to deter the United States in fear of Washington’s retaliation over the devastating loss on the Bay of Pigs.¹⁴⁹ Thus, nuclear optimists may be tempted to argue that states are willing to acquire, or in this case, allow the deployment of nuclear arsenals within their domestic territory, in pursuit of national security. In an optimist’s eye, Castro’s willingness to have missiles in Cuba is mainly for protection from another American invasion. Although national security is indeed often one of the key reasons of states’ acquisition of nuclear weapons, and although it is impossible to actually illuminate what the exact intentions were of Castro’s, it only provoked the United States upon witnessing the

¹⁴⁷ *Cuban Missile Crisis: Three Men Go to War*. Accessed July 21, 2020.

¹⁴⁸ *Cuban Missile Crisis: Three Men Go to War*. Accessed July 21, 2020.

¹⁴⁹ *Cuban Missile Crisis: Three Men Go to War*. Accessed July 21, 2020.

missile sites. Moreover, to argue that Castro's main incentive was national security, is actually contrary to what he had proclaimed to the Soviet Union. On the evening of October 27th nineteen sixty-two, Castro reaffirmed Khrushchev of his solidarity in preserving the socialist ideology—that is, he was willing to sacrifice his state and its people in the name of ideological affiliation.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, this undermines the foundations of realist theory regarding state behavior. The cost-benefit analysis, or human rationality, is usually cited as one of the key arguments for proliferation. Optimists often use rationality, coupled with the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, to argue why deterrence had prevailed during the Cold War and thus why proliferation can be a strategic tool in establishing global stability. However, as exemplified by Castro's willingness to risk the decimation of his own nation, it reveals that the factors that leaders take into account when analyzing foreign policy, is subjective and speaks for one's own personal values. Therefore, to utilize the Cold War era as the exemplary age in which deterrence prevailed—it barely did so if not for the sheer amount of luck that Khrushchev was unwilling to strike first despite Castro's insistence—can actually be misleading.

In the modern era, the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains to be one of the most pressing concerns for the international community. Despite of the previous dangers that it posed however, some states are still willing to take the risk of acquiring these weaponries, and some scholars still believe in its efficacy to maintain deterrence. Kenneth Waltz, a prominent figure in the study of International Relations, argues that “chances that nuclear weapons will be fired in anger or accidentally [...] are finite, though unknown.”¹⁵¹ This is a fair claim, considering how historically speaking, there truly has been no misuse of nuclear weapons, just several close-calls.

¹⁵⁰ *Cuban Missile Crisis: Three Men Go to War*. Accessed July 21, 2020.

¹⁵¹ "INTRODUCTION." Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute F. Accessed July 21, 2020).
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm>.

Furthermore, perhaps one of the recurring arguments of Waltz is that the word “proliferation” itself can be misleading; by definition, the word means “to spread like wildfire,” which has not happened,¹⁵² as forwarded by Waltz. He further argues that contrary to what policy makers had predicted, the emergence of nuclear states actually decelerated since the 1970.¹⁵³ This strengthens his argument that proliferation has indeed failed to materialize, or at least, yet.

However, given that the circumstances have now been more complex than in the past, the acquisition of nuclear weapons are not being pursued only by superpowers, as had the Soviet Union and the United States, but also by rogue states. This heightens the concerns for the mishandling and insecurity of nuclear materials as the emergence of terrorist groups has also contributed to the anxiety already caused by the possession of such highly destructive weapons. In fact, one of the grave concerns of the United States right now is the emergence of a nuclear Iran—a state that has been involved in supporting and funding resistance groups, or as the West mostly refer to them as “terrorist groups,” namely the Hamas and Hezbollah.¹⁵⁴ Evidently, this is one of the main reasons why Iran faces international condemnation in its pursuit of nuclear arsenals, subsequently with the possibility of a brewing tension between Israel.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, some argue that a nuclear armed Iran would only increase regional tension in the Middle East, compelling its neighbor states to develop nuclear weapons, especially Saudi Arabia.¹⁵⁶

Considering that Saudi Arabia has previously enjoyed dominance within the region and given

¹⁵² Sagan, Scott, Kenneth Waltz, and Richard K. Betts. "A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER?" *Journal of International Affairs* 60, no. 2 (2007): 135-50. Accessed July 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/24357975.

¹⁵³ Waltz, Kenneth N. "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability." *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 4 (2012): 2-5. Accessed July 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/23218033.

¹⁵⁴ Fayazi, Negar. Report. Institute for Global Dialogue, 2017. Accessed July 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17466.

¹⁵⁵ Edelman, Eric S., Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery. "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment." *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 1 (2011): 66-81. Accessed July 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/25800382.

¹⁵⁶ “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment,” pg 3.

that the two states are ideological and geopolitical rivals, Saudi Arabia may feel pressured to go nuclear in order to assert supremacy.¹⁵⁷ Adding onto the tensions, some analysts even predict that given Saudi Arabia's close ties with Pakistan and given the latter's advantage in nuclear weaponry, the two could form an alliance¹⁵⁸ which could potentially make other states in the region, especially Israel, feel vulnerable. All of these are reasonable concerns, but as realists usually contend, these are merely predictions, not empirical evidence grounded on actual events. As Waltz put it, analysts should want to see the future world rather than imagine the possibilities as proliferation of nuclear weapons increases.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, Waltz argue that a nuclear Iran would actually balance the power scale in the Middle East, thus producing stability.¹⁶⁰ Since Israel, despite of its unannounced nuclear status, has maintained nuclear monopoly in the region, Waltz asserts that a nuclear Iran would actually extinguish the military imbalance that Israel created.¹⁶¹ As per the concern over Iran providing these weapons and materials to potentially dangerous nonstate actors, Waltz dubiously considers that a state would just transfer such an investment.¹⁶² He therefore assures that as historical evidence purports, "where nuclear capabilities emerge, so does stability."¹⁶³ However, this is yet to be determined with the rise of other nuclear states.

Despite of the lack of empirical evidence discrediting the efficacy of nuclear acquisition as the basis of deterrence, this does not mean that leaders and policy makers should solely rely on them to maintain global harmony. In fact, it is difficult to envision living in a world that is in constant brink of nuclear disaster. Scott Sagan, a significant figure in the argument for nuclear

¹⁵⁷ "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment," pg 6.

¹⁵⁸ "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment," pg, 7.

¹⁵⁹ "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better"

¹⁶⁰ "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability," pg 1.

¹⁶¹ "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability," pg 3.

¹⁶² "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability," pg 4-5.

¹⁶³ "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability," pg 5.

disarmament argues that we are putting a great deal of trust in the hands of fallible human beings regarding highly destructive materials.¹⁶⁴ This could not be any more true as by nature, human beings are bound to be fallible. To entrust state leaders with weaponry that could decide the fate of mankind should raise every bit of worry and horror not just to scholars, but to the general public as well. As history had witnessed, the rise of charismatic leaders such as Adolf Hitler or Benito Mussolini is inevitable, and although very little can be predicted as to how these two dictators would have behaved had they developed nuclear weaponry, the danger that a leader similar to the two would come to power in the future and possess nuclear materials is still unwavering. Going back to the example of Castro eagerly sacrificing his state and populace provides a transparent case that falsifies and undermines the core of proliferation theory which is human rationality. The efficacy of cost-benefit analysis as a deterrent is heavily reliant on human rationality. Furthermore, to assume that state leaders who have distinct backgrounds--- culture, values, religious and ideological affiliations--- would adhere to the similar kind of rationality that is common in most liberal states, is simply idealistic. What is also problematic is the possibility of insider theft and opportunistic individuals who would want to illicitly sell their knowledge and materials to other states. The A.Q. Khan for instance, which initiated a nuclear black market led by a senior scientist who provided bomb design and centrifuge technology to rogue states including Libya and North Korea¹⁶⁵ is a prime example of this. Thus, it is evident that there are many factors in human nature that makes proliferation more threatening than it is reassuring. If the international community wants to maintain harmony, then restrictions must be tightened to ensure that destructive nuclear materials do not end up in the hands of irrational, greedy, individuals.

¹⁶⁴ "A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER?" pg 5.

¹⁶⁵ "A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER?" pg 7-8.

Acquiring nuclear arsenals comes with a heavy responsibility of proper safekeeping and taking extra measures to ensure that storage sites are secured from theft and potential mishandling. This can be economically demanding and is quite an investment for any state to pursue. Therefore, given the costly sacrifice of developing and maintaining these weaponries, what could be the incentives of states for proliferating? One would be amiss to argue against proliferation all the while overlooking the strategic and national security purposes that mostly acts as the driving forces behind it. There could be several reasons why a state may choose to develop their own nuclear arsenal, but perhaps the most cited one is attributed to national security. In the case of Iran, Waltz argue that Iran's geographic location places it in a vulnerable position with its neighboring countries.¹⁶⁶ He contends that Iran is placed in an unsafe location where it borders Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the former being a nuclear-armed state, and Iraq to the west, whom it fought eight years of bloody wars with.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, given the United States' military presence in neighboring Iraq, and how the Bush administration invaded Iraq in two thousand-two, this only heightens the anxieties and fears of some nation states within the region.¹⁶⁸ The case of Iran exemplifies the very dilemma that is rooted in the argument for and against proliferation. The national security of the state is any leader's utmost priority. To acquire nuclear weapons in the name of national security is both reasonable and understandable. However, non-proliferation scholars counter this by claiming that the main security problem lies solely within the possession of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons can be a tool for deterrence as they are a tool for destruction--- sometimes, the latter may even outweigh the former if those who are in control of it are placed under great pressure. Furthermore, another argument proposed

¹⁶⁶ "A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER?" pg 4.

¹⁶⁷ "A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER?" pg 4.

¹⁶⁸ "A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER?" pg 4.

by pessimists is the “use them or lose them” dilemma,¹⁶⁹ which exemplifies an accurate, potential quandary that rival states may find themselves in. For instance, Iran’s proliferation could be seen as a security threat to Israel, and some fear that given Israel’s relatively smaller geographical size, it might face the “use them or lose them” dilemma and launch an offensive nuclear attack against Iran.¹⁷⁰ This is merely a calculation, albeit rather substantial. On the contrary, optimists, namely Waltz argue that this should not be too grave of a concern, and since India and Pakistan managed to come to an agreement regarding state behavior when it comes to their nuclear weapons, then perhaps Israel and Iran could come to the same conclusion.¹⁷¹ Therefore, drawing evidence from recent diplomatic negotiations between states, optimists contend that countries, through rationality and some compromise, can settle the security dilemma that pessimists constantly apprehend about.

When it comes to the argument regarding the efficacy of deterrence throughout history, optimists and realists are quick to point out that nuclear pessimists are visionaries of events that have never occurred. Thus, it can be said that optimists are usually concerned about *what is*, and dealing with the world as how it has been for the past fifty years,¹⁷² compared to pessimists who envision several consequences that has not happened, or at least, yet. Waltz argue that by doing so, this puts the pessimists in an “ill-defined, hypothesized world,”¹⁷³ and may distort their vision of how the world actually is. The premise of this argument is correct, and it indeed puts the pessimists at a disadvantage caused by the lack of empirical historical evidence. However, on the contrary, this also strengthens the pessimists’ argument, for it reinstates that their advocacy and

¹⁶⁹ Lyon, Rod. Report. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010. Accessed July 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03948.

¹⁷⁰ “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment,” pg 4.

¹⁷¹ “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” pg 5.

¹⁷² “A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER,” pg 9.

¹⁷³ “A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER,” pg 9.

awareness on the dangers of nuclear weapons has contributed to the deterrence that the international realm has enjoyed for the past two centuries. Although the decision of states' acquisition of nuclear materials ultimately relies upon its leader, one must not discredit the pessimist rationale for its contribution in raising awareness and educating states about the dangers of acquiring such materials. In fact, it is quite ironic how optimists usually undermine pessimist concerns for preparing for the future, when they themselves keep on idealizing the past, particularly the Cold War era and using its legacy to assess the behavior of future proliferators.¹⁷⁴ To curtail the assessment of human behavior within the time frame of the Cold War would be to greatly undermine the capability of emerging leaders, and may direct analysts to miscalculate the potential costs of nuclear expansion. Besides, deterrence during the Cold War can be heavily attributed to the former bipolar international order of the day that is contemporarily unattainable due to the existing multipolarity of the global realm.¹⁷⁵ Inevitably, the structure of international order has evolved throughout the past century that makes bipolarity simply a thing of the past. Time has altered the global structure in a way that just makes nuclear proliferation today, problematic and menacing. The current state of multipolarity and globalization, through interdependence, allows much more room for shifting coalitions that "can tip the balance of power and create incentives for an attack."¹⁷⁶

There is a phrase that 'prevention is better than cure' and although this is commonly referred to illnesses, this is also very much accurate in this aspect of International Relations. Additionally, allowing open proliferation as means of deterrence would not suffice to ensure global security¹⁷⁷ and is also not the strategic way to do it. Although total abolishment of nuclear

¹⁷⁴ "A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER," pg 6.

¹⁷⁵ "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment," pg 8.

¹⁷⁶ "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment," pg 8.

¹⁷⁷ Report, pg 4.

weapons and materials would be the optimal condition to ensure long-lasting peace and cooperation, there are also some diplomatic negotiations that states can consider. If it so happens that a state crosses the nuclear threshold, Sagan contends that the best way to deal with them is by initiating negotiations through diplomatic means rather than through military coercion.¹⁷⁸ In the case of Iran, Sagan asserts that further threats by the United States towards the Iranian regime can actually aggravate them even more, increasing their justification for the necessity of nuclear development.¹⁷⁹ This approach is also applicable to future proliferators as opposed to threatening them of military intervention. To do so would only heighten their fears of foreign intervention threatening their sovereignty, thus exacerbating the essence of acquiring malicious technology in order to assert supremacy. Another alternative in regulating nuclear state behavior is through ‘no first-use’ declarations. ‘No first-use’ declarations are a proclamation of nuclear states to not launch an offensive attack against an adversary given their nuclear capability.¹⁸⁰ In the context of Iran, Sagan analyzes that a no first-use doctrine would be helpful in mitigating the risks that is driving Tehran’s nuclear development incentives.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, the United States’ leadership in declaring a no-first use may actually ease the likelihood of states proliferating as leaders of some countries, particularly those in developing regions, may regard the United States as an existential threat to their nation. Given the United States’ rich history in military intervention, for whatever purpose it might be---the spread of western doctrine or for their own self-interests---pose a grave threat to the leadership of some leaders, particularly those with opposing ideological affiliations. Moreover, Sagan illuminated that the credibility of the United States’ assurance of not using their nuclear capability against non-nuclear weapon states was challenged

¹⁷⁸ “A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER,” pg 11.

¹⁷⁹ “A NUCLEAR IRAN: PROMOTING STABILITY OR COURTING DISASTER,” pg 11.

¹⁸⁰ Report, pg 8.

¹⁸¹ Sagan, Scott D. "The Case for No First Use." *Survival* 51, no. 3 (2009): 163-82.

when documents leaked to the press, stating that the United States was planning an attack against Syria and Libya using nuclear forces.¹⁸² Consequently, this makes it even more vital for the United States to adopt a no-first use policy in order to reassert its commitment on nuclear disarmament. However, some question the reliability of no-first use declarations on the grounds that it is problematic in practice.¹⁸³ Part of the reason for this can be attributed to the ‘use them or lose them’ dilemma that states may encounter if they were losing a conventional crisis with their vital interests at stake.¹⁸⁴ The United States’ bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki serves as an exemplary illustration of this.¹⁸⁵ It demonstrates that when a nation’s self-interests were endangered in a conventional quarrel, they will always have the ability to, or in this case, do rely on their nuclear advancement to defend their interests, hence making no-first use doctrines merely symbolic.¹⁸⁶ Therefore, analysts contend that instead, states should see nuclear weapons for what they truly are: a weapon of *last* resort, and not as “mere extensions of their conventional capabilities.”¹⁸⁷ To enforce these norms regulating nuclear ownership behavior would inevitably take years to formalize. However, if the total abolishment of nuclear weapons cannot materialize, then norms concerning state behavior can provide the global community some source of security by implementing higher standards for state conduct, especially for those that possess considerable nuclear advancements.

Ultimately, the debate for nuclear proliferation albeit contentious, is rather necessary to ensure that global harmony and cooperation can persevere. Scholars of proliferation usually refer to the Cold War as the golden example of why nuclear weapons produces effective deterrence

¹⁸² “The Case for No First Use.”

¹⁸³ Report, pg 8.

¹⁸⁴ Report, pg 8.

¹⁸⁵ Report, pg 8.

¹⁸⁶ Report, pg 9.

¹⁸⁷ Report, pg 9.

and thus acquisition should be encouraged. However, as the Cuban Missile Crisis had demonstrated, other factors also play a vital role in ensuring that a nuclear disaster does not occur. In particular, the reliability of cost-benefit analysis relying on human rationality to maintain deterrence has been disproved through Fidel Castro's actions. The realist argument holds that leaders share a common rationality, that is they behave with special caution with regards to usage of nuclear weapons. Castro exemplified, however, that that is not always correct for leaders who have strong, deep ideological adherence. Thus, to contend that human rationality regulates state behavior when dealing with nuclear weapons, is actually false. State leaders and human beings in general, are made up of distinct values, culture, and lived experiences, that simply makes it impossible for them to adhere to the same rationality that is commonly found in liberal states. Therefore, it is not advisable to rely solely on human rationality to maintain global harmony. Although the enrichment of disastrous nuclear weapons are indeed menacing, it is also significant to "understand the political and security environment in which a state finds itself when attempting to understand strategies it might employ."¹⁸⁸ In an optimist's eye, situational factors can make nuclear acquisition compelling, if not necessary, to ensure state survival within their regions. Nuclear optimism thereby contends that proliferation provides not just international deterrence, but also national security to states who may feel threatened by their neighboring countries. On the opposition however, pessimists argue that open proliferation is not ideal for ensuring stability and has the potential of disrupting regional balance. Pessimists condemn optimists' encouragement for proliferation on the grounds that nuclear weapons are highly destructive and has the capability of annihilating mankind. Furthermore, the emergence of terrorist groups and other influences such as the multipolarity of the current international order,

¹⁸⁸ Gavin, Francis J. "Same as It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War." *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2009): 7-37. Accessed July 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/40389232.

makes the deterrence that prevailed during the Cold War era, highly irrelevant and inapplicable to today's modern global structure. Nevertheless, pessimists recognize the fact that it is difficult to discard and dismantle the existing arsenals possessed by nuclear states today. Therefore, this is why diplomatic means and negotiations must be pursued in order to ensure that mishandling of highly destructive materials do not occur, and that state behavior is regulated by raising the standards for the conduct of nuclear-armed states.

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**Developing European Collective Memory Through Civic Engagement: Gunter Demnig's
Stolpersteine**
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COMS 591

Stolpersteine, or 'stumbling blocks' in English, are brass plaques individually engraved as a monument of remembrance for Holocaust victims (Stevens, Franck & Fazakerley, 2018). The plaques, developed by Gunter Demnig in 1996, were initially intended to serve as fragments of a grassroots art project and identify landmarks where victims of the Holocaust last willingly "lived, loved, ate, and slept" (Snyder, 2016, para. 18) (Stevens, Franck & Fazakerley, 2018). Each 'stumbling block' is emblazoned with a victim's name, "[date] of birth, deportation and death" (Stevens, Franck & Fazakerley, 2018, p. 722). As of December 2019, more than 75,000 plaques have been laid with more scheduled to be placed late into 2021 (Stolpersteine, 2020). The project's scale and ability to incite connection with history in a matter that is not only commemorative but educational renders Stolpersteine a prime candidate to be considered a countermonument (Young, 1993). Demnig's plaques democratize the Holocaust archival process, allowing community members to 'sponsor' one upon paying the €120 fee (Bonte-Friedheim, 2013); local school classes are also recruited to research profiled victims to educate youth and promote greater community awareness of the memorials (Harjes, 2005). This civic engagement in the Holocaust archival process ensures genuine narratives of trauma are disseminated and "absorbed by the wider ethnic or national collectiv[e]" (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994, p. 51). In consideration of the creation and installation of Stolpersteine, we see that the ability for decentralized bodies to control Holocaust memory archives becomes democratized where centralized narratives typically guide public memory. Civic engagement with countermonuments develops collective memory and encourages archival research (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994). This notion; however, is challenged in a deeper exploration of the Stolpersteine project because the

stones act as a better archive of Germany's development of collective memory than of memorializing victims of the Nazis (Osborne, 2014).

To ensure victims' experiences are preserved, communities must be involved in etching such experiences in collective memory, so they are not understated or concealed. Post-war memory in Germany has been shaped by discourse maintained by German institutions, such as the church bell in Herxheim am Berg – dedicated to Adolph Hitler – that still chimes to this day (Eder, 2020). This blatant exhibition of Nazi propaganda neglects to acknowledge the narrative of the crimes of the Nazis and the innocence of their victims (Eder, 2020), “there is no political power without control of the archive” (Derrida, 1995, as cited in Osborne, 2014, p. 373) and in the lack of regulation of Nazi propaganda, Nazi ideologies are preserved in embittered memory (Winter, 2008). The persistence of these Nazi-glorifying memorials erases the experiences of the millions of Holocaust victims where hegemonic ideals of the pre-war era prevail (Winter, 2008). The lack of condemnation by centralized entities and lack of resources and information available at the site of the church bell (Eder, 2020) negatively impact narratives circulated in collective memory. Memorials that encourage active community engagement with history allow archives to grow alongside public knowledge. Such public engagement and research should be encouraged in the presentation of monuments that highlight Nazism, as seen in the Stolpersteine project.

Demnig's grassroots project has been called “vivid and personal” (Papi, 2019, as cited in Apperly, 2019, para. 9) an alternative to pretentious and convoluted memorials that do little to develop collective memory (Apperly, 2019). The stories of victims that previously populated communities disappear over time and neighbourhoods lose their connection to history. The artist aims to combat this loss of culture and community through commemorative remembrance that is accessible to all and promotes archival research (Stolpersteine, 2020). Stolpersteine have been

labelled “the world’s largest decentralized memorial... reaching beyond the institutions of art into public spaces through its performative, political dimension” (Osborne, 2013, p. 378). Public placement ensures archives exist outside of elitist institutions, like museums, and present all with the opportunity to discover the past. The stumbling blocks democratize access to Holocaust memorials by integrating community engagement and public placement to further develop collective memory.

The positioning of Stolpersteine on public sidewalks serves a strategic purpose, their shine drawing one’s gaze from the greys of the walkway, “it forces the passerby to bow in front of the murdered person” (Demnig, 2013, as cited in Bonte-Friedheim, 2013, para. 16). Demnig decided on sidewalk placement because only permission from local authority was required for installation, opting for brass plaques that would be polished as they were trodden on by passersby (Stolpersteine, n.d.). In actuality, the plaques are typically stepped around and are cleaned by local citizen groups (Stolpersteine, n.d.) Whether intentional or not, the juxtaposition of the brass and the ground draws an interesting parallel with the events of the Holocaust. Much of the general public ignored the events of the Holocaust in real time; however, in present time the consequences are made impossible to ignore. The public placement of the plaques renders private memories part of a larger, collective memory, “people stop and talk and find out about a history that they didn’t know” (Demnig, 2013, as cited in Bonte-Friedheim, 2013, para. 17), the stones are meant to be stumbled upon, “to surprise, provoke, and trigger reflection” (Epstein, 2020, para. 8).

Demnig’s instruments of public remembrance, though rooted in community engagement and education, have been met with great critique; Munich and Antwerp have gone as far as to forbid the stumbling stones (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 2018). According to Charlotte

Knoblach (2018), president of the Israelite community of Munich and Upper Bavaria, the placement of stones “on the ground, where people tread on them or dirt falls on them, [is] an insult to the memory of Holocaust victims” (as cited in Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 2018, para. 6). Holocaust survivor Manuela Mendels Bornstein (2019) echoes Knoblach’s sentiment, saying “I don’t think it[']s respectful because people walk on them” (as cited in Jaben-Eilon, 2019, para. 8). Opinions on their placement vary greatly. Helen Epstein (2020), a Holocaust survivor’s daughter, had three plaques installed for her family in Prague calling Demnig’s project “a small act of ingenious commemoration” (Epstein, 2020, para. 14). The placement and purpose of Stolpersteine remain a controversial issue. Placement in public areas democratizes access to the monuments (Harjes, 2005); however, their placement on the ground where they can be stepped on can be considered disrespectful (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 2018).

Demnig has been critiqued not only for the sites of the plaques but for their misrepresentation of statistics and homogenization of victims (Osborne, 2014). The project acts as a physical – and virtual – database of Holocaust victims; however, it is in no way representative of the scale of victims and their installation is dependent on plaque sponsorship by the community and the artist’s schedule and can be considered misleading (Osborne, 2014). Uniformity in plaque appearance and content, differing only in personal details, make the plaques, and thereby victims, appear more ubiquitous (Osborne, 2014). While Demnig’s project provides an important alternative to traditional monuments, his vision cannot be truly realized; he cannot identify and lay a plaque for every victim of the Nazis (Osborne, 2014). The names of victims are displayed but they are not known; identities blend, forming a cliched silhouette of a victim for those who witness the plaques (Osborne, 2014). The team behind Stolpersteine identifies this as the opposite of their goal. The creative process in manufacturing Stolpersteine,

led by Michael Friedrichs-Friedländer, is completely manual to directly counter the systemic and mechanized genocide the Nazis carried out (Apperly, 2019). Friedrichs-Friedländer says (2019) “to show respect for the victims it must be done by hand”, (as cited in Apperly, 2019, para. 28) of his craftsmanship. Despite Demnig’s intentions, the way publicly displayed art is perceived can alter the efficacy of the whole project.

Countermonuments provide a democratization of access to collective memory that exists outside of elitist institutions and resources, available to all who stumble across them (Apperly, 2019). Stolpersteine are particularly interesting in that the production of the countermonument plaques depend on rates of civic engagement of the community. Demnig’s plaques are significant in developing European collective memory around the Holocaust; however, their site and form have drawn significant criticism for being ubiquitous and reinforcing cliches of Jewish victims (Osborne, 2014). The motives of the artist have been drawn into question as Demnig has forbidden placement of Stolpersteine without his presence (Stolpersteine, n.d.). Osborne (2014) suggests the Stolpersteine project “in which victim identities are appropriated by the artist for his project” (p. 381) to become a celebrated pan-European artist. The ethical considerations of becoming a recognized name in art as a result of the suffering of others are complex and beyond the scope of this paper; however, important to note.

Regardless of the artist’s intention, Stolpersteine have bolstered both European collective memory of Holocaust victims through their presence in the public sphere and the civic engagement of citizens conducting research for the plaques (Young, 1993). The decentralized organization of the plaques rejects the need to conform to centralized rhetoric and unconventionally acts to democratize access to collective memory, and functionally commemorate victims of the Holocaust (Harjes, 2005). To move forward, Demnig and his team

could work to improve their virtual archive and rethink the placement on the ground, given feedback from the greater community. The virtual Stolpersteine archive provides identical information found on the plaques themselves, the addition of any supplementary personal details or anecdotes to these archive entries could further enhance collective memory and promote further digital engagement with the project. The development of more virtual components for this project would further democratize access to collective memory and allow those unable to experience the plaques in person to remain engaged in addition to mitigating homogeneity. Placement remains a more difficult issue to tackle. Collaboration with local centralized bodies to consider placement options would be an excellent starting point. Demnig's project boasts impressive civic engagement and European collective memory development; however, the execution of the project should be addressed to best serve victims of the Holocaust, European communities, and the Stolpersteine organization itself.

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Cancer from a Biopsychosocial Perspective: An Overview of the Literature
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Cancer From a Biopsychosocial Perspective: An Overview of the Literature

The term “cancer” includes a broad range of disease experiences which are the product of many systems interacting. There are no clear and easily understood causal relationships for cancer, and what is known is predominantly genetic. However, the full extent of cancer occurrences and etiology cannot be understood without approaching them from a more wholistic, biopsychosocial level. The human experience is not solely rooted in its physical existence — the environment and how the environment is perceived hold an equally important role in shaping the individual. Some social conditions, such as being of a low socioeconomic status or a member of a minority group, can be chronically stressful, while certain psychological predispositions may limit the individual’s ability to responsibly cope with psychosocial stressors. These can be understood collectively as psychosocial stress. This paper looks to examine any potential causal or therapeutic connections which may exist between cancer and psychosocial stress.

Psychosocial stress can inflict significant harms to the physical body, especially when it is experienced for extended periods without proper management (Sarafino et al., 2020). Poor stress management can lead to substance use which can damage tissues and increase cancer risks (Sarafino et al., 2020). Psychosocial stress can also impact the immune system and potentially interfere with the body’s normal cancer protections (Kruk et al., 2019; Sarafino et al., 2020). However, most psychosocial methods play a larger role after a cancer diagnosis. Cancer is not only physically devastating; the mental toll of confronting one’s mortality as well as the physical excursion and pains of treatment can cripple the patient’s morale, both during and after cancer

treatments (Mooney et al., 2018; Conti et al., 2011; Sarafino et al., 2020). It is essential to recognize that cancer occurrences cannot be entirely attributed to stress alone, as a more plausible explanation for cancer development is that stress facilitates the development of an already existing genetic cause (National Cancer Institute, 2012). However, psychosocial practices can help to alter poor habits and encourage healthier ones, thereby reducing certain cancer risks (Sarafino et al., 2020; Kennedy et al., 2017).

Cancer and Psychosocial Stress

Roughly half of all cancers can be accounted for by genetic predisposition, physiology, lifestyle, or environmental risk factors (Kruk et al., 2019). It is generally accepted that psychosocial distress can worsen malignant cancers, with depression, abnormal immune activity, and tumour development all being correlated, though the exact extent and relation have not been clearly determined (Conti et al., 2011). There is significant evidence to suggest that psychosocial stress can interfere with the immune system in ways that enable the development of cancer (Sarafino et al., 2020). Depression and trauma have been recognized as a risk factor for cancer as they maintain biological responses that increase the production of pro-inflammatory cytokines and increases the rate of cell aging (Conti et al., 2011; Kruk et al., 2019). There is evidence to suggest that cells may undergo changes at the genetic levels following periods of stress, such as significant life events, severe daily hassles, and social isolation (Kruk et al., 2017).

The greatest connection between psychosocial stress and cancer is predominantly related to the negative health behaviours associated with poor stress management, especially during youth and adolescence (Sarafino et al., 2020; Kennedy et al., 2017). Moderate psychosocial stress resilience has been associated with lowered overall cancer risk, but low resilience has not

been associated with increased overall cancer risk (Kennedy et al., 2017). A proposed reason for this is that those low in stress resilience are more likely to be overweight or underweight and to be substance users (Kennedy et al., 2017). Being overweight or obese has been proposed to be one of the leading behavioural risk factors for cancer development (Kruk et al., 2019; Sarafino et al., 2020). Low stress resiliency could also result in an increased physiological and immune response to psychosocial stress, which in turn could increase negative cardiovascular effects and cancer risks (Kennedy et al., 2017). Those who are less adept at handling psychosocial stress are also likely to be of lower socioeconomic status, which could play a significant role in limiting their ability to access medical treatments and preventative measures (Kennedy et al., 2017).

Specific Cancers

Certain cancers have a stronger link with psychosocial stress than others (National Cancer Institute, 2012; Sarafino et al., 2020). Most cancers, including central nervous system cancers, gastric cancers, colorectal cancers, and non-melanomas have no definitive association with psychosocial stress (Kennedy et al., 2017; National Cancer Institute, 2012; Sarafino et al., 2020). Some, such as prostate cancers, melanomas, and pancreatic cancers are not as prevalent within individuals low in stress resiliency for still unexplained reasons (Kennedy et al., 2017). Other cancers, such as lung and liver cancers, are strongly associated with low stress resiliency, likely due to reliance on substance use to cope with psychosocial stress (Kennedy et al., 2017). For example, smokers are more likely to develop lung cancers and the use of alcohol may increase the chances of developing liver cancers (Sarafino et al., 2020).

The connection between psychosocial stress and cancer is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the occurrence of esophageal cancer. Esophageal cancers are normally one of

two main types of carcinoma: esophageal squamous cell carcinoma (ESCC) and esophageal adenocarcinoma (Enzinger & Mayer, 2003). The ratio of these two carcinomas has changed with time as healthier lifestyle habits have become encouraged (Huang & Yu, 2018). ESCC is highly associated with smoking, and is therefore more prominent in regions where smoking is more common (Huang & Yu, 2018). Esophageal adenocarcinoma is found in 5% of those with *Barrett's esophagus*, a condition defined by the transformation of the esophageal tissue into a more cancer-prone tissue (Huang & Yu, 2018). Gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), heartburn, and regurgitation are all significant risk factors for Barrett's esophagus and esophageal adenocarcinoma, with all three also being associated or aggravated by elevated stress levels (Edman et al., 2017; Huang & Yu, 2018).

Treatment

The most relevant application of the biopsychosocial model for cancer is during treatment (Sarafino et al., 2020). As established, there are no generally accepted and robust explanations for psychosocial stress explicitly causing cancer; however, it is nearly unavoidable during medical cancer treatments (National Cancer Institute, 2012; Sarafino et al., 2017). Those with lower resiliency and poorer coping skills can struggle during cancer treatment as said coping methods are no longer viable for them because many of those poor coping strategies are the likely causes of their cancer (National Cancer Institute, 2012). Other uses of psychosocial therapies can include attempts to mitigate the food aversion, pain, and the other troubling side effects of most cancer treatments (Sarafino et al., 2020).

Of course, implementing better coping skills, such as becoming more physically active, can not only reduce psychosocial stress and improve their quality of life, but it may also allow

them to survive their illness (Sarafino et al., 2020; Jacobsen et al., 2013). Even after the patient has gone into remission, the distress from having undergone treatment and facing a life-threatening illness can still remain (Mooney et al., 2018). Developing strong, healthy stress management skills is imperative during cancer treatment since tumours are more prone to become metastases when the body is under stress (National Cancer Institute, 2012; Conti et al., 2011). These treatments can enable healthier behaviours after the cancer has gone into remission (Sarafino et al., Jacobsen et al., 2013).

Assessing Methods

Psychosocial treatment methods often focus on increasing wellness through health-based treatments, mindfulness-based interventions and stress management training (Jacobsen et al., 2013; Cillessen et al., 2019). Nearly all research concerning the etiology of cancer will inevitably take an epidemiological angle in their studies, as they allow for a greater understanding of the etiology of diseases (Campbell, 2020). There are two commonly used methods for conducting research that assesses the relationship between cancer and psychosocial stress: correlational studies and randomized controlled trials. Correlational studies are useful for quickly determining if a relationship between two variables exists, though they are not able to demonstrate a causal relationship (Campbell, 2020). They have been used in the assessment of illness impacts, treatments, and health outcomes, as well as to relate symptoms to stressful experiences (Mooney et al., 2018; Cillessen et al., 2019).

When a potential link between two variables can be established, randomized controlled trials are a highly reputable research method in health psychology (Campbell, 2020).

Randomized controlled trials are predominantly used in attempts to determine the effectiveness

of treatments (Jacobsen et al., 2013). Occasionally, as with the Kennedy et al. (2017) study, longitudinal methods have been used to assess connections to events throughout participants' life time (Campbell, 2020). Meta-analyses are commonly used in this area of research to summarize the many diverse findings of this field (Cillessen et al., 2019; Kruk et al., 2019; Huang & Yu, 2018). They are a largely uncontroversial method when conducted properly, as they are useful for clarifying the general consensus of how psychosocial stress and cancer are presumed to interact (Campbell, 2020).

Future Directions

There is still much work to be done if a definitive causal link between psychosocial stress and cancer is to be defined. As more becomes understood about cancer and psychosocial stress independent of each other, potential connections between the two may become more evident. Research focusing on the prevalence of specific cancers in comparison to different levels and stress management styles could also provide insights into the nature of their relations. Examinations of specific psychosocial stressors's relations to cancer could also highlight a more focused interaction of elements. For example, it may be useful to follow the example of the work by Kennedy et al. (2017) and assess cancer occurrence longitudinally, especially in a manner which takes into account the stresses of the COVID-19 pandemic since social isolation and severe life events are both key cancer-related stressors (Kruk et al., 2019).

As highlighted by the studies which have assessed therapeutic treatments (Cillessen et al., 2019; Jacobsen et al., 2013), there is room for elaborating and refining suggested practices. Any and all psychosocial therapies should attempt to be as accessible as possible, as they will be most effective for cancer prevention in lower socioeconomic communities (Kennedy et al., 2017).

Increasing awareness of the potential for social and psychological elements that influence cancer risks could allow for earlier detection (Kennedy et al., 2017). Encouraging healthy coping mechanisms and building strong resilience strategies in the population may also help to prevent cancers from developing in the first place. Improved treatments methods should also work to decrease patient distress both during treatment and remission (Mooney et al., 2018). It may also be useful to extend stress management therapy options to close family members of cancer patients, as they may be at risk for also developing cancer due to shared genetics, biology, environmental exposures, and coping mechanisms. Perhaps a form of group therapy could be useful in this, as it has been suggested that greater social supports can help to mediate the stress caused by confronting cancer information (Chae et al., 2019).

Conclusion

As seen, the understanding of how psychosocial stress can influence the occurrence and development of various cancers is a growing and complex area of research. While a causal link between the two has yet to be clearly defined, there is clear evidence to suggest a relationship exists. There is a clear role for psychological therapy for improving patient health and wellbeing both during and after cancer treatment. Going forwards, research examining the relationship between psychosocial stress and cancer could enable a deeper understanding of the etiology of different cancers. This area could also benefit from improving the efficacy of current psychological therapies to better address the needs of current and future cancer patients.

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Learning from Bolivia: Decolonial Ambitions and Extractive Roadblocks
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Introduction:

Despite the strong Indigenous rhetoric that brought Evo Morales and the MAS to power, contradictions between discourse and political practice have stunted the realization of a genuine decolonial democracy. This paper argues that these contradictions result from the state's neoextractivist development model. As such, I seek to explain i) *how* Bolivia's dependence on extractive industries limited its realization of decolonial democracy, and ii) *why* decolonization in Bolivia is at odds with its reliance on natural resource exports. Finally, I suggest a path forward for Bolivia based on a binding commitment to Indigenous rights of first, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).

From Canada to Latin America, Indigenous peoples have resisted the destructive forces of colonialism since its arrival in the "Americas." A form of this resistance has been long-held demands for autonomy, self-determination, and decolonization. The 1989 International Labour Organization's Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) have strengthened the legitimacy of these demands in the eyes of the international community (Rice, 2019). But even as many countries signed onto these declarations, in practice, Indigenous communities remain(ed) under the thumb of the state. By investigating the cause for this trend within Bolivia, I hope to illuminate a probable cause for its occurrence in other resource rich nations in Latin America.

Literature Review/Theoretical Framework:

Bolivia's decolonial project can be understood as a movement towards a form of radical democracy divorced from western-cognitive imperialism. The concept of radical democracy goes beyond Dahl's measures of contestation and participation (Van Cott, 2009). It promotes a broader notion of democracy that values—aside from representation—accountability, equality, and autonomy (Cohen & Fung, 2004). Radical democracy strongly resembles Andean visions of democracy, which value intercultural, participatory, deliberative, and transparent government (Van Cott, 2009).

I will be using Tatah Mentan's definition of decoloniality, which requires “delinking from the colonial matrix of power underlying western modernity to imagine and build global futures in which human beings and the nature world are no longer exploited in the relentless quest for wealth and accumulation.”

My argument will draw on the political economy theory of neoextractivism to explain why an extractive agenda has been detrimental to actualizing Bolivia's decolonial project. Neoextractivism expands on existing literature of the “paradox of plenty” to explain why progressive governments in Latin America, despite their state-centred extractive models, continue to experience the ills of the resource curse. Alberto Acosta posits that the resource curse is not due to poor governance alone, but to the mode of accumulation itself, which encourages the state to pursue rent-seeking and authoritarian practices (Acosta, 2013).

Decolonization efforts in Latin America are contingent on their opposition to extractivism and neoliberalism, as they were seen to be inextricably linked to imperialism. Thus, a political economy approach focused on modes of capital accumulation and development is necessary when investigating the reasons for the limitations of these efforts (Postero, 2017).

Historically, Indigenous people in Latin America have been both engines of (Western) development and subjects of modernization. The former, through extractive colonialism, and the latter, through the 20th century assimilationist policy of *Indigenismo* (Stavenhagen, 2002). In Bolivia's more recent past, sites of Indigenous struggle have surrounded neoliberal policies and resource governance. When Evo Morales came to power as the first Indigenous President in 2005, he built upon struggles for resource sovereignty using a language of Indigenous justice and post-liberalism (Fabricant & Postero, 2019).

Bolivia's 2009 Constitution embodies the aspirations of decoloniality and radical democracy while also, owing to the state's neoextractive agenda, holding contradictions to those very same goals. Specifically, it embraced the language of Plurinationalism and Suma Qamaña, while denying Indigenous economic rights of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2016).

FPIC is rights-based approach to protect Indigenous rights in the context of industrial projects in Indigenous territories (Tomlinson, 2019). To fulfill a genuine standard of FPIC, four components must be present. It must be free, entailing that consent is given freely—without coercion or intimidation. It must be prior, in that consent is acquired before every step of the development project. It must be informed, whereby all information is easily understood and accessible for all decision-makers. Finally, there must be consent, meaning that there is the option to accept or reject projects that impact Indigenous lands and cultures (Rice, 2019).

Bolivia's constitution includes a commitment to free, prior, and informed consultation. "Consultation" maintains the power asymmetries between the state and Indigenous communities. It implies that the state will consult Indigenous communities before a project begins, but that the

support or opposition of Indigenous peoples has no substantive power in affecting development outcomes (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2016). For a genuine FPIC process to take place there must be an ability to withhold consent, meaning there must be a veto power ascribed to affected groups (Rice, 2019).

Evidence and Analysis:

Resource dependency is a significant barrier to achieving decolonial democracy in Bolivia. Rent-seeking and authoritarian behaviour under the Movement towards Socialism (MAS), encouraged by the state's model of resource-based development, have undermined the implementation of the Indigenous participatory institutions and epistemologies embedded in the 2009 constitution.

Resource nationalism has played a large role in legitimizing Evo Morales and the MAS, as well as extractive industries themselves. Rents from the hydrocarbon and mining sectors have funded significant social and infrastructural spending, which has led to meaningful reductions in material poverty (Cameron & Tockman, 2018). To pay for social programs and infrastructural improvements, the government increased mineral and hydrocarbon extraction. In tandem with the state's increased involvement in allocating resource wealth, the MAS employed a nationalist discourse of resource control as revolution. This is best exemplified through the words of former MAS Vice President, García Linera stated that due to Bolivia's asymmetrical position in the global economy, an expansion of resource extraction is necessary in the short term for a transition beyond capitalism in the long term (Marston & Kennemore, 2019). This underscores the importance of natural resource extraction in the MAS' maintenance of power, even against a decolonial and revolutionary backdrop.

The constitution “re-founded” Bolivia as a Plurinational State, incorporating Indigenous values into the core of the nation. A pivotal tenant of plurinationalism is the right of Indigenous peoples to self-governance and autonomy. Indigenous autonomy was established within the document as jurisdictions called Indigenous First Peoples’ Peasant Autonomies (AIOCs) (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2016). At the same time, the constitution granted the state exclusive authority over the entirety of country’s natural resources. These conditions are in conflict due to their incompatibility with Indigenous understandings of territory, which typically involves both land and sub-surface resources (Springerová & Vališková, 2016). The assertion of state control over resources located in Indigenous territories means that genuine territorial autonomy cannot occur under Bolivia’s constitution.

This contradiction is purposeful given the threat Indigenous autonomy poses to the state via its threat to national development. This is emblematic in the constitution, secondary legislation, and the ambivalence of the national MAS government towards the realization of AIOCs. The constitutional proposal for Indigenous autonomy from the Unity Pact of Indigenous, First Peoples, and Peasant Organizations (Unity Pact) included control of renewable natural resources and a veto power for development projects on Indigenous territories. This crucial element of the Unity Pact’s proposal was left out of the final constitution as negotiated by the MAS and other political parties in 2008. In 2010, the government passed the Framework Law on Autonomies and Decentralization (LMAD), which defined the requirements for the creation and operation of AIOCs. The strict conditions and bureaucratic hoops that accompanied this process deterred six groups who had initially expressed interest, from applying for the autonomous status. For the twelve groups who did apply, the support of nongovernmental organizations or technical staff from regional indigenous organizations was crucial in completing the applications

(Cameron & Tockman, 2018). The need for these auxiliary aides demonstrates that the national government did not have the political will to expense public officials in assisting these processes.

The ambivalence of the MAS government derives from its preference for an extractivist agenda at expense to Indigenous and environmental rights. This was exemplified when they sought to construct a highway through the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS). The proposal of this project, and its aftermath, made clear that capitalist development was a greater priority than the protection of rural indigenous communities (Postero, 2017). Following public outcry due to the lack of consultation with the lowland Indigenous peoples, the government developed a draft law on the right to prior consultation. It was agreed that the Assembly of the Guaraní People (APG) and the government commission would each write a draft law that would eventually be combined. Though, after several meetings with the government commission in the spring of 2013, the APG decided to refrain from further meetings due to the state's unwillingness to compromise. Comparison of the APG's and the government's proposals reveal the differing meanings that the two groups assigned to the process of FPIC—where the APG considered that the consultation should be binding, the government did not. President Morales defended this position by emphasizing the strategic importance of subsoil resources within Bolivia (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2016). He often stated that the interest of the general population would not be superseded by the interests of specific, territorially based Indigenous peoples (Cameron & Tockman, 2018).

The valid critiques lowland Indigenous groups and climate activists raised following the TIPNIS crisis were often overshadowed by the narrative pushed by Morales that his critics were

enemies of the people's revolution. This villanization further concentrated power in the executive, as you either supported the extractionist party-line or were deemed a revisionist.

Morales' treatment of private media reinforced this idea. Freedom of the press was not censored or suppressed under his presidency, however the MAS high-ranking officials acted belligerently towards the privately-owned media, resulting in a climate of fear and self-censorship (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011).

By positioning resource extraction as critical to the advancement of Morales' decolonial revolution, the government could effectively suppress Indigenous rights to territorial autonomy and FPIC. In doing this the MAS could continue the environmental exploitation that ensured the party's longevity in office.

The state's resource-led development model not only conflicts with Indigenous participatory rights, but also with the Andean epistemology of Suma qamaña. Mentioned in the constitution, Suma qamaña references a (non)development model based on collective well-being. This model advocates for a movement away from growth, and towards a more sustainable way of life that benefits people and nature (Artaraz & Calestani, 2015). Under Morales, Bolivia's economy became more dependent on natural resource exports than any other country in Latin America (Cameron & Tockman, 2018). This level of exploitation is inherently incompatible with a decolonial worldview that advocates for a non-anthropocentric view of nature.

Discussion & Conclusion:

Evo Morales advanced a radical political project that envisioned a decolonial democracy. The purpose of this paper is not to diminish the incredible success he has achieved in terms of

representation and wealth redistribution. Nor is it to ignore his admirable efforts to push back against U.S. imperialism. That being said, the purpose of this paper is to understand and learn from the limitations of decolonization in the Bolivian context.

Bolivia's resource dependency ultimately stunted its realization of decolonization. As the state continues to prioritize a capitalist development model based on natural resource extraction, it continues to sacrifice indigenous people's lands and livelihoods (Postero, 2017). In this sense, the patterns of colonization persist in the country today.

A movement away from resource dependency and towards a genuine decolonial democracy necessitates granting Indigenous peoples political and economic rights (Rice, 2017). Granting these rights initiates the process of de-linking from aspirations of "western modernity." This occurs when the state affirms the right to Indigenous ways of life and land use, regardless of their profit-value. Economic rights, such as a genuine FPIC process, ensure that political rights are not superseded by the monied and power-oriented interests of the resource-dependent state.

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COVID-19 as Globalization
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ANTH 393

Commodity chains today operate within the same mechanisms that trade networks have throughout history – they are the pathways by which international markets connect people, goods, and disease pools. Covid-19 has bypassed all local, national, and international borders, and serves to test their legitimacy. Disease is not bound the same way that societies are, and the experience of disease has become common to citizens worldwide. While nationalism has marked debates over the politics of blame in determining who is responsible for this pandemic, its divisive quality may draw away from attempts at a collaborative solution. The experience of infectious disease in the contemporary era highlights pre-existing inequities; the Canadian Medical Association estimates that merely 15% of disease is caused by biological infectious agents (CMA, 2018). Rather, attention must be directed to what Marmot (2005) terms the social determinants of health. The aim of this paper is to address the global division of labour based on the capitalist economy that resulted from European colonization worldwide. The spread and patterns of morbidity and mortality due to Covid-19 are a direct function of the inequalities produced by capitalism. The impact of the ongoing pandemic exacerbates the differences marked by the social, political, and economic marginalization of vulnerable populations as indicated by the flow of goods and services across borders.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) or simply Covid-19, is seemingly the only topic that comes to mind as of late. It is the first headline of every news outlet or blog post, and feathers through the majority of small talk and casual conversation. While remarkably similar in etiology and symptomatology as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-1) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), Covid-19 has taken on a magnitude seemingly only matched by the infamous Black Death of the 14th century. As a student who studies Anthropology and Sociology, the fact

that it has occurred is not exactly surprising to me. Abdel Omran's discussion of the third phase of epidemiological transition, characterized by re-emerging infectious disease and novel antibiotic-resistant pathogens (Omran, 2005), seems to reflect quite accurately the current state of affairs. Originally proposed in 1971, Omran's predictions eerily resound with the development of SARS-Cov-2. It is a novel pathogen, thereby an emerging infectious disease.

What is beyond my comprehension is the persistence of the disease almost a year later. The 'second wave' seems to be far worse than the first, as rates of infection in Alberta and worldwide continue to climb. However, in China where the pandemic originated, cases seem to be at an all time low. As of Dec. 14, 2020, China reported 94 400 total cases of infection, with remarkably low rates of daily infection since April 2020 (Thomala, 2020); meanwhile, in the province of Alberta alone, there have been a total of 87 451 cases as of Dec. 17, 2020, with daily increases of over 1 000 per day in December (Government of Alberta, 2020). Although there is considerable debate about the validity and accuracy of some of these numbers, the general trends in infection are not to be ignored. This pandemic is of a global scale, but it does not affect all citizens of the globe in an even pattern. Mortality rates due to Covid-19 are significantly less than MERS or SARS; however, they vary greatly within and among regions (Lu et. al, 2020). Over the past few months, I have heard much sentiment that Covid-19 is not a cause for concern due to this statistic. While it is true that the global average of mortality is low, taking solely this etic perspective downplays the volatility that characterizes the pandemic on a local level on marginalized communities (Wolf, 2010, p.324). The disproportionate impact of Covid-19, and how it continues to change is better explained by social factors, rather than the biological evolution of the virus.

Disease flows easily across borders, but resources do not (Farmer, 1996). While borders are in fact political constructs, they have real economic and social consequences. The spread of disease, rather than the etiology or place of origin, is important to understand how borders are semi-permeable in nature. The global shortage of personal protection equipment (PPE) to the shortages of necessities like canned goods and toilet paper in grocery stores are important to understand the global division of labour and the subsequent global wealth gap. The study of borders is rather the study of social inequities (Farmer, 2018). Differences within and among local populations, as well as disparities on the global stage reflect longstanding systems of core and periphery (Wolf, 2010, p. 296). The incidence, prevalence, and availability of treatment varies by the inequitable distribution of resources. There has been considerable hope generated by the news of the Pfizer and the Moderna vaccine – many believe this is the beginning of the return to normal pre-pandemic life (Howard & Levenson, 2020). But there is serious concern to be raised about when and more importantly, who receives this treatment. Akin to the persistence of tuberculosis (TB) worldwide, disease may not simply cease once a cure is found. In the case of TB, a cure and effective treatment has been found; and yet it is not made accessible to the populations most vulnerable to it (Farmer 2018). The availability of vaccines, especially during this time of global demand, is increasingly vulnerable to monopoly. Simultaneously, the strain on health care systems and limits on hospital beds and respirators creates concern over supply. Wealth is implicated in this; people with the means to do so can and will monopolize access to medical resources as another commodity in the market to the exclusion of those who are disempowered and do not possess material wealth.

Interruptions to global commodity chains highlights concerns around the operation of the world economy. The economic downturn caused by Covid-19 is connected to a geographic base;

in this way, disease is mediated by economic activity (Wolf, 2010, p. 312). The SARS epidemic that originated in China in 2003, lasting until 2004, occurred when China's economy accounted for only 2% of global GDP. 17 years later, China holds roughly 20% of the world market, and this increase in participation in international markets reflects the spread and magnitude of the Covid-19 pandemic (Lee & Wright, 2020). International trade is marked by ever increasing speed and efficiency, tying together markets across the world. Improvements in transportation and technological advancement in information and communications technologies (ICT) drive both the integration of all peoples into a market economy, as well as a common disease pool (Wolf, 2010, p. 133). The key drive behind capitalism that calls for the endless accumulation of wealth has hit a roadblock: economic activities came to a halt as governments scrambled to hold some control over the spread of disease. The pace of the pandemic is only matched by the pace of international travel, and merely reminds us that this is the reality of living within a globalized world. While there is indeed enormous wealth to be generated from successful participation in foreign markets, there is increasing concern over the sustainability of capitalism. Alberta's history of prosperity from the oil booms of the 1970s and 1990s is just one example; the mass recessions that followed are just as important (Dunn, 2020). The endless accumulation of wealth seems to have a limit, especially in the economic externalities of the status of the environment and quantities of non-renewable natural resources. The dependence on international markets puts this economy at risk of collapse and mass unemployment - conservative government policies that seek to roll back social support programs and the reluctance to offer crisis funds to citizens seem to be blinded to local conditions as situated within global contexts.

Health and illness is inherently political, for humans are social beings. The disproportionate disease burden imposed by Covid-19 on marginalized populations, embedded

within the politics of blame, is a clear example of structural violence. It is social inequalities, rather than essential biology, that cause illness and death in people who have been systematically disempowered. The statements made by Alberta Premier Jason Kenney formalizes the essentialist victim-blaming argument that has formed the basis of debates over the etiology of the pandemic. During an interview in November 2020, Kenney stated that ‘we see a very high level of spread of Covid-19 in the South Asian community. And I don’t say that to blame or target anyone’ (Villani, 2020). While the overrepresentation of South Asians in terms of infection rates is true, Kenney’s statement formalizes the structural violence enacted by the government – the disproportionate disease burden is blamed on the people who suffer from it. Drawing attention away from the power of governments and large corporations in facilitating the spread and perpetuation of disease via blaming cultural differences seems redundant in a country that has long prided itself on a policy of ‘multiculturalism’ (McKenzie, 2020). Examining the intersecting dimensions of oppression that characterize the living and working conditions of South Asian immigrants in Canada, data on the employment status of South Asian immigrant women suggests that they are underrepresented in high status, high wage professional occupations in a similar pattern as Black and Chinese women (Gagnon & Milan, 2020). Racialized minorities continue to be overrepresented in low status service work due to language barriers and underemployment when international credentials are not recognized. These same occupations, such as taxi drivers, retail sales, and personal support workers, are frontline jobs that cannot be done from home. Concurrently, a meta-analysis conducted by Sze et. al., indicated that Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics were significantly more likely to become infected by Covid-19 (Sze et. al. 2020).

These results are consistent with prior findings that provide evidence for the pre-existing secondary health status experienced by Indigenous Canadians (Koladouz et. al., 2015), Blacks

and other visible minority populations in Canada (Rizvic, 2020). The increased risk of morbidity and mortality is likely related to ethnicity, substandard housing and living conditions, or the social determinants of health (McKeown, 2009). The lack of necessary employment support and a devaluation of foreign credentials from specific regions has led to the concentration of BIPOC in the occupations that generate their lower health status, challenging the validity of Canada's multiculturalism policy. Blaming the structure of multigenerational households imposes a deviant status on families that lie outside the dominant paradigm of the nuclear family in North America, ignoring the financial constraints that necessitate it.

As a visible minority student who is of Asian descent, as well as someone born to immigrant parents, I find his comments threatening. Not only does tuition continue to climb during this time of economic distress for many, but the government continues to sanction discrimination against myself and people like me. His comments remind us all that Canada is a modern settler colonial state; colonialism continues to produce the social settings in which people both thrive and suffer (Wolf, 2010, p. 362). Kenney's microaggressions towards the South Asian community are nothing more than blaming the victim – this locates the blame squarely on the shoulders of people who are simply attempting to participate in the capitalist economy within the living conditions the Government of Canada has bestowed upon them.

Although I am a person of colour, I find that I have occupied a remarkably privileged position during this pandemic, although my ideas of privilege have been redefined. I come from a low-income family, work at a minimum wage job on my weekends, and accrue student loan debt from my ongoing post-secondary education. Even after being laid off due to the pandemic, I just barely qualified for the Government of Canada's Canada Emergency Response Benefit

(CERB), which has allowed me and my family to stay afloat. I have the privilege of being able to stay home and stay safe with my family and continue to attend university for the time being. These basic activities should not be considered ‘privilege’; and yet they are luxuries relative to life during a pandemic. I work at a family-owned store, and while closures at the beginning of the pandemic certainly harmed business, revenues now are stabilizing. There is increasingly a movement to shop local; instead of a heavy reliance on global commodity chains, people seem to be gravitating towards locally grown, produced, and sold goods and services. This gives me some hope for the post-pandemic world - while the global trend of capitalism has always been contingent on combining the volatility of independent commodity goods (Wolf, 2010, p. 319) in a fashion similar to Joseph Schumpeter’s description of creative destruction (Reier, 2000), increasing dependence on localized markets may in fact be beneficial. My decisions as a consumer of where I decide to participate in the economy indeed help to determine what businesses are allowed to stay open even in the aftermath of this global pandemic, even as the future of international commerce points to e-commerce giants like Amazon and Aliexpress.

However, I am increasingly concerned about the duration of this privileged status. With the ongoing tuition increases at the University of Calgary and a second wave of infection in Alberta threatening the re-closure of my workplace, I have had to reconsider my status as a student; I may no longer be able to afford attending this institution and might not actually be able to finish my degree. Thus far, online school has not been optimal for me, and my learning has suffered from a substandard quality of instruction at an ever-increasing price point. Access to the physical university and other public library resources has been restricted to prevent the spread of Covid-19, but it has effectively closed my access to university resources that aided my learning such as open study spaces. The move towards online classes even before the global pandemic

was an inevitable one, motivated by the acceleration of technological development. However, access via a stable internet connection and an up-to-date computer among other things calls attention to the changing nature of education. Education, especially at the post-secondary level, has become a privilege, not a right (Pietrantoni, Glance, & Smith, 2015). It is increasingly becoming yet again a marker of social status rather than a right of the majority, even after a history of advances towards increasing the access to and representation of minority groups. The basis of this is economic in nature, and a future solution will require examining how the economy is intertwined with who is allowed entry into professional status occupations via higher education, including the interests served by sources of funding for universities.

In sum, the interdependence of the world – integration into a single multifaceted economy, and then one disease pool, is etiology for this pandemic. Covid-19 seems to be only the beginning of a future characterized by emerging and re-emerging infectious disease. My only hope is that after the experience of this past year, this world will be better equipped to react to this extraordinary change if and when it occurs again. Covid-19 has changed my relationship to not only other people, but to my own identity and master statuses of student and worker. Under less tragic circumstances, perhaps the awareness and perspective that this pandemic has brought to me will be incredibly beneficial to understand my locus within the world – as an individual, I am capable of enacting change far beyond my own personal realm of life. My choices to wear a mask and to continue to practice safe social distancing behaviours are powerful to protect others around me and preserve my way of life.

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How Can Realism Help Us Understand How the Saudi-Iranian Conflict Contributed to the Yemen Humanitarian Crisis?

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POLI 381**

Introduction

Saudi Arabia and Iran are currently the strongest powers in the Middle East who are both competing to have hegemonic influence in the region. Both countries are trying their best to influence other states around them and gain enough power to become the sole power in the region. One of these states is Yemen, that has experienced a civil war, which led to the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran in pursuit of their own interests. In regard to this geopolitical issue, this paper will attempt to answer the question: How can realism help us understand how the Saudi-Iranian conflict contributed to the Yemen Humanitarian Crisis? Realism can best help in understanding the Saudi-Iranian conflict and its contribution to the Yemen Humanitarian Crisis because this issue revolves around the need for increasing the power and security of Saudi Arabia and Iran, the fact that these states are acting in their own interest and are involved in Yemen only because they have something to gain relative to one another, which has gone so far as to impact Yemen's population. This paper will begin with a discussion of realism and its core tenants, and will apply the core tenants of realism to explain the Saudi-Iranian conflict, the civil war in Yemen, how the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran has had an impact on the Yemen Humanitarian Crisis and how their involvement benefits their interests.

Realism

Realism is a state-centric theory that is one of the oldest and most popular theories in international politics. Realism posits that "international politics is a continuous struggle for power" (Dunne & Schmidt, 2020). There are four core tenants of realism. The first tenant is that states are the only actors relevant in the international political system and that they will act in their own interest. NGO's and international organizations have little to no importance to realists.

Although realism seems to provide the best understanding of the issue, it makes no sense to ignore the importance of actors that are not states, especially when IO's are a huge part of modern politics. The second tenant is that all states exist in a system of international 'anarchy' where there is no overarching authority in the international system therefore, they must do their best to help themselves. This is analogous to the phrase "everyone for themselves" where states will do anything they can to help themselves. This leads to the third tenant, that a state will only express an interest in something if it will increase their power and security. States are more interested in ensuring their own survival and will do that by any means necessary, including lethal force (Dunne & Schmidt, 2020). The fourth tenant is that states are focused on relative gains, which means that states will only interact with other states or issues if they have something to gain relative to others. States will only make decisions for their own gain.

Saudi-Iranian Conflict

The interactions between Saudi Arabia and Iran has greatly impacted the current situation of Yemen. This is because both countries have been backing opposite sides in Yemen and because of this, the war in Yemen has been referred to as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Al Jazeera English, 2019). The relationship that Saudi Arabia and Iran have are that of rivals, they are both competing for regional dominance and want to be leaders of the Islamic world. Iran is a Shia majority country while Saudi Arabia is a Sunni majority country. Sunni and Shia are two major and dominant sects of Islam and although both sects share many of the same fundamental beliefs and traditions, they differ in their doctrines, laws, theology and religious organization (BBC, 2016). In the Muslim world, they are two opposite ideologies, competing with one another as the true followers of Islam.

The struggle for power between Saudi Arabia and Iran began after the rise of the theocratic regime in Iran (Modebadze, 2019). This is when the Shi'i Islamic Republic of Iran came under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini who expressed his interest in furthering the Shia revolution to other countries in the region (Gater-Smith, 2020). They have done this by funding or backing certain groups and Islamic movements that also share the same ideology and interests. This is a clear example of a state expressing their interest in something in order to increase their power and security, which is the third tenant of realism. This became a problem for Sunni countries, in this case Saudi Arabia who have a Shia minority, as this threatened their power and security, and had the potential to trigger an uprising in their country (Gater-Smith, 2020). The goal for Saudi Arabia was then to "reduce the influence of Shia Iran in the Middle East" (Modebadze, 2019, p.67). Because Iran's interests conflict with Saudi Arabia's interests, as realism states, they will also try to increase their influence in the region to protect their power and security. In order to maintain and increase their own influence, Saudi Arabia has also backed and funded certain groups and Islamic movements who share the same ideology and interests. But, the need for regime security and power maximization actually seems to go far beyond the ideological principles of both countries. For example, Iran not only supports Shia groups in different countries like the Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, but they have also allegedly supported Sunni Hamas, Sunni Islamic Jihad and the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. And in Saudi Arabia's case, they have also supported the Shi'i Iraqi regime, and Iraq's Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr when fighting the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. (Gater-Smith, 2020). The fourth tenant of realism which is that states will only interact with other states if they have something to gain relative to others can be applied to this situation, but it can only be applied if other actors, such as Islamic movements can also be included. Through the realist perspective (if

we also include other actors), both countries are interacting with different groups and states because it will allow them to gain power relative to one another. This also further supports the fact that realism is the most appropriate theory to understand the Saudi-Iranian conflict because of the lengths they will go to increase their power and security. The lengths both countries have gone can be seen in Yemen, who are currently “the largest humanitarian crisis in the world” (UNICEF, 2020).

Current situation in Yemen

Yemen has a population of more than 24 million people and almost 80 percent of their population are in need of humanitarian assistance which include over 12 million children. There has also been an outbreak of Cholera that strikes in populations that are vulnerable due to malnutrition and drought, and where there is poor sanitation and hygiene (UNICEF, 2020). According to the World Health Organization, the total suspected number of cholera cases reported from January 2018 to May 2020 was 1,371,819 (WHO, 2020). Clearly, the armed conflict between the Saudi-led government coalition and the Houthi rebels has severely impacted the ability to import and export necessary resources which has made it extremely difficult for healthcare workers to get access to essential medicines (The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 2017). Now, not only is Yemen dealing with other complex health issues related to war, they are also having to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak.

Civil War in Yemen

Yemen was established in 1990 when North Yemen and South Yemen had merged with the support of the West. Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was the North representative became elected

president, while the southern representative, Ali Salim al-Beidh, became vice-president. Economic issues and political marginalization of the tribes in South Yemen led to the leaders splitting from one another, leading to a civil war. Saleh remained in power until the end of 2011 when the people of Yemen revolted against him during the Arab Spring (Munteanu, 2015).

The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), whose most influential member is Saudi Arabia, oversaw negotiations to force Saleh out and transition to a new government (Al Jazeera English, 2019). Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi was placed into power but Yemen continued to have economic problems that fueled social tensions, “underlying perhaps the biggest Yemeni problems: secessionist tendencies from South and Houthi’s power expansion” (Munteanu, 2015, p.58). The Houthis, who are a conservative group, “apparently influenced by Tehran” were striving for political influence in Sana’a. US Ambassador to Yemen, Gerald Feierstein stated that, “to expand its influence in Yemen, Iran supports Shi’ite rebels in the country and other forces that are interested in secession state” (Munteanu, 2015, p.59). The Houthis have claimed that they have been marginalized by the government. Eventually, by joining forces with Saleh who was also sidelined by the GCC, they took over Yemen’s capital in 2014 (Al Jazeera English, 2019). President Hadi then fled to Saudi Arabia. Hadi also proposed a constitutional draft “which sought territorial reorganization of the state in six administrative provinces, proposing instead an administrative model based on the two regions: The North and the South” (Munteanu, 2015, p.58). His request was denied. President Hadi formed a coalition with Saudi Arabia and a few other countries in order to return to power. This is when Saudi Arabia expressed three war aims: bring President Hadi back into power, protect their own southern border by preventing Yemen from collapsing, and contain the perceived growth of influence from Iran in the region (Al Jazeera English, 2019). Realism makes it evident that Saudi Arabia is concerned with increasing

its security and power because they want to bring President Hadi's government back into power, and this is because Saudi Arabia would get along with Hadi's government rather than the Houthis. Also, because Yemen borders Saudi Arabia, they are concerned with the possible collapse of Yemen since it will also affect them, from a realist perspective, the state of Saudi Arabia is acting in its own interest when they say that they are concerned with Yemen. The last war aim, from a realist lens, is very clearly about trying to increase their own security and power by trying to bring down another state that also wants to increase their security and power.

How Saudi Arabia and Iran have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Yemen

As stated before, the armed conflict between the Saudi-led government coalition and the Houthis, who have been allegedly backed by Iran, has severely impacted the ability to import and export goods which has made it extremely difficult for healthcare workers to get access to essential medicines (The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 2017). There was also a Saudi-led intervention where they sent more than 19,000 airstrikes to Yemen from 2016-2019. Saudi led forces have also been targeting their enemies, the Houthis, but many rights groups have accused these Saudi-led forces of bombing schools and hospitals, where thousands of Yemenis have died (Al Jazeera English, 2019). From a realist perspective, this shows that Saudi Arabia is only concerned with ensuring their own survival and are doing that by any means necessary, including lethal force. Iran is also concerned with ensuring their own survival and trying to increase their power by providing the Houthi regime with weapons. An instance of this would be when Iranian drones and cruise missiles were dropped on Saudi oil installations, this shut down half of their oil production for weeks. Iran denied any connection and claimed it was done solely by the Houthis (Khan & Zhaoying, 2020), but Saudi Arabia and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo believe

otherwise (Al Jazeera, 2019). What is more directly causing the Yemen Humanitarian Crisis though, is the fact that aid is being used as a weapon. The Saudi-led coalition created a land, sea and air barrier around Yemen in 2015, which made it nearly impossible for resources and supplies to get in or out the country. The Houthis have been accused of taking, blocking and destroying the aid that the Yemen population desperately needs (Al Jazeera English, 2019).

How the involvement in Yemen can increase the power of Saudi Arabia and Iran

It has been established that Saudi Arabia and Iran are competing for hegemonic influence of the Middle East, and that Yemen is one of the countries that they are competing in. The Gulf region, which Yemen is a part of, has a very important location. This region has a very important economic significance because not only does it have oil resources and minerals, it is an avenue of trade for those resources as well as military ships (Abuelghanam & Tahboub, 2018). Munteanu (2015), outlines the importance of Yemen's location well in terms of regional geopolitics, "if we look carefully at its geographical location we can understand its strategic importance, since Yemen is at the entrance of the Gulf of Aden and Bab el Mandeb Strait, crossed daily by over 3 million barrels of oil leaving the Persian Gulf to the West" (p.59). Iran has used the Shi'ite Houthi movement to "transform Yemen into an Iranian-dominated stronghold that will harass and weaken its Saudi competitor and provide it with a navel foothold in the strategic Red Sea" (Khan & Zhaoying, 2020, p.250). From a realist perspective, having access to the Gulf would allow either country an opportunity to gain something relative to one another and increase their power around the world.

Conclusion

The Saudi-Iranian conflict is very complex. It stems out of the need to claim that they are the true leaders of the Islamic world since Saudi Arabia is a Sunni country while Iran is a Shia country. Both countries are rivals and are trying to increase their power and security by supporting different Islamic movements and participating or being linked to attacks in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In an attempt to increase their power, both countries have a vested interest in Yemen because Yemen has a very important geographical location that will benefit the economy of either state. Their involvement in Yemen has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, making it one of largest humanitarian crisis in the world. Because the main goal for both Saudi Arabia and Iran is to increase their power and security, realism provides the best understanding for this geopolitical issue. Although realism fails to consider that other actors such as the GCC and the many different Islamic movements, play a significant role in the pursuit of power and influence over the Middle East. As things stand now, the Houthis still have control of Sana'a and most of north Yemen (Al Jazeera, 2020) and there are still ongoing attacks between each side.

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Convincing Choices: Artistic Decisions in Death Portraiture and Photography
Vanessa Lamb
ARHI 431

In Western culture, I think that we are fearful of death because it is so unknown to us. Despite the efforts of modern medicine, we are unable to live forever as of right now and death is an inescapability for everyone. Portraiture and especially photography offer a means by which a person's memory can be preserved and commemorated. A portrait is an effort to capture a person's essence—what they are like and who they are. I think that rather than having a person's true essence presented in a photograph it is rather their essence translated through the perspective of the artist. An essence can only be pure when it comes straight from the source. Death portraiture and photography do something similar; they are attempting to create and perpetuate the memory of a loved one (most of the time). By using art as the form of translation the message of death becomes more easily digestible. Instead of death and the dead being an unfathomable fear, it becomes something simpler. These are photographs of something, someone, that was, instead of being taboo. The photograph(s) facilitate the deliverability of aesthetic and memory in the morbid reality of the dead bodies shown. Within the following representations, there is an amount of beauty found in all the interpretations of death.

On a brief, more personal anecdote, to help to show not only my viewpoint on this subject matter but also that of Western ideology surrounding the dead, I find death uncomfortable. When it is fake and in television shows or movies it is approachable to a degree. I even find interest in mysteries or true crime but there is a separation between these dramatizations and my reality. However, when it comes to news and journalism, I get unnerved. Unsettled by not only the dead but the nature that these things happen in, I find that I take on the accompanying sadness. As well, having had family members pass away, I am not good at confronting death and grief much like I am not good at dealing with it on the news. I am not a

person that is good at goodbyes and death is the final one. As such, I understand the sentiment behind wanting to preserve and memorialize a person through photography or portraiture. Why would you not want to have a memory for as long as possible? What I have trouble with within death photography is the loss that I feel when looking at them. Although fascinating, I found this an emotional topic to address for many obvious reasons. One of the most pertinent being no matter how hard you try to capture these people and their essence they are not coming back to you in this world and that is okay.

Anthropologist Jay Ruby wrote a book entitled *Secure the Shadow: Death and Photography in America*, it goes through different subsections of death portraiture, not only the personal but also that of celebrities or societal icons. Death photography and portraiture began to become more popular in the nineteenth century, continuing into the twentieth as well.¹⁸⁹ The dynamic surrounding death had a shift however in the United States, in the nineteenth century. It was not an uncommon topic of conversation but into the early twentieth it became taboo among the middle class.¹⁹⁰ Ruby truly solidifies this by stating “the slightest sign of distress at the death of a family member was regarded as pathological.”¹⁹¹ I think part of this sentiment extends through to today, death continues to be a difficult subject. It is hard to address it in a personal way or in that of mass media as well. Photography, though, can make death easier to digest. As Ruby explains the connection between photography, memory, and grieving is inherent.¹⁹² This connection is exemplified using photography by mourners to address and deal with their loss and help them to properly grieve.¹⁹³ The prospect of the photograph makes the idea of death, simpler.

¹⁸⁹ Jay Ruby, *Secure the Shadow: Death and Photography in America*, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995), 50.

¹⁹⁰ Ruby, 7.

¹⁹¹ Ruby, 7.

¹⁹² Ruby, 9.

¹⁹³ Ruby, 9.

In contradiction to the above, Ruby also mentions a particular “artistic problem” that occurs and that is the denial of death present within the genre.¹⁹⁴ Rather than that death portraits function to help grieve, they act “to retain the dead, to capture the sense of the essence of a being now gone, to deny death,” as Rudy articulated.¹⁹⁵ These portraits exist to prolong the life of someone who is already dead, to deny their passing and focus on their living memory and essence. However, pretending someone is still alive, and ignoring the death does make it easier to get through the consumption of grief. The aforementioned denial of death is embodied in the recurrence of a practice called the last sleep. This practice purposely presents the subject as if they were asleep, not dead, as death is permanent, but sleep is not.¹⁹⁶

As seen in the below example, *Post-mortem Portrait of an Unidentified Child* by Southworth and Hawes (see fig. 1), the child is posed as if they were sleeping peacefully. This creates the most ideal fantasy related to death, death as sleep. The child pictured is also dressed in white, I think rather angelically, and is also holding a rosary. In *Photography and Death*, Audrey Linkman expands on this notion of the theme of death as sleep in portraiture. Linkman notes that this practice specifically leads the viewer away from disturbing the reality of death and is given hope for the subject.¹⁹⁷ This is done not only by making the child in the image look asleep but also hiding all physical aspects that could point towards death.¹⁹⁸ Continuing this idea, she says that photographers were encouraged to “aim for an expression that was free of any suggestion of pain” this could then “convey a reassuring sense of peace and serenity.”¹⁹⁹ But this goal took much artist intervention to conceal the physicality of death, by posing and moving the

¹⁹⁴ Ruby, 29.

¹⁹⁵ Ruby, 29.

¹⁹⁶ Audrey Linkman, *Photography and Death (Exposures)*, (London, England: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2011), 21.

¹⁹⁷ Linkman, 21.

¹⁹⁸ Linkman, 21.

¹⁹⁹ Linkman, 24.

dead body to the most desirable position.²⁰⁰ Looking at the *Post-mortem Portrait of an Unidentified Child*, I see that idea of solace demonstrated as the child looks fully at rest. But no matter how convincing these last sleep portraits are they still present the dead. It is by their artistic techniques that we are comforted into thinking that we are not being confronted with the reality of death.



²⁰¹(Fig. 1) Southworth and Hawes, Boston, *Post-mortem Portrait of an Unidentified Child*, c. 1850, July 17, 2008, Flickr accessed April 6, 2020 https://www.flickr.com/photos/george_eastman_house/2677487993 .

²⁰⁰ Linkman, 25.

²⁰¹ Southworth and Hawes, Boston, *Post-mortem Portrait of an Unidentified Child*, c. 1850, July 17, 2008, Flickr accessed April 6, 2020 https://www.flickr.com/photos/george_eastman_house/2677487993 .

Traditional death photography and death portraits from the eighteenth to twentieth centuries focus on bringing the subject back to life. Or to fool the viewer into thinking that they are alive making the person less of a memory, like the last sleep portrait. A contemporary example is Andres Serrano's series *The Morgue*, it offers a contrasting effect to the historic portraits. His images are of unidentified or unidentifiable bodies in a morgue.²⁰² This is not the kind of death that I think we are used to seeing or wanting to see. They do not hide the ideas of death but instead, show the reality of the aftermath. These are not the images of the scenes that are common to us, but rather exclusive access to the protected. This was even true for Serrano himself, he was given privileged access to these subjects, these bodies, photographed them making them art, and then extended his access to us.²⁰³ As the viewer, we get to see the truth that is often not given. It was typical to hide the physical implication of death as seen in the death as sleep portraits, as mentioned previously, but here are provided with just that.

Serrano's images do not present an idealization, they show the grotesque wounds of the dead people with no shame. From the cause of death to the autopsy it is all recognizable in almost all photographs, unlike the death as sleep portraits. I think Serrano's photographs offer a sympathetic commemoration instead of the loving remembrance the last sleep portraits give. *The Morgue* gives these otherwise forgotten people a kind of longevity, but I do not think this is the photograph's prominent function. Perhaps they function more as a personal reminder of, instead of remembering life like the more historic death portraits, these are more a reminder of the inevitability of death; a memento mori. Presenting us with the reality of death that may cause "us to imagine our own death."²⁰⁴ Mary O'Neill in "Speaking to the Dead: Images of the Dead in

²⁰² Mary O'Neill, "Speaking to the Dead: Images of the Dead in Contemporary Art." *Health* 15, no. 3 (May 2011): 305.

²⁰³ O'Neill, 305.

²⁰⁴ O'Neill, 306.

Contemporary Art” later enhances the function of the images of being a memento mori by stating, “we may be strengthened by risking empathy with the victims of violence, by the realization that we are witnessing the artworks that will represent us in the future.”²⁰⁵ I think that she is saying that by us, as the viewer, seeing the humanity in the figures we can understand the concept of death as a possibility for us. Thereby when we see ourselves in these artworks, we can better interpret them, but also the subject of death. Death is not easy to fathom when isolated, but when translated through oneself and through art, it can be navigated simplistically.

As the identities of the bodies in Serrano’s photographs were unknown, they are instead titled by their cause of death. Thus, this puts death at the forefront of all aspects of the works, there is no break from it. But I would argue that this honesty in the depiction and in their title is redeeming. He does not hide the facts of death and not only that, but I think he uses art to display them in a manner that makes us look. We are guided to look at what we usually ignore, death. Death is now an easy subject, but it is something that never goes away. It will reoccur in our lives whether we try to disguise it or not. The artistic qualities in the framing of the portraits give an artistic essence because there is not a reference to the human essence these people had. There is no glorification of what happened to these people, they are simply dead.

²⁰⁵ O’Neill, 306.



²⁰⁶(Fig. 2) Andres Serrano, *Fatal Meningitis*, 1993, Photograph. From artistwebsite. <http://andresserrano.org/series/the-morgue>

One specific work of Serrano's particularly struck me, *Fatal Meningitis*, 1993 (see fig. 2). The subject is just two relaxed feet and lower legs of what I assume to be a child, and a tag tied around one of the legs. There is such clarity given by the quality of the photograph, impressions of socks are left on each leg. When I begin to address the subject matter of this photo my breathe skips and I get upset. I associate children with joy, happiness and wonder, and that was all taken away from this one. It is not the life that this child lived that matters here, but the pain and the end result of that suffering that is most prevalent. Scholar, Mary O'Neill says that within Serrano's work "there is no attempt here at transcendence, no redeeming moment of

²⁰⁶ Andres Serrano, *Fatal Meningitis*, 1993, Photograph. From artist website. <http://andresserrano.org/series/the-morgue> .

resilience of the human spirit.”²⁰⁷ I feel like that is particularly illustrated here, there is no saving of the child in the image. We as the viewer do not have the ability to take away or hide the subject matter. We are unable to hide in any redemption either, we must face death. Although I think one of the only things that made this more addressable was the cropping. It is just the feet that are in view, we do not have the face. There is dignity given to the child in this choice, they retain their full anonymity whilst still being addressed. It is the artistic choice within the framing and cropping of the piece that makes the devastation of death more approachable.

Within death portraiture, we are forced away from what we as the viewers are traditionally comfortable with, especially in the contemporary example and towards a more artistic understanding of death. As noted previously a key difference in the historic and contemporary being in the presentation. Serrano’s portraits present us with the grotesque aspects of death whereas last sleep portraiture is peaceful and gentler. When first confronted by the images they seem like complete opposites, but the two portraits do contain similarities. Within Andres Serrano’s work, the memory of these people can be reinvented and continue through those that view the series. We as a viewer are presented with a grotesque beauty that can be found in decay instead of the terrifying reality of looking at a dead body. In the historic practice of death as sleep instead of the violence of death, we are offered comfort in the illusion of the imagery. They share the use of artistic implications to aid in the comprehension of the often insurmountable topic of death. The artistic decisions give us the tools to navigate and address our personal ideals and qualms with death, something we will undoubtedly experience.

²⁰⁷ O’Neill, 307.

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**Collective Strength Through Dance: The Implications of Western Colonialism on the Hijra
Community
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DNCE 481**

Introduction

The strikes of a *dholak* (hand-drum) intertwine with the metronomic ringing of the *Manjira* (finger cymbals)²⁰⁸, filling the street with a percussive backdrop for the *Hijra* dancer. Dressed in a fluorescent green sari, the intricate movements of the dancer's finger positions extend outwards to the circle of onlookers around them, giving blessings to the baby boy on his birthday.²⁰⁹ While this performance may appear to be an informal, casual dance in the streets of India, the societal implications of the Hijra's performance extends deep into the discourse on dance, LGBTQ+ rights, and Indian culture. Referring to female-identifying individuals that were born in biologically male bodies, the term 'Hijra' encompasses elements of intersectionality within the LGBTQ+ community.²¹⁰ In Western cultures, individuals are often categorized into rigid categories with regard to their sexual orientation and gender, leaving little room for movement between labels. While distinctive approaches to gender and sexuality are not consistently observed throughout all cultures, the presence of Hijras in Indian society serves as an example of how intersectionality between the sexual and gender categories is practiced in India. Rather than being categorized from the Western context as transgender, Hijras are considered the "third gender" of India.²¹¹ Ancient Hindu religious texts present Hijras as reincarnations of spiritual leaders, where they are believed

208 Robert L. Hardgrave and Stephen M. Slawek. "Instruments and Music Culture in Eighteenth Century India: The Solvyns Portraits." *Asian Music* 20, no. 1 (1988), doi:10.2307/833855.

209 "Sheman Dance On Boy's Birth In India.mp4." YouTube video, 1:09, posted by "Praveein Pandey," September 21, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=44SD6Y8IN3Q&ab_channel=PraveeinPandey.

210 Bithika Mondal, Sudeshna Das, Deepshikha Ray, and Debanjan Banerjee, . "Their Untold Stories...": Lived Experiences of Being a Transgender (Hijra), A Qualitative Study From India." *Journal of Psychosexual Health* 2, no. 2 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1177/2631831820936924>.

211 Christine Garlough "Refiguring the South Asian American Tradition Bearer: Performing the "Third Gender" in Yoni Ki Baat." *The Journal of American Folklore* 128, no. 510 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.5406/jamerfolk.128.510.0412>.

to encompass the ability to provide blessings or curses through dance. The power that their bodies exude through movement contributes to their exoticization in current day society, where they are both feared and desired for their spiritual abilities. As an individual who has been raised through Western educational institutions, I have noticed the lack of historical discussions on the fluidity and intersectionality between dance, spirituality, and gender, thus piquing my interest in the Hijra community. From the perspective of a post-secondary dance student with a Western education, I will analyze the historical presence of Hijras in a religious context, the role of dance in their social class sub-system, and the present day LGBTQ2IS+ human rights challenges. I will evaluate how the gender-fluid presentations of Hijran dance practices of threatened colonial powers, and how Western perspectives influenced the marginalization and exoticization of the Hijra community within the larger socio-political Indian context.

More Than a Myth: Ancient and Religious History

The paradox of the exoticization and ostracization against the Hijra community extends back to the ancient inception of their predecessors. Hinduism is the predominant religion practiced in India, woven into the cultural traditions of their society for over three thousand years.²¹² The perceived ability of the Hijras to possess supernatural powers originates from two Sanskrit epics retrieved from ancient Hindu texts, known as the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*.²¹³ *Ramayana* depicts the story of a banished lord named Rama, exiled to the forest for fourteen years. His devoted followers trailed behind him in mourning, where he instructed the “men and the women”

²¹² *Encyclopedia of American Studies*, s.v. “Hinduism,” accessed November 27, 2020. <https://search-credreference-com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/content/entry/jhueas/hinduism/0>

²¹³ “It's Official, Transgenders Finally Get Formal Identity from Supreme Court [Politics and Nation],” *The Economic Times*, April 16, 2014, <http://ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/docview/1516189077?accountid=9838>

to return back to their city. After serving his sentence, the lord returned back to where he last addressed his devoted followers. Lord Rama saw that a group of exiled Hijras, identifying neither as men nor women, were still waiting for him. It is claimed that because of their devotion, the lord was impressed with the Hijras and granted them their powers of conferring blessings through song and dance.²¹⁴ This mythological source proves the early existence of queer communities in ancient Indian society. The story of Ramayana breaks free of the Western binary gender perspective, ultimately supporting the idea that gender can exist on a sliding scale. Although the acceptance of this perspective can be controversial in current-day society, the praising of the Hijras for their “otherness” within this text reveals the powers Hijras hold in a religious context.

In the tale of the Mahabharata, the Pandava brothers, sons of the king, lose in a game of dice to their enemy and were forced to exile. Upon their last year of exile, it was agreed that they remain incognito before returning back into normal civilization. One of the brothers, Arjuna, states that he will undergo a disguise as a Eunuch and serve in the royal court. He undergoes castration and dresses in female-identifying elements, engaging in court activities of singing and dancing with other queens.²¹⁵ This tale provides mythological confirmation of the *Khawaja Saras*, the predecessors to the current day Hijras. The inception of the Khawaja Saras originates from the 16th century Muslim Mughal Empire which precedes British colonial rule.²¹⁶ The Khwaja Saras held various roles in the court, varying from protectors of the royal harems to being confidants of

²¹⁴ Devdutt P, “Hindu scriptures always speak of the third gender,” *The New Indian Express*, December 12, 2018, <https://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/bengaluru/2018/dec/12/hindu-scriptures-always-speak-of-the-third-gender-1910314.html>

²¹⁵ Devdutt, “Hindu scriptures always speak of the third gender.”

²¹⁶ Susan, B. “Historical Origins of a ‘Caste Society,’” *Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age*, (1999)doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521264341.003.

the rulers. These roles were seen as desirable to the general population, where parents would consider castrating their children to ensure future employment possibilities.²¹⁷

Lord Rama and Arjuna are only two out of the vast gender-diverse figures with religious origins in Hinduism. *Bahuchara Mata* is known as a manifestation of the Mother Goddess and is the main goddess worshiped by the Hijra community. She possesses the ability to grant fertility, fortune to males, and transformations in the body. While not all Hijras are castrated, the process of castration, also known as *Nirvan*,²¹⁸ holds significant influence on the Hijra community. The religious ceremony that follows Nirvan is dedicated to Bahuchara Mata, where it is thought that the goddess will provide the Hijra with powers by committing to this process.

While the extent of the historical accuracy is debated, the role of the Hijras in the Ramayana, Mahabharata, and Mughal period reveal a surprisingly positive perception of Hijras. The worshiping of gender-diverse figures in religious texts brings forward the commonalities and prevalence of fluidity in gender identification across both Hindu and Muslim religions. This indicates that the concept of genderfluidity is not only a contemporary construct in current day society, but a concept with historical roots. Ancient history frames the Hijras as well-revered and mythical figures, setting up a perspective that will be heavily contradicted as colonial powers influx. Western influences will reveal an increase in aggression as I evaluate events in Indian history that progress towards the present, including the significance of the caste system, the role

²¹⁷ Ina G., "Hijra Communities of Dehli," *Sexualities* 19 no. 5-6 (2015): 535-546. <https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1177/1363460715616946>

²¹⁸ Annalysse M., "The Role of Hinduism in the Construction of Hijra Identity in Modern Hindu India." *Invocations Undergraduate Journal of Religious Studies*, (2017): <https://invocationsiu.wordpress.com/2017/04/01/the-role-of-hinduism-in-the-construction-of-hijra-identity-in-modern-hindu-india/>

of Western powers in its development, and the effects of both on the perceptions of the Hijra community.

Taking Control with the British Crown

The invasion of British colonial powers can be considered the catalyst for the marginalization of the Hijra community in Indian society. Although there were cases of mistreatment of Hijras in an ancient context, such as the trading of slaves or sex work, the ostracization of the community came into full effect as colonization restructured the entirety of Indian society. Susan Bayly, a scholar known for evaluating the development of the caste system, describes the caste system as: "...a system of elaborate stratified social hierarchy that distinguishes India from all other societies."⁽¹⁾²¹⁹ Tracing back to religious roots, the caste system is believed to be inspired by a Hindu law that encompasses social, economic, and political aspects of society. *Brhamins* (priests and teachers) were at the top, followed by the *Kshatiyas* (warriors/rulers), *Vaishyas* (farmers/traders/merchants), and the *Shudras* (labourers). Those who did not fit in the system were known as *Outcastes* and often held occupations of "unclean work."²²⁰ While the hierarchical system divided citizens based on their specific occupations, those identities of were not as influential prior to the colonization of India where movement between the castes were possible.²²¹ As the 18th century progressed, India was quickly conquered by the East India

²¹⁹ Bayly, "Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age," 1.

²²⁰Sanjoy Chakravorty, "Viewpoint: How the British reshaped India's caste system," *BBC News*, accessed November 28, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-48619734>

²²¹ "What Is India's Caste System?," *BBC News*, Accessed November 28, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-35650616#:~:text=The%20caste%20system%20divides%20Hindus,the%20Hindu%20God%20of%20creation.>

Company, eventually leading to the complete rule of the British colonizers in India. The sudden and absolute rule of the colonizers allowed for the misinformation and adaptation of religious texts, where the British crown implemented the Hindu “law” into their nationwide census.

The institutionalization and manipulation of spiritual belief into Western law was an imposition of power from the British, solidifying the rigid structure of the caste system with lasting effects into modern society. The British made the caste system a defining feature of the social, political, and economic systems of Indian culture, leading to the reframing of the Hijras as “ungovernable.” The qualities that the Hijra used to be praised for was now punishable, where they were ostracized for their association with the queer community. Dancing, singing, and blessings gave the Hijra community power, which the British rule saw as a threat to their absolute authority. The Hijra community was labeled as dangerous to the public and became outcasted, due to the British claiming the Hijras were sexually deviant, contained disease, and contaminated society.²²² The colonizer’s discriminatory views led to the banning of public performances of the Hijras as they expressed gender non-conforming ideals, which included the presentation of feminine clothing and gestures. Threats, fines, prison, and in some cases, death, were brought onto the Hijra community if they did not comply with the institutional changes. Western binary and heteronormative views dictated the actions of the colonizers, forcing gender-fluid individuals to be pushed to the fringes of society. Although the British crown used the relationship between dance and gender to eradicate the Hijra community, their devotion to spirituality, gender expression, and dance led to their survival post-colonial rule.²²³

²²² Soutik Biswas, “How Britain tried to ‘erase’ India’s third gender,” *BBC News*, assessed November 28, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-48442934>

²²³ Biswas, “How Britain tried to ‘erase’ India’s third gender.”

Inside the Houses of the Hijras: The Power of Dance

Contributing both to their inception in religious texts and survival post-colonialism, the defiant nature of the Hijras against societal norms can be credited to their collective strength. While Western influences outcast the Hijras to the margins of society, Hijras grew resilient through their own social structure and beliefs. Their sub-societal system is divided into distinct “houses,” contrasting the broader Indian caste system as it does not function based on hierarchical lineage.²²⁴ A fictional kinship is formed between the Hijras and their gurus, creating extensive social relationships of mothers and daughters. The sub-system of the Hijras value to role of the matriarchy, while the wider community of India functions based on a patriarchal society.²²⁵ As Hijras are born as male-identifying individuals, their families will disown and exile them for expressing themselves outside of the gender-normative ideals. The action of exile demonstrates a direct shift in the values and acceptance of gender expression in comparison to ancient texts, where families would voluntarily, and with honour, send their sons to the courts to become Khawaja Saras.

The cyclical nature of the survival of their sub-societal structure within the wider caste system can be credited to their collective identity over dance. Dance provided the Hijra community with the strength to survive, and in turn, their survival allowed them to continue expressing their genderfluidity through dance. As a faith-based society in India, the Hijra community’s association with Bahachura Mata perpetuates the belief to the rest of Indian society that Hijras can confer blessings to newlywed couples, newborn babies, or male infants.²²⁶ This leads to the mistreated community being both actively sought out and outcasted, which can result in Hijras turning to

²²⁴ Serena N., “The Hijras of India.” *Journal of Homosexuality* 11, 2-4 (1986): 35-54.

https://doi.org/10.1300/J082v11n03_03

²²⁵ Nanda, “The Hijras of India.”

²²⁶ Nanda, “The Hijras of India.”

prostitution to provide income when employment opportunities are unavailable. Weddings, festivals, and ceremonial-like performances will typically contain elements of singing, dancing, and comedy. Performances can occur in structured halls or venues but are most often evident on the streets outside of the homes that hired the Hijras. Movement qualities of Hijran dance performances can be drawn from Classical Indian dance, where there is an emphasis on the articulation of the hands, clapping, percussive qualities of the feet, and twisting motions of the hips.²²⁷ The dichotomy of exoticization and marginalization exists within the application of their dance practices, where fear and admiration influence elements of their performances. While they present themselves as female in the clothes they perform in, their mannerisms are exaggerated to present a caricature of a typical cis-gender woman. Comedic and satirical perpetuations of female behaviour are exuded, where Hijras will present facial or body hair, use aggressive speech, and perform gestures to contrast the idea of “restrained femininity,”²²⁸ a common concept perpetuated in Hindu culture. Although sought out for their blessings, Hijras hold their own significant amount of power in their ability to confer curses. Serena Nanda, a scholar studying the dimensions of Hijra in India, describes the actions of a curse in the quote: “The ultimate sanction of hijras to an abusive or unresponsive public is to lift their skirts and expose the mutilated genitals.”²²⁹ The exaggeration of the gender-fluid qualities diminished by colonial powers is the community's way of reclaiming their identity through the form of dance. While dance has the power to unify their collective identity and brings forward their role in Indian culture, the Hijran community still faces extreme human rights violations due to the lasting effects of colonization.

²²⁷ “A Unique Culture in India. Kinner dance and giving blessing to newly married couples हिजडे dance.” YouTube video, 20:48. Posted by “1983manpreet,” February 23, 2010.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B7Hp6zlcQm&ab_channel=Travel.

²²⁸ Nana, “The Hijras of India.”

²²⁹ Nana, “The Hijras of India.”

Western Ideals, Eastern Adoption, and Global Rights

The conception of the “third gender” has been prevalent in cultures across the globe, only to be recently redefined and reframed by Western perspectives. The *Fa’afafine* in Samoan cultures, *Kathoey* in Thailand, and *Sambia* in Papua New Guinea all serve as examples of collectives with gender-fluid presentations, where Western perspectives will find difficulty in describing their identity.²³⁰ By Western definitions, the individuals described above would be considered transgender females; born with biological male attributes, identifying as female. This point of view restrains the identity of these gender-diverse communities, removing the spiritual, cultural, and traditional essences that contribute to their role in their respective societies.

As the awareness of transgender individuals and rights increase in Western societies, this begins to question how colonized countries acknowledge their gender-diverse communities. In effect from 1858 to 2018, section 377 of the Indian Penal Code dictated that any “unnatural offences against the order of nature” were illegal.²³¹ The recent upturn of colonial laws demonstrates how colonial powers embedded themselves into the long-lasting fabric of society. The Supreme Court of India explicitly stated restrictions on Hijras in 2013, leaving them with little access to education, health care, and employment. The Supreme Court was severely criticized for their discrimination, eventually officially recognizing India’s “Third Gender” in 2014. The “Right for Transgender Persons Bill” was drafted in 2014 and passed in 2016, finally

²³⁰ Govindasamy A., “Living on the Societal Edge: India’s Transgender Realities,” *J relig Health* 54, (2015): 1451-1459, <https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1007/s10943-014-9987-z>

²³¹ UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog, “India’s Relationship with the Third Gender,” October 29, 2018. <https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2018/10/29/indias-relationship-with-the-third-gender/#:~:text=In%20April%20of%202014%2C%20the,to%20as%20Hijra%20or%20transgender.>

making the discrimination against Hijras illegal.²³² While the political movements are revered for having secured new safety rights and “official” recognition of Hijras in society, those rights previously existed before centuries of colonial oppression stripped them away. Hijras are still unable to officially transfer property or adopt children, as those processes only apply to “men” or “women” in India. This indicates that even with recognition, gender-diverse individuals are still considered lesser than those who are cisgender. By dictating the Hijras as “transgender” through these acts and bills, it perpetuates the Western ideals of gender within the Indian context, ultimately disregarding the historical significance of Hijras in society.

Conclusion

Dance and spirituality have empowered the Hijra community through ancient mythologies, colonial impositions, and present-day society. While their ability to possess power through their dance practices were revered in ancient texts, colonial rule viewed the Hijra’s existence as a threat to their authority. British colonialism imposed their Western ideologies on India, reshaping their society which ultimately caused the marginalization of the Hijras. Colonial Western views have lasted centuries, where Hijras in the present are still struggling to obtain basic human rights.

My evaluation of the Hijra community brings forward the significance of examining dance from a holistic perspective, taking into account the historical, cultural, and spiritual contexts. The Hijra community demonstrates the intersectionality between dance, gender, and sexuality, suggesting that all three cannot be separated from their collective identity as the

²³² UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog, “ India’s Relationship with the Third Gender, ” <https://sites.uab.edu/humanrights/2018/10/29/indias-relationship-with-the-third-gender/#:~:text=In%20April%20of%202014%2C%20the,to%20as%20Hijra%20or%20transgender.>

British previously attempted to do so. With the rise of social media activism, awareness of the Hijra community and other ancient gender-diverse collectives have been brought to the forefront on a global scale. Western society praises itself for its innovative and progressive ways of thinking, yet when I first personally learned about this community, I was shocked to see how gender and spirituality uniquely existed alongside their dance practice. This was unlike any community I had grown up learning about, where the discussions regarding the relationship between gender, sexuality, spirituality, and dance did not begin until I enrolled in post-secondary studies. While the West continues to praise themselves for improved progression towards a more inclusive comprehension of gender and sexuality, other cultures have historically demonstrated a deeply rooted relationship with those elements. I believe that as we shift towards a more progressive and understanding society, learning about the complex history of the Hijra community will allow scholars, dancers, and individuals in Western society to increase their awareness of the complexities surrounding gender and sexual identities, both in a dance context and the broader global collective.

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Most Similar Cases: Socialism of the Twenty-First Century in Venezuela and Ecuador
Ana Valdospinos
POLI 473

Socialism of the 21st century is a revisionist view of socialism, the term was first coined by German sociologist Heinz Dieterich advocating that both free-market capitalism and Marxist socialism have failed societies to solve problems like poverty, hunger, and equality (Wenting & Yunyi, 2019). This ideology was included in governing models in Ecuador and Venezuela, under a mix of democratic and socialist elements producing populist regimes, which allowed both governments to stay in power for extended presidential terms. According to Juan Linz, an *authoritarian regime* is a political system with limited pluralism, which favors a leader or elite group which governs to exercise political power under undefined limits (2010). The Venezuelan new authoritarian regime led to a traditional authoritarian state commanded by Chavez's successor: Nicolas Maduro. While in Ecuador, Correa's socialist state advanced authoritarian tendencies without seizing complete control of the powers of the state, allowing its successor, Lenin Moreno, to reverse policies that threatened democratic practices. This research paper will study the Socialism of the Twenty-First Century in Venezuela and Ecuador, under the presidency of Hugo Chavez and Rafael Correa. There are several similitudes among the theoretical approaches in both political campaigns, like social reforms and increased political participation targeting all sectors in society (de la Torre, 2013). However, the capacities of both democratic states resulted differently. Even though both governments subscribed to the same doctrine, why did Venezuela generate an authoritarian regime while Ecuador did not? This paper would argue that this phenomenon was caused by a mix of complex preconditions, including constitutional reform, the influence of opposition, and the creation of alternative elites, in addition to the political stands taken by each country's successor.

The pink tide in Latin-American, the turn towards left-wing governments, came back to the region after three decades of dictatorships and neoliberal structuring. (Beasley-Murray, Cameron & Hersehberg, 2009, p.319). This comeback is a consequence of social disillusionment on past governments due to poverty and social disparity (p.320). Leftist Latin-American governments have proposed innovative policies in poverty alleviation, redistribution of wealth, social welfare, and citizen participation (p.321). This initiated debates about the implications of *asistencialismo* (band-aid solutions to welfare problems), the persistence of populism, and the reappearance of socialism in the region (p.322). Two prominent examples of left turns are the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian cases, where leftist governments surged after decades of neoliberalism—next, a summary of the political situation of both countries.

After decades of rampant corruption and neoliberal structuralist policies, Venezuela elected Hugo Chavez as their president in 1998 through fair and free elections. Chavez governed the country for 14 years, winning four consecutive elections between 1998 and 2013. During his presidency, he improved citizen participation by implementing local community councils that permitted direct involvement of the people with the government. This policy became part of his populist appeal to the citizenry. Chavez also reformed the constitution. He proposed anti-neoliberalist legislation, centralized state power through reengineering the electoral system, silencing the opposition, and expropriated primary industry companies, all under the new constitution in a discriminatory legalism (Weyland, 2013, p.21). After Chavez died in 2013, his mentee, Nicolas Maduro, assumed power through a national election with only a 1,3% margin of difference. Nevertheless, during his term, Maduro enhanced Chavez's policies and tightened the state's central control, creating a fully authoritarian regime. Abusing his power and military support, Maduro dismissed the 2018 elections results alleging electoral fraud, elections in which,

opposition's leader, Juan Guaidó, won the presidency. Consequently, transforming Maduro's government into an authoritarian regime (Roberts, 2020, p.2).

The Ecuadorian case started in a similar situation to that one of Venezuela. Ecuador had the same experience of corruption and neoliberalism that most of the region. Correa entered the political scene in 2007, during a time of public political disengagement and lack of trust in the government, caused by years of past corrupted governments. Correa won six elections, from 2007 to 2017, in which his approval rate never got lower than 56%. His populist appeal, equally as Chavez, was the appeal to the lower classes of society, which he called "the citizen's revolution." During his government, Correa reformed the constitution, augmenting executive powers, allowing presidential reelection, regulating the communication code, and intimidating the opposition. However, Correa did not wholly eliminate neoliberal policies, even when he advocated for the ideology of *the Socialism of the Twenty-first Century* (Becker, 2014). In 2017, Correa decided to cede the presidential campaign to his former vice-president, Lenin Moreno, who won free and fair elections. To everyone's surprise, Moreno reversed most of the autocratic policies that Correa implemented and delinked him and his party from the socialist ideology (Weyland, 2013, p.19). Moreno also assumed an open to dialogue approach to national politics, in which he included neoliberal policies, advocated for democracy and anti-corruption mechanisms.

Ecuador and Venezuela went through similar political periods of democracy destabilization without being completely authoritarian. However, the governments which succeeded Correa's and Chavez's presidencies took different paths. Maduro, assuming an authoritarian state and Moreno restituting democratic institutions. We will start analyzing these

different results by identifying their similarities first and then explaining the variables that created the different outcomes.

The most similar features between these countries are a shared ideology called Socialism of the Twenty-First Century and the populism that took both leaders to power.

The Socialism of the Twenty-first Century is an ideology that emerged as an alternative to capitalism, communism, and even classical socialism, focusing on the needs of the Global South, particularly in Latin America. This economic model proposes a strengthening of the state as a regulatory institution in the economic and political life of the country, as well as policies of redistribution of wealth, greater inclusion of marginalized and vulnerable groups, and extended citizen participation through elections and referendums (Lalender, 2011, p.62). A fundamental feature of the theory is its radical democracy approach. Democratic radicalism focuses on the principle of communal will, collectivism, cooperativism, and augmented participation that includes segregated sectors of the population. Radical democrats seek to extend political participation and create a deliberative democracy, in which citizens address public matters through collective debates and implement that solution in forms of public policy (p.68). A fundamental aspect of radical democracy is, therefore, the implementation of participative democracy. The sociologist Heinz Dieterich highlights participative democracy as a fundamental feature of this ideological model. He states that the term refers to the actual capacity of the citizenry to decide over a fundamental aspect of the public sphere, which means an extensive and more inclusive form of participation beyond voting. Dieterich proposes extended participation in every aspect of public life, including the private sector, communities, universities, and the media (p.63). Following this theory, both the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments instituted an extended form of political participation in their reformed constitutions. However, the

applications of the concept were institutionalized at different levels. While Chavez local Communal Councils, Correa restrained participation levels to an increased amount of referendums. Chavez's Communal Councils were places of dialogue among community members that were later taken to higher authorities and were considered during the formation of public policy (Ellner, 2014). Chavez's extended institutionalization of participation gave a voice to the marginalized groups in the country and created a sense of direct political involvement, which helped increase his approval rates among the population. On the other hand, Correa decided not to implement increased participation due to his conflict with social movements, like indigenous communities, which accused him of falsely advocating for indigenous rights and taking advantage of the *Sumak Kawsay* (Buen Vivir) ideology as a tokenistic strategy (de la Torre, 2014, p.475). The lack of an extended and more direct form of participation ripped the population out of a sense of direct involvement, meaning this was not a complete implementation of the socialism of the Twenty-first-century theory, besides its other social policies towards poverty alleviation and redistribution of wealth.

Another similarity between Chavez's and Correa's regimes is the populist appeal they presented to the electorate. *Populism* is a political process based on a charismatic leader who represents the people and advocates for their rights. It seeks to bypass bureaucratic mechanisms to directly express people's will (Beasley-Murray, et al., 2009, p.324). In his article, Juan Andres Diaz explains that populism is a recurrent phenomenon in Latin-American because the presidential systems of the region place great expectations on the head of state, caused by the symbolic, legal, and political power it represents (2019). Thus, charismatic leaders with populist social inclusion and poverty alleviation discourses seem increasingly appealing for these populations. However, there are some significant differences in the type of populism that

Correa and Chávez used. While Chavez stuck to traditional populism based on a charismatic figure, Correa relies on a techno-populism, defined by Carlos de la Torre as a combination of charismatic leadership with a technic approach to public policy, based on a cabinet of experts in each government area (2014). This type of populism is legitimized by the technical knowledge of government affairs it offers to the citizenry. In contrast, Chávez's state management was characterized by its improvised feature, to which he referred as building the *revolución Bolivariana* on the run according to the needs of the people. Consequently, Chavez depended heavily on its populist capacity of mass mobilization to support political action in his government, placing his cabinet in a peripheral position in front of the population (Diaz, 2019).

An assumption about populism is that it threatens democracy because the concentration of power in a single figure eliminates aspects of representation of different social groups, which is a hazard for the freedoms of the public sphere. However, Diaz explains that populism can group democratically and authoritarian elements like extended participation or multi-party system politics and vertical control of social organizations and reduction of the public space for the opposition (2019, p.468). Nevertheless, how do we determine when a government has gone one way or the other? According to Robert Dahl, a nation must meet three requirements to be considered a democracy:

Citizens must be able to: formulate their preferences, signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action, and have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighed with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference. (1971, p.8)

For instance, towards the end of Chávez's presidency, Venezuela was not entirely a democracy but a regime in between a polyarchy and an inclusive hegemony, a deteriorating democracy. It

was categorized like that due to its low rates of public contestation caused by censoring the opposition and the media. In contrast, during Correa's presidency, Ecuador was always categorized as a weak democracy due to median rates of public contestation and political participation. Because, although Correa antagonized the opposition, he did not entirely censor it. After Chávez's death, Maduro took power and converted the country into a textbook definition of an authoritarian regime. At the same time, under Moreno's leadership, Ecuador got rid of some democratic threats and strengthened the national polyarchy.

Scholar Juan Linz states that an authoritarian regime is characterized by limited political pluralism, restricted social mobilization, illegitimacy, and executive power, usually a person or an elite group (2010). Besides, the elite group or individual in power attempts to strengthen the state's power by using the military, the police, or other armed forces to maintain the hegemony. Other types of regimes can exist, but the dominant political party controls the state apparatus, leading to opposition groups having little or no effect on the regime (Svensson, 2019, p.6). This description perfectly fits the Maduro presidency because of the abuse of his military support to restrict protests, his fixed personalist leadership style, and the incarceration on various occasions of opposition leaders. However, none of the actions that triggered the authoritarian regime would have occurred without the precedents that the Chavez presidential term left. I propose that the Chavez administration was not a partially democratic regime in deterioration but a new type of authoritarianism of the Twenty-first Century. This type of regime adapted its survival strategies by adopting democratic tendencies so they can last longer. Some characteristics of hybrid regimes like this are "the use of law in the executive branch, the opposition portrayed as the enemy, the civil society's loyalty to the government and, the use of the military and armed forces" (p.10). For instance, Venezuela, during the Chavez administration, held free and fair

elections. However, the use of constitutional law allowed him to censor the media and centralize power. The loyalty of the military forces to his regime help him intimidate the opposition, and his portrayal of the opposition as the enemy helped strengthen his popularity rates. Thus, Chavez's presidency can be categorized as a hybrid model of New authoritarianism.

In contrast, the Ecuadorian case differs from this definition. It did not use the military and armed forces for the interests of the regime, or to a different extent, censored the media; Correa did regulate the communication law but, in principle, never censored it. For these reasons, Ecuador under the presidency of Rafael Correa can still be categorized as a weak democracy.

Now that we have conceptualized both regimes, I will analyze both cases. How did these countries that appeared similar in ideology and governance form ended with different outcomes?

I will argue it is due to three preconditions present in the Chávez administration and not in Correa's. These are Constitutional reform of the national representative assembly, support of alternative elites, and confrontation with the opposition. I will conclude with the final condition that transformed Venezuela into a fully authoritarian regime, not present in the Ecuadorian case: power succession.

In 1999, after Chavez won his first elections, he decided to implement a new constitution aimed to validate his *Revolucion Bolivariana*. This new constitution allowed him to increase the presidential term to six years and abolished term limits for reelection, meaning he allowed indefinite reelection (Roberts, 2020, p.9-10). Thus, Chavez runs for the presidency on four terms, from 1998 to 2013. The constitutions also allowed him to pass referendums at will and consolidate his power by eliminating the bicameral National Assembly and turning it into a unicameral one based on lack of political representation from the Senate. Making the National Assembly, an elected unicameral body, allowed Chavez to get party loyalists into those

positions, centralizing the power of the state in his persona with the majority of votes from the assembly. The majority of party loyalists in the assembly helped pass a bill on military promotions, which gave Chavez complete control over the military. (p.8-9). The three constitutional changes mentioned granted Chavez control over the executive, legislative and military powers, threatening the levels of public contestation in the state.

Similar to Chavez, Correa also reformed the constitution of Ecuador in 2008. The new constitution seeks to implement the institutionalization of the *Revolucion Ciudadana* through promoting inclusivity for indigenous peoples, women, and minority groups. However, Correa's new constitution also approved a bill on immediate reelection, allowing presidents to run for two consecutive terms. In addition, the new Carta Magna restructured the Congress, eroded by corruption, and changed it for a National Assembly, meant to represent better each province, district, and municipality in the country (Treminio, 2014, p.66-67). The New Assembly was composed in a multi-party system, in which Correa's party occupied the majority of seats, yet this did not threaten the participation of other parties. As a head of state, Correa had control over the executive power and a strong influence on the legislative branch, but that cannot be called authoritarian. Thus, his reforms to the constitution only changed the citizenry's levels of representation and participative democracy.

Another precondition present in Venezuela but not in Ecuador is the formation of an alternative elite. Chavez, who based his political appeal on a charismatic type of populism, understood early the need to form a solid political party to support his decisions in government. In 2006, he formed the *Partido Socialist Unido de Venezuela* (PSUV) to reduce the internal conflicts in his governance team. The party rapidly ascended in the Constituent Assembly until it became the hegemonic party, with broad electoral support. However, an economic elite formed

within the party, as the group became highly influential in public policy, the benefits obtained from high positions also increased. Eventually, the economic elite agreed unconditionally with the executive branch for personal interest, like keeping the regime alive and thus their status quo. In addition, the bill he passed on military promotions and allowed him to control the military transformed the military itself is a secondary alternative elite, where he placed party loyalists to give him better control of the institution. Because of these two alternative elites, the new authoritarian regime survived Chávez's death because the ideology remained embedded in the political party he created and the military elite within the branch of the armed forces (Bull & Sánchez, 2020). The case in Ecuador differs in that Correa did not successfully build an alternative elite. The party he created, *Alianza País* (AP), became secondary support for his presidency. Correa's techno-populism was excessively personalist, and that limited the strengthening of alternative elites. The political party served as an electoral instrument conformed by clientelist networks fed by state institutions primarily regulated by Correa.

Thus, the party depended highly on Correa's political figure, and once he left power, the party continued as one more in the multi-party system, but not as an elite. His group of technocrats also failed to become an alternative elite due to the economic crisis that hit the country in 2009 caused by low petroleum prices. This crisis forced the state to reduce funds in public institutions, including wages and contracts of public employees, which rested visibility from the technocratic group. Consequently, Correa's technocratic group also depended highly on Correa as the head of the techno-populist movement that placed them in higher ranks. (Bull, 2020). For these reasons, both attempts of alternative elite formation failed. Based on both cases, we can assume that a populist regime needs a leader as much as an elite group to prolong the life of the said regime.

The third precondition for Venezuelan transition into a traditional authoritarian regime is the lack of strong opposition. Correa and Chavez entered the political sphere in a time of public discontent and political party fragmentation. The weakening of the opposition parties affected the high support rates that the political parties PSUV and AP had due to their direct connection to the populist head of state in each country. This made both opposition parties in each country too weak to have a direct influence on the assembly or confront the party in power (2020). However, a different type of opposition surged in Ecuador, led by economic elites. Within the new constitutional framework, Correa implemented taxation and wealth redistribution laws that prioritized the public sector.

Consequently, the private sector felt excluded from the political sphere. Nonetheless, the regional business organizations are influential in the country. For instance, in 2011, The Chamber of Commerce of Quito summoned protests claiming more freedom and democracy for business groups in the country (2020). Correa initially used populist strategies of confrontation, like labeling the private sector as *pelucones*. Nevertheless, the business organizations of the country opted for promoting the defense of its member through analysis of empiric data in favor of free commerce instead of boycotting the country's economy. The contrary happened in Venezuela in 2001 when *Fedecamaras*, a vital business organization, called for a country-wide strike that, according to Chavez, "boycotted the country's economy" (2020).

In contrast, economic elites in Ecuador created a technical forcefulness through their nonconnotative approach, which cornered Correa's government to open a dialogue with the leaders of business organizations like the Chamber of industry of Pichincha and The Ecuadorian Corporate Committee. These dialogues changed Correa's stand on free trade, allowing more international agreements (2020). Therefore, Correa's government allowed a place on contestation

for the country's oppositions that Chavez did not. On the contrary, Chavez insisted on constant confrontation with the economic elites, weakening their social influence gradually through discriminatory legalisms granted by the new constitution (Weyland, 2013, p.26). By this process of opposition weakening, Chavez significantly decreased the levels of public contestation in the country, which added up to the centralizing powers granted by the constitution, created a new authoritarian regime.

The three preconditions mentioned before, constitutional reform, creation of an alternative elite, and lack of a viable opposition, made possible the transition of the Venezuelan new authoritarian regime into a traditional authoritarian. Nevertheless, I would like to highlight that the most crucial factor in this regime transition is the political stand taken by each country's successor. In the case of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro was personally chosen by Chavez as his successor. He assumed power through free and fair elections in 2013. Maduro faced a significant increase in opposition from the economic and civil society and the general population. To maintain social order, Maduro opted for stricter measures of social control, exercising his control over the military. He repressed protests and completely censored anyone who disagrees with the government. Nevertheless, his most radical stand was to refuse the results of the elected representative of the National Assembly in 2015 (Roberts, 2020, p.32-34), which was a complete anti-democratic act that turned his regime into a traditional autocracy.

This differs significantly from the stand taken by Lenin Moreno in Ecuador. Correa also chose Moreno as his successor to run under the same party, AP. Moreno won the presidency in 2017 by a small percentage of the vote against right-wing candidate Guillermo Lasso. However, early in his presidential period, Moreno broke with his mentor Rafael Correa (de la Torre, 2018, p.83). In a recent interview for the digital newspaper *La Posta*, he stated that once he assumed

the presidency and realized the economic disaster and the level of institutionalized corruption that the former president left, he felt discouraged and decided to make a change (La Posta, 2021). As a result, Moreno reworked Correa's most autocratic-like measures, the communication law, and the presidential reelection decree. In addition, Moreno instituted open dialogue between opposition parties and the government in power, in what he called "the government of everyone" (de la Torre, 2018, p.84). The actions taken by Moreno in his presidential term raised the past low public contestation levels, allowing Ecuador to keep being a democracy with free and fair elections.

In conclusion, the pink tide that resurged in Latin-American in the past two decades has several similarities like leftists ideology, populist strategies of appeal to the population, and discourse of poverty alleviation and redistribution of wealth. However, not every model can be applied in the same way to different countries. Ecuador and Venezuela looked initially like a replica of a case study, similar ideologies, presidential system, legislative branch. However, the preconditions of each political sphere and the internal decisions of later government officials marked a significant difference between them. The reform to the constitution in Venezuela centralized power and granted Chávez control over the executive, legislative and military branches. The rise of the *Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela* formed an alternative elite and military loyalists, and in consequence, prolonging the life of the authoritarian regime in the absence of the head of the party. Furthermore, the weakened opposition, conformed by political parties and the private sector, was constantly under attack from the governed, villainized, and limited through discriminatory legalism, based on the powers granted by the new constitution. Consequently, those three preconditions allowed Maduro to continue the regime. The alternative

elite allowed the power to keep its approval rate and handed Maduro its victory in his first elections. The extended control over the executive, legislative, and military allowed him to pass bills without opposition and maintain social unrest. Moreover, finally, the lack of a viable opposition silenced the voices of the people who did not approve of the government anymore, leaving them with no options. The set of preconditions mentioned before was not present during the Correa administration and therefore did not allow for the regime's continuation. However, the actions taken by Moreno were a fundamental part of the set of variables that did not allow for democratic rupture. By breaking up with the past decade of corruption and autocratic tendencies, Moreno brought back public contestation and increased levels of trust in democracy.

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Photography as Medium of Propaganda: An Analysis of Meaning Making Behind Heinrich Hoffman's Photographs of Adolf Hitler

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COMS 381

The concept of seeing something often lends to the creation of meaning as purported by the producer of any image. In seeing, we are able to deduct the exigence of a visual artifact through clues found within an image and in considering its details in great depth. Visual rhetoric from 1933-1945 within Nazi Germany provided a sense of authority and connection between the regime and the people it sought to govern. As the Nazi Regime, recognized as the Third Reich, expanded their political reach, they made use of rhetorical strategies in order to persuade the masses and inject their belief within German society. Heinrich Hoffman, born in 1885 in Fürth, Germany, was Adolf Hitler's personal photographer since joining the Nazi Party in the 1920's, prior to Hitler's appointment as chancellor by Paul von Hindenburg.²³³ The power of visual appeal was demonstrated within Hitler's leadership and was beneficial in their rise to power over Germany and most of Europe. "Spectacle was like oxygen for the Nazis, and Heinrich Hoffmann was instrumental in staging Hitler's growing pageant of power".²³⁴ To present the value of visual appeal as means of propaganda, TIME comments on how images impose a narrative onto the viewer, and in this case, ostentatious presentations of the world of Adolf Hitler. In this study, symbolism does not only consider the obvious material symbols such as the swastika, the banners, and the uniform, among others, but also Hitler as the prime symbol used within the regime. As the poster child of the Nazis, the chancellor of Germany became the embodiment of the party's philosophies. This growing influence was strongly assisted by the visual splendour as evidenced by the photographs produced in his time. This paper analyzes clues in Heinrich

²³³ C. Peter Chen, "Heinrich Hoffman", People, World War II Database, last modified August (n.d.) 2011, https://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=649.

²³⁴ "Heinrich Hoffman: Hitler at a Nazi Party Rally", TIME 100 Photos, TIME, accessed April 11, 2020, <http://100photos.time.com/photos/heinrich-hoffmann-hitler-nazi-party-rally>.

Hoffman's visual representations of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party through photography. A critical perspective is taken to understand how poses, lighting, background, interaction with characters, and overall composition contributed to the "selling" of the Nazi brand through the use of visual culture.

Photography in Communications History

To look at the work of Hoffman within a communication studies standpoint is to look at how it explicitly and implicitly creates meaning. As historical photographs serve as the main artifacts of this paper, to look at their role in interpreting the past connects us to the narratives intended with the creation of an image. "Photographs furnish evidence. Something we hear about, but doubt, seems proven when we're shown a photograph of it".²³⁵ The past tells us the story of what was important within a group or culture. It is possible that through photographs, we are able to identify the values salient within a group, and in this study's case, the Nazi Party's ideals. To note, however, photographs could also be biased depending on how a subject is framed and presented. "While a painting or a prose description can never be other than a narrowly selective interpretation, a photograph can be treated as a narrowly selective transparency".²³⁶ The manner in which we tell a story matters in referencing reality. As in photography, the way in which a subject is depicted, particularly in relation to other characters or symbols, matters in the shaping of a narrative or an intended message. This means that the realities we experience can be preserved in a fashion we wish it to be. "If one tries to examine society as a form of communication, one sees it as a process whereby reality is created, shared,

²³⁵ Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (New York: Rosetta Books LLC, 1973), 3.

²³⁶ Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (New York: Rosetta Books LLC, 1973), 3-4.

modified, and preserved”.²³⁷ As the images in this study were sourced from Hitler’s personal photographer, it is to be understood that the images were in lieu with the desires of the *Führer* and the artistic influence of Hoffman as a photographer. Visual culture within communication studies can also be viewed from a consumerist standpoint. In this study, let us consider Hitler as the product of Nazi Germany; this reference is made to create the connection between a brand and the notion of selling. The analogy of the Nazi Party as the brand and Hitler as the product proves even more that visual appeal works in spreading ideology, the same way that visual appeal works in selling an object. “As Hoffmann explained to a reporter from the *New Yorker* in 1950, “By the time Hitler came to power, he had become the best-advertised product in the world [...]”.²³⁸ The propagandistic nature of photography, much like the selling of an object, relies on what the masses see within that object. In an image, what an audience sees is strongly reliant on how the subject of any image is framed within its environment. When we look at an image, it is important to see it from a multi-faceted perspective, including the agency that an image gives or takes away from an audience, as well as the social effects that an image might enforce.²³⁹

Hitler as symbol of the Nazi Regime

“A key aim of Nazi propaganda was, of course, the projection of Hitler’s carefully crafted image; the projection of Hitler himself as the central integument of Nazi propaganda”.²⁴⁰

Symbolism was highly utilized within the Third Reich, especially with Hitler as prime symbol,


²³⁷ James W. Carey, *Communication as Culture: Essays on New Media and Society* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 33.

²³⁸ John Fraser, “Hitler’s Cameraman: Part 1.” *British Journal of Photography* 132, no.39 (Fall 1985): 1085, quoted in Donna West Brett, ““Banality, Memory, and the Index: Thomas Demand and Hitler’s Photographer”, *Photographies* 5, no.3 (Fall 2016): 245, <https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1080/17540763.2016.1202132>.

²³⁹ Gillian Rose, *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials* (London: Sage, 2007), 26.

²⁴⁰ Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, “Selling Hitler: Propaganda and the Nazi Brand”, *Journal of Public Affairs* 9, no.1 (Winter 2009): 57, <https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1002/pa.312>.

the man was the living embodiment of the Nazi Party's belief system. As propaganda sought to coerce, so did the representations of Hitler as prime symbol become intrinsic to the spread of Nazism. Often pictured within dramatic settings, Hitler commanded his audiences through postures of authority. The first image in this study presents Hitler walking up the steps of the



Bückeberg Harvest Festival on September 30, 1934, a year after his appointment as chancellor of Germany.

Figure 1: Photograph by Heinrich Hoffman, Bückeberg Harvest Festival, 1934, *TIME100 Photos*

“By capturing this and so many other extravaganzas, Hoffman [...] fed the regime's vast propaganda machine and spread its demonic dream”.²⁴¹ In this image (Figure 1), we see an unsurprising manner of framing. As the subject, Hitler is symmetrically positioned for the

²⁴¹ “Heinrich Hoffman: Hitler at a Nazi Party Rally”, *TIME 100 Photos*, TIME, accessed April 11, 2020, <http://100photos.time.com/photos/heinrich-hoffmann-hitler-nazi-party-rally>.

camera. Between the ranks of what seems to be the predecessors of the Wehrmacht (the combined German defence force consisting the Army, Navy, and Air Force). Considering that this image was used for the purposes of propaganda, it is to understand that the intended audience of this photograph was the general public, particularly Nazi Germany. Flanked by his officers left and right, the *Führer* walks up the steps, and behind him are hoards of people parted to the sides of what seems to be a pathway reserved for Hitler and his entourage. With the soldiers carrying the Nazi standards bearing the swastika, we are reminded of how Roman armies of the past would carry the same as signifiers of their battalions. This representation within Nazi rhetoric invokes their might as a militaristic force prepared to serve according to the will of their *Führer*. How does this representation of Hitler in the company of his comrades portray the position he held as topmost figure of the Nazi regime? And how does this image serve a propagandistic purpose? As a figure of power and having absolute control over the Nazi Party, Hitler was framed as the centre of attention, something we shall see in many of Hoffman's works. This gives us an idea that Hitler was not only of symbolic prominence, but a very real portrait of Hitler as "in control" of the totalitarian German nation. In constructing the reality of absolute power over Germany, the representation of other characters within the image in relation to the subject should be made note of. As Nazi Germany was a highly militarized nation, having rearmed its forces more than what the Treaty of Versailles of 1920 permitted, the armed forces in this narrative served as the representation of the country's might.²⁴² With Hitler as supreme commander of these forces, this image painted an ideal reference to the power that the man held. In the context of photography as means of propaganda, the selling of Hitler's brand can be seen in displays of what seemed to be narratives of unquestioned authority. "Such images were all-

²⁴² C. Peter Chen, "Adolf Hitler", People, World War II Database, last modified May (n.d.) 2019, https://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=95.

pervasive in Hitler's Reich [...], the stark graphics on Nazi banners [...] make Aryanism seem worthy of godlike worship".²⁴³ Aryanism is defined as "the doctrine popularized by Nazism that the so-called Aryan peoples possess superior capacities for government, social organization, and civilization".²⁴⁴ As argued in this study that Hitler served as a prime symbol for the Nazi regime, he, in turn, embodied the Aryan philosophy, making him a pivotal tool within the party's propagandistic strategy. Centring Hitler as the primary subject of many photographs served the purpose of promulgating the Nazi philosophy. The second image in this study presents Hitler



amongst the company of young uniformed members of the Nazi Party in 1935.

Figure 2: Photograph by Heinrich Hoffman, Braune Haus, Munich, 1935, *The Life Picture Collection/Getty Images*

²⁴³ "Heinrich Hoffman: Hitler at a Nazi Party Rally", TIME 100 Photos, TIME, accessed April 11, 2020, <http://100photos.time.com/photos/heinrich-hoffmann-hitler-nazi-party-rally>.

²⁴⁴ "Aryanism", Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, accessed April 11, 2020, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Aryanism>.

“[...]Photographic images retain some knowledge, meaning or memory that attests to their veracity—as if an image contains this quality within itself—all of which is contingent on the context of the photographic event and its reception.”²⁴⁵ As Hoffman produced images for propaganda’s purposes, his responsibility was to capture Hitler in lights where he can be seen as a source of knowledge, and even wisdom, within the Nazi regime. Because of Hitler’s position as leader of the party, it would be appropriate to consider his ability as more than knowledgeable with what his party members needed. In this image (Figure 2), we see Hitler as a source of inspiration for members of the party and witness him surrounded by uniformed proponents of the Third Reich. Considering that this image was used for the purposes of propaganda, it is to understand that the intended audience of this photograph was the general public. It is to note as well that this image contains one identifiable character as a woman (third character from Hitler’s right). It is interesting to see how much of his party was made up of men, though not surprising considering the gender dynamics within Germany at the time. Reading the image closely, we see Hitler staring intently towards the group that returns the same gesture. From Hitler’s stern look to the eager grins of other characters present, there is a strong emotional appeal taking up the language of this image. From the young boy wearing a white shirt close to Hitler to the young men in the background occupying the top portion of the image, excitement seems to loom within a narrative where their *Führer* is about to speak. Much like how Christ was seen preaching to his disciples and surrounded by flocks of people, we see a value referenced in this work of Hoffman’s: wisdom. When a wise man preaches, many surround him. Intently, people await what comes out of his mouth. What he says matters, and what matters all rely on his words. This description is very apt in considering the framing of Hitler within this work. Hoffman created a

²⁴⁵ Donna West Brett, ““Banality, Memory, and the Index: Thomas Demand and Hitler’s Photographer”, *Photographies* 5, no.3 (Fall 2016): 233, <https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1080/17540763.2016.1202132>.

masterpiece where the man who murdered many seems in this image worthy of praise and someone to be listened to. This leads us to the third and final photograph, originally desired by Hitler to be destroyed, though kept by Hoffman in his personal collection.²⁴⁶ This last image in the study presents Hitler by himself, posing dramatically, whilst listening to recordings of his own speeches.²⁴⁷



Figure 3: Photograph by Heinrich Hoffman, Hitler whilst listening to recordings of his own speeches, 1925, *The Life Picture Collection/Getty Images*

²⁴⁶ “Heinrich Hoffman: Hitler at a Nazi Party Rally”, TIME 100 Photos, TIME, accessed April 11, 2020, <http://100photos.time.com/photos/heinrich-hoffmann-hitler-nazi-party-rally>.

²⁴⁷ “Heinrich Hoffman: Hitler at a Nazi Party Rally”, TIME 100 Photos, TIME, accessed April 11, 2020, <http://100photos.time.com/photos/heinrich-hoffmann-hitler-nazi-party-rally>.

“Hoffmann also took photographs of Hitler while he practised his speeches, capturing him while he determined his preferred hand movements and stances ahead of their delivery. In effect, Hitler controlled his image and how it would be seen”.²⁴⁸ Whenever the German leader spoke, it was conveyed with grandeur and sophistication. His hand gestures were magnificent, his hand waves and stark stance demanded attention. In this image (Figure 3), Hoffman framed Hitler as an outstanding orator, requiring drama as strategy, just as if someone were to act out in a play. As this image presents Hitler rehearsing and posing for the camera as if it were a candid shot, one could only imagine how he would have spoken in front of thousands. His gestures weren't only dramatic, but they were also practical. The fact that hoards attended Hitler's speaking occasions meant that many would be far from his position. Having gestures such as this made him a magnet for attention even for those viewing from afar. Hoffman deliberately captured in this image the magnificence and visual splendour of Nazi rhetoric. Solitarily positioned in the middle of the frame, with mouth wide open and arm outstretched with the other poised for effect, Hitler demanded authority and conveyed his ability of being a spokesperson for the party. As the prime symbol of the regime, one could guess that this figure must have had all the qualities one could ever aspire to have as a Nazi. Though this abstraction may be but a biased description of Hitler, Hoffman certainly created Hitler's public image a visual masterpiece. Hoffman not only contributed simply through artistic measures as a photographer, but Hoffman himself served as a vehicle of selling the Nazi brand as embodied by Hitler. This photo shows Hitler wearing what seems to be civilian clothing instead of his khaki-coloured uniform. This, however, is not surprising. The image was taken in 1925, prior to Hitler's appointment as chancellor of Germany. This means that the party was not as militarized as it would be later on.

²⁴⁸ Donna West Brett, ““Banality, Memory, and the Index: Thomas Demand and Hitler's Photographer”, *Photographies* 5, no.3 (Fall 2016): 237, <https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/10.1080/17540763.2016.1202132>.

As the Nazi party led up to their rise to power in 1933, Hitler was already considered a great orator and this ability of his contributed to his own rise to power. How could one spread any philosophy without knowing the means of spreading it? Hitler certainly made use of his oratory skills as well as a curated image in expanding his reach from party leader to leader of the German nation.

Limitations of the Study

Overall, we see the relevance of Hitler as a symbol within Nazi Germany and as represented through photography. The study's focus was on how meaning was created from the perspective of the image's producer; however, it is still important to point out that meaning can become fluid when considering the perspective of an intended audience. Meaning may be conveyed subtly through framing, though narratives are often influenced by different factors depending on who is viewing a photograph. It is to note that as this study was conducted with a focus on meaning making in reverence to the producers' intentions, namely Hitler and Hoffman's intentions, it is a limitation that audience interpretation was not a focus, yet only alluded to. Considering the variety of audience interpretations possible, it has been the decision of the researcher to place focus on the production of meaning as intended by Hitler and Hoffman.

Conclusion

In considering images as vehicles of propaganda, particularly within a communication studies lens, we are then made aware of how framing serves as a rhetorical tool in the creation of meaning. As meaning is fluid, one needs to make deliberate any attempt, especially in a photograph, to form meaning through symbols that create a narrative. Hitler, in all three images

presented in the study, served as the prime symbol of Nazi Germany. As the Nazis sought to occupy Europe even further, they needed a man to represent their ideological system. Through Hoffman's intricate framing of the führer, we see this representation summed up by authority and ability. Hitler, according to Hoffman's photographs, was not simply the leader of a nation, but was ideally represented as having unquestioned authority, power over militaristic Germany, and carrying the qualities of an outstanding orator. In reality, one can speculate that Hitler may have just been a man of more than modest ability, yet the power of framing within visual culture demanded us to see Hitler as godlike, someone wise, and someone who was an embodiment of absolute power.

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Hindsight in 2020: A Review of Osler's Principles
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ASHA 501

Introduction

Sir William Osler (1849-1919) has been repeatedly referred to as a revered teacher, and one of the most esteemed and admired physicians in medical history^{i,ii}. His most famous text, *The Principles and Practice of Medicine*, was originally published in New York in 1892, and has been called a medical masterpiece and a Bible for medical students and practitioners^{iii,iv}. As a Canadian student, highly fascinated with the study of medicine, the McGill graduate's innovative practice and revision of the North American medical curriculum quickly found me enthralled with his *Principles*, as they are often called^v. I came across a digitized version of Osler's second edition text, originally published in 1897 in Edinburgh and London, in the Alberta Online Medical History Collection of the University of Calgary, where many of his other works can also be found^{vi}. I was also able to locate and assess digital versions of the first and third editions of the text, published in New York in 1892 and 1898, respectively^{iii,vii}. Following the turn of the century, Osler continued to revise his *Principles* 13 more times, for a total of 16 editions^{viii}. This was an extremely valuable medical textbook for the time, as it encompassed the past 50 years of advancements in medicine. The book's immediate success in the medical community, with both students and physicians, gave Osler (and his co-authors following his death) grounds to republish many times over the next 55 years, and Osler's *Principles* remained the gold-standard of medical texts until the mid-20th century, replacing outdated texts and despite the emergence of other medical books around the same time^{v,viii,ix,x}. Not only did the book contain a wealth of invaluable information, but it also embodied the innovative curriculum he sought to promote, making it revolutionary in the eyes of historical and contemporary physicians and medical historians^x.

Throughout the following discourse, I will outline my research into Osler's *The Principles and Practice of Medicine* and frame it in the context of the end of the 19th century. This paper will describe the text's historical and medical significance, its role in past and present research, as well as its current physical state of preservation. It is important to note that the subsequent discussion of *Osler's Principles* is in reference to hard copies available at the time of publishing, rather than the digitized versions currently available. However, given the restrictions in place due to the current COVID-19 pandemic, I was unable to interact with said physical copies and will

instead be describing the physical properties of the texts as they appear to me in the digitized versions.

Research Methods

This investigation of Osler's *Principles* began with a broad search of the digital collections available on the University of Calgary Library and Cultural Resources website. On the "Research" tab I selected "Databases" followed by "Digital Collections", as the current COVID-19 pandemic restricted my research to digital sources rather than physical collections. With the intention of finding a medicine-related object of interest, I typed "medicine" into the search bar, which yielded two collections. I selected the first collection, termed "Medical History" and proceeded to browse the collection and various objects until I came across Osler's *Principles* second edition. After briefly scanning the title page, preface, and first few diseases listed in the text, I searched "Osler's Principles" both on the University of Calgary Library and Cultural Resources website and Google in search of literature and background regarding the book and Osler himself. In addition, Nadine Hoffman, librarian at the University of Calgary, was helpful in directing me to the first and third editions of the book at the Hathi Trust Digital Library. I chose to direct my focus to Osler's first edition as the focus of this paper, for the sake of clarity and simplicity. More specifically, why was this text so revolutionary and insightful at the time? How was it used in education and research? What is its current role in this Medical History collection? And finally, how has this copy been preserved, and what are its physical qualities as a textbook from the 1890's as compared to more contemporary texts?

Research Narrative

As discussed in the introduction, Osler's *Principles* was an immediate success in the medical community, garnering attention throughout North American and the United Kingdom^{ix}. Richard L. Golden (1929–2016), medical doctor and Osler expert, has written various books and reviews on the Osler texts and has been quoted saying *The Principles and Practice of Medicine* was precise and clear, and contained a wealth of information with a strong foundation in pathology. He has also claimed the text is not only up to date (for the time period) and informative, but also enjoyable to read^{xi}. Furthermore, critics have attributed the Osler text's success in comparison to other commensurate books to his inspired writing style and extensive scientific and clinical background⁹. In fact, among other leading medical texts in 1906-1907, *The Principles and Practice of Medicine* was adopted by 95% of institutions in their medical

curriculums, with the next leading text reaching only 65% of these curriculums^{xii}. The profitability of the book has also been in part attributed to the serendipitous merging of scientific and clinical medicine around the time of publishing, as well as the so-called medical Golden Age of the early 20th century^{ix,xiii}. Thus, various sources have recognized the combination of situational and personal (attributable to Osler himself) reasons for the sovereignty of Osler's *Principle's*, in terms of medical textbooks of the 1890's.

As previously mentioned, Golden stated that the Osler text was solidly established based on Osler's own medical practice and expertise¹³. Aside from its penetration of curriculums in North America and the United Kingdom and profound impact on medical education from 1892 onwards, Osler's *Principles* has played a sizable role in medical research. The most notable impact relates to the founding of the Rockefeller Institute of Medical Research in 1901, supposedly due to the influence of the *Principles* on Frederick Gates (1853-1929)^{xiii}. Gates, working under business-man John D. Rockefeller (1839-1937), encountered Osler's *Principles* in 1897 and was, simply put, inspired. Gates' response to the Osler text supposedly contributed directly to the foundation of the Rockefeller Institute, now known as Rockefeller University^{xiii}. Given that this institution is the oldest biomedical research institute in the United States, which now has approximately 170 biomedical research institutes, the impact of *The Principles and Practice of Medicine* on the world of research, especially in North America, is readily apparent^{xiv,xv}.

Following the pervasive and long-lasting dynasty of the book, Osler's *Principles* has earned itself recognition in 21st century discussion of medicine, as is validated by this paper. As I have discussed its historical relevance, it follows that we should investigate its modern-day relevance and current roles, such as in the Medical History digital collection. There are 1580 objects on record in the University of Calgary Medical History collection, including commemorative plaques and medals, various catalogues and bulletins, and textbooks. Many of Osler's other texts are recognized in this collection, including *Cancer of the Stomach: A Clinical Study* from 1900 and *Lectures on Angina Pectoris and Allied States* from 1901. Furthermore, a search for the term "Osler" returns 73 hits, as William Osler is mentioned or credited in various historical medical records. Despite the volume of Osler-related materials, *The Principles and Practice of Medicine* is notably Osler's most famous work and thus holds high standing in this collection. Finally, the Osler text in modern medicine may no longer be up to date, but is a

symbol for the insightful and valuable reinterpretation of medicine which, with Osler's influence to no small degree, defined medicine for the subsequent century and continues to do so today.

The final research question I sought to resolve was: what is the physical state of Osler's first edition text? I hope to accurately describe its materiality as it appears in digital form on the Hathi Trust Digital Library and compare its form to that of more modern-style textbooks. The first feature of note is that this copy of the first edition *Principles* has a plain dark brown cover, and each page is digitally watermarked with "Digitized by Google" and "Original from University of Michigan". Despite inability to actually interact with physical copies of the text, Osler's third edition's preface notes that the first two editions have a different font type, smaller pages, and lesser quality paper than future editions⁷. The University of Michigan library in which this physical copy is stored has labelled it with "B557,800" and the label is indicative of its age, however the book seems in good condition and aside from stylistic differences, one might not immediately recognize the age of this text. The inside is stamped as property of the University of Michigan Libraries, and the following page is inscribed with "RC 46 .082", likely indicating its previous owner. Following three empty pages, the inside cover is in large, capitalized, and bolded print with the title, author and affiliations, and publisher. This edition, unlike its descendants, has no preface, only a note of appreciation prior to the contents. I will not continue to detail the remainder of the pages, as they are primarily informational and unrelated to the purpose of this paper, but of note is the simple text, absence of images/colour, and density of information. Based on my experience with modern day texts, the difference in style is evident of over a century's time passed. More specifically, current texts make use of colour and imagery on the cover for commercial purposes, to entice consumers. Additionally, printing has evolved and thus pictures are nearly always included in textbooks to supplement and segment written information, which is not observed in Osler's book from 1892. Ultimately, the age of this book is most obvious based on the style rather than wear, however I find it likely that this particular copy endured decades of faithful use.

Discussion

Osler's *Principles* has been called a masterpiece, and merges science as it occurs in lab with science that occurs in clinics. This concept of dissolving "pure" science, such that science can exist in various locations and with diverse goals, was extremely innovative for Osler's time. In terms of John V. Pickstone's (1944-2014) *Ways of Knowing*, biomedicine is exceedingly

interdisciplinary and a prime example of Technoscience^{xvi}. Pickstone's 1993 paper pinpoints the emergence of technoscience to the end of the 19th century, which rightly correlates with Osler's first edition in 1892^{iii,xvi}. Furthermore, Pickstone characterizes technoscience to have been born due to a "... reconstructing [of] the social relations of STM," supporting the assessment that Osler was a revolutionary in his time, as he reimagined the role of biomedical research in society, and paved the way for laboratory medicine to meet clinical medicine^{xvi}. This correlation between Osler's *Principles* and Pickstone's *Ways of Knowing* lends support to Pickstone's historical model of science. Perhaps more importantly however, it indicates that the first edition of *The Principles and Practice of Medicine* truly was a turning point in the history of medicine, and helps to explain why Osler's *Principles* was so profound, and continues to hold meaning to this day.

This paper sought to explore *The Principles and Practice of Medicine* by William Osler based on the first edition text available in the Hathi Trust Digital Library. The second edition of Osler's *Principles* was accessible to me as a student of the University of Calgary, and with the help of librarian Nadine Hoffman with the University of Calgary, I was able to quickly access the first and third editions. I cannot speak to this accessibility for those not affiliated with the University of Calgary, however for students and academics interested in Osler's *Principles*, accessing a digital copy of these texts is rather effortless.

The literature search has revealed that Osler's text had a profound impact on both medical research and education. Most notably, Osler's *Principles* played a direct role in the foundation of the Rockefeller Institute and thus had everlasting effects on the future of biomedical research. Additionally, the late 19th and early 20th centuries saw the text at its peak, when it was incorporated into many universities' curriculums, influencing the way new medical doctors were educated and also how they practiced. Aside from the books most widespread influences, the various authors who have reviewed Osler's text or related works are indicative of the personal influence it has had on individuals to this day. Osler's inspiring reinterpretation of medicine and ground-breaking practice continues to inspire doctors and influence the way we relate research to clinical medicine.

Notes

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- ⁱ Richard L. Golden, "William Osler at 150: An Overview of a Life," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 282, no. 23 (December 1999): 2252, 10.1001/jama.283.20.2658.
- ⁱⁱ Mary V. Seeman and Robert E. Becker, "Osler and the Way We Were Taught," *Medical Science Educator* 27, no. 3 (May 2017): 555, 10.1007/s40670-017-0419-z.
- ⁱⁱⁱ William Osler, *The Principles and Practice of Medicine: Designed for the Use of Practitioners and Students of Medicine* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1892).
- ^{iv} Paul J. Edelson, "Adopting Osler's Principles: Medical Textbooks in American Medical Schools," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 68, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 68.
- ^v "Celebrating the Contributions of William Osler: Biography," The John Hopkins Health System and The John Hopkins University, 1999, <https://medicalarchives.jhmi.edu:8443/osler/biography.htm>.
- ^{vi} William Osler, *The Principles and Practice of Medicine: Designed for the Use of Practitioners and Students of Medicine*, 2nd ed., (Edinburgh; London: Young J. Pentland, 1897).
- ^{vii} William Osler, *The Principles and Practice of Medicine; Designed for the Use of Practitioners and Students of Medicine*, 3rd ed., (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1898).
- ^{viii} Stephen B. Greenberg, "Osler," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 293, no. 15 (April 2005): 1926, 10.1001/jama.293.15.1926-a.
- ^{ix} Jeremiah A. Barondess, "The History of William Osler's *The Principles and Practice of Medicine* Richard L. Golden Osler Library Studies in the History of Medicine, No. 8 Montréal: McGill University and The American Osler Society, 2004, xiii + 221 p., \$25.00," *Canadian Bulletin of Medical History* 24, no. 1 (April 2007): 219, 10.3138/cbmh.24.1.218.
- ^x Paul J. Edelson, "Adopting Osler's Principles: Medical Textbooks in American Medical Schools," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 68, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 75-77.
- ^{xi} Robert Hudson, "Richard L. Golden. A History of William Osler's *The Principles and Practice of Medicine*." Montreal, Canada, Osler Library, 2004. xiii, 265 pp., illus. (No price given). Reviewed by Robert Hudson, M.D., M.A., Department of the History and Philosophy of Medicine, University of Kansas Medical Center, Kansas 66160.," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 60, no. 4 (October 2005): 518-519, 10.1093/jhmas/jri066.
- ^{xii} Paul J. Edelson, "Adopting Osler's Principles: Medical Textbooks in American Medical Schools," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 68, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 81.
- ^{xiii} Robert Hudson, "Richard L. Golden. A History of William Osler's *The Principles and Practice of Medicine*." Montreal, Canada, Osler Library, 2004. xiii, 265 pp., illus. (No price given). Reviewed by Robert Hudson, M.D., M.A., Department of the History and Philosophy of Medicine, University of Kansas Medical Center, Kansas 66160.," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 60, no. 4 (October 2005): 519, 10.1093/jhmas/jri066.
- ^{xiv} "Rockefeller University," Wikipedia, last modified November 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rockefeller_University
- ^{xv} "Category: Medical Research Institutes in the United States," Wikipedia, last modified May 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Medical_research_institutes_in_the_United_States.

^{xvi} John V. Pickstone, "Ways of Knowing: Towards a Historical Sociology of Science, Technology and Medicine," *The British Journal for the History of Science* 26, no. 4 (December 1993): 434. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4027465>.

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